1,722,003 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Larsen, Martin Vinæs and Olsen, Asmus Leth: Reducing Bias in Citizens’ Perception of Crime Rates: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Burglary Prevalence.
No full textThis repository contains data and R script files for the analysis reported in Larsen, Martin Vinæs and Olsen, Asmus Leth: Reducing Bias in Citizens’ Perception of Crime Rates: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Burglary Prevalence. The authors would like to thank TrygFonden for funding with the project "Raising Awareness without Raising Fears'' (ID=119942)
Replication Data for: Larsen, Martin Vinæs and Olsen, Asmus Leth: Reducing Bias in Citizens’ Perception of Crime Rates: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Burglary Prevalence.
No full textThis repository contains data and R script files for the analysis reported in Larsen, Martin Vinæs and Olsen, Asmus Leth: Reducing Bias in Citizens’ Perception of Crime Rates: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Burglary Prevalence. The authors would like to thank TrygFonden for funding with the project "Raising Awareness without Raising Fears'' (ID=119942)
Replication Data for: How Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable for Personal Welfare? Evidence of a Self-Serving Bias
No full textAbstract: "Examining a government’s record is difficult. This is a problem for voters who want to hold governments accountable. One solution is for voters to hold governments accountable for changes in their personal welfare. Yet, it is often unclear whether changes in personal welfare are caused by government policies or voters’ own actions. Since voters have a desire to protect their self-image, this ambiguity might fuel a self-serving bias in attribution. That is, voters might take personal responsibility for positive changes in personal welfare and hold the government responsible for negative changes. Based on data from election surveys and survey experiments, this article shows that voters attribute responsibility for personal welfare in this self-serving way. This hurts democratic accountability because voters do not reward governments (enough) for improving their personal welfare."
Instructions for reproduction of tables and figures:
(1) Download all files to the same folder.
(2) Set directory to this folder in Stata.
(3) Run script study1_replication.do, study2_replication.do and study3_replication.do to reproduce tables and figures related to study 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Notes: This reproduces tables and figures in the article as well as the tables and figures in the online appendices. Stata 15 (IC) was used to produce the figures and tables in the article
Replication Data for: Incumbent Tenure Crowds Out Economic Voting
No full textDoes the importance of the economy change during a government's time in office? Governments arguably become more responsible for current economic conditions during their tenure. This might lead voters to hold experienced governments more accountable for economic conditions. However, voters also accumulate information about governments' competence over time. If voters are Bayesian learners, then this growing stock of information should crowd out the importance of current economic conditions. We explore these divergent predictions about the relationship between tenure and the economic vote using three datasets. First, using country-level data from a diverse set of elections, we find that support for experienced governments is less dependent on economic growth. Second, using individual-level data from 60 election surveys covering 10 countries, we find that voters' perceptions of the economy matters more for government support when the government is inexperienced. Finally, we use a municipal reform in Denmark that assigned some voters to new local incumbents. We find that voters assigned to new incumbents respond more strongly to the local economy. In conclusion, all three studies point in the same direction---economic voting decreases with time in office
Replication Data for: When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets
No full textThe file instructions.txt gives instructions for how to reproduce the results in the article and in the article's Online Appendix
Replication Data for: Incumbent Tenure Crowds Out Economic Voting
No full textDoes the importance of the economy change during a government's time in office? Governments arguably become more responsible for current economic conditions during their tenure. This might lead voters to hold experienced governments more accountable for economic conditions. However, voters also accumulate information about governments' competence over time. If voters are Bayesian learners, then this growing stock of information should crowd out the importance of current economic conditions. We explore these divergent predictions about the relationship between tenure and the economic vote using three datasets. First, using country-level data from a diverse set of elections, we find that support for experienced governments is less dependent on economic growth. Second, using individual-level data from 60 election surveys covering 10 countries, we find that voters' perceptions of the economy matters more for government support when the government is inexperienced. Finally, we use a municipal reform in Denmark that assigned some voters to new local incumbents. We find that voters assigned to new incumbents respond more strongly to the local economy. In conclusion, all three studies point in the same direction---economic voting decreases with time in office
Replication Data for: When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets
No full textThe file instructions.txt gives instructions for how to reproduce the results in the article and in the article's Online Appendix
Replication Data for: Is the Relationship between Political Responsibility and Electoral Accountability Causal, Adaptive and Policy-specific?
No full textAbstract: Will voters hold an incumbent more electorally accountable for the quality of a policy outcome if the incumbent's political responsibility for the underlying policy increases? To answer this question, this study exploits a reform of labor market regulation in Denmark that exogenously assigned more political responsibility for unemployment services to some municipal mayors. The study finds that in subsequent elections these mayors were held more electorally accountable for unemployment services, but not more accountable for other policy outcomes. This suggests that the relationship between political responsibility and electoral accountability is causal, adaptive and tied to specific policies. On balance, the electorate thus seems to be quite judicious when assigning electoral credit or blame, moderating the extent to which incumbents are held accountable for specific outcomes based on the extent to which these incumbents crafted and implemented the policies that shaped these outcomes
Replication Data for: Is the Relationship between Political Responsibility and Electoral Accountability Causal, Adaptive and Policy-specific?
No full textAbstract: Will voters hold an incumbent more electorally accountable for the quality of a policy outcome if the incumbent's political responsibility for the underlying policy increases? To answer this question, this study exploits a reform of labor market regulation in Denmark that exogenously assigned more political responsibility for unemployment services to some municipal mayors. The study finds that in subsequent elections these mayors were held more electorally accountable for unemployment services, but not more accountable for other policy outcomes. This suggests that the relationship between political responsibility and electoral accountability is causal, adaptive and tied to specific policies. On balance, the electorate thus seems to be quite judicious when assigning electoral credit or blame, moderating the extent to which incumbents are held accountable for specific outcomes based on the extent to which these incumbents crafted and implemented the policies that shaped these outcomes
How Campaigns Enhance European Issues Voting during European Parliament Elections
No full textBased on findings from the literature on campaign effects on the one hand, and the literature on European Parliament elections on the other, we propose a model of European Parliamentary elections in which the campaign shift the calculus of electoral support, making differences in national political allegiances less important and attitudes about the European project more important by informing voters of and getting them interested in European politics. In effect, we argue that the political campaign leading up to the election makes European Parliament elections less second-order. While previous studies have demonstrated that EU attitudes can matter for voting behavior in European Parliament elections, existing research has drawn on post-election surveys that do not enable us to capture campaign effects. Our contribution is to assess the impact of a campaign by utilizing a rolling cross sectional survey (RCS) that enables us to track how voters were affected by the campaign. Our findings show that campaigns do have an effect on European Parliament election outcomes, in that they provide information that enables voters to make decisions based on European issues, making voter decision-making more dominated by EU issue voting
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