135 research outputs found
Towards a General Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation for International Courts?
No full textThis contribution presents a summary record of a presentation given in the panel on Parallelism before International Courts and Tribunals convened by the Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals (IGICT). It focuses on issues posed by the possible occurrence of divergent interpretations of the same legal rule or concept in parallel proceedings, and examines whether these may be addressed by formulating a general doctrine of consistent interpretation for international courts. The term employed here does not refer to a binding obligation on international courts to abide by the rulings of their international counterparts or predecessors, but rather to a broader normative claim for consistency and harmony in the interpretation of international legal rules. This claim rest on three interconnected pillars: the interpretative authority of international courts, comity between international courts, and the notion of res interpretata
Towards a General Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation for International Courts?
No full textThis contribution presents a summary record of a presentation given in the panel on Parallelism before International Courts and Tribunals convened by the Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals (IGICT). It focuses on issues posed by the possible occurrence of divergent interpretations of the same legal rule or concept in parallel proceedings, and examines whether these may be addressed by formulating a general doctrine of consistent interpretation for international courts. The term employed here does not refer to a binding obligation on international courts to abide by the rulings of their international counterparts or predecessors, but rather to a broader normative claim for consistency and harmony in the interpretation of international legal rules. This claim rest on three interconnected pillars: the interpretative authority of international courts, comity between international courts, and the notion of res interpretata
Towards a General Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation for International Courts?
No full textThis contribution presents a summary record of a presentation given in the panel on Parallelism before International Courts and Tribunals convened by the Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals (IGICT). It focuses on issues posed by the possible occurrence of divergent interpretations of the same legal rule or concept in parallel proceedings, and examines whether these may be addressed by formulating a general doctrine of consistent interpretation for international courts. The term employed here does not refer to a binding obligation on international courts to abide by the rulings of their international counterparts or predecessors, but rather to a broader normative claim for consistency and harmony in the interpretation of international legal rules. This claim rest on three interconnected pillars: the interpretative authority of international courts, comity between international courts, and the notion of res interpretata
Towards a General Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation for International Courts?
No full textThis contribution presents a summary record of a presentation given in the panel on Parallelism before International Courts and Tribunals convened by the Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals (IGICT). It focuses on issues posed by the possible occurrence of divergent interpretations of the same legal rule or concept in parallel proceedings, and examines whether these may be addressed by formulating a general doctrine of consistent interpretation for international courts. The term employed here does not refer to a binding obligation on international courts to abide by the rulings of their international counterparts or predecessors, but rather to a broader normative claim for consistency and harmony in the interpretation of international legal rules. This claim rest on three interconnected pillars: the interpretative authority of international courts, comity between international courts, and the notion of res interpretata
Towards a General Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation for International Courts?
No full textThis contribution presents a summary record of a presentation given in the panel on Parallelism before International Courts and Tribunals convened by the Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals (IGICT). It focuses on issues posed by the possible occurrence of divergent interpretations of the same legal rule or concept in parallel proceedings, and examines whether these may be addressed by formulating a general doctrine of consistent interpretation for international courts. The term employed here does not refer to a binding obligation on international courts to abide by the rulings of their international counterparts or predecessors, but rather to a broader normative claim for consistency and harmony in the interpretation of international legal rules. This claim rest on three interconnected pillars: the interpretative authority of international courts, comity between international courts, and the notion of res interpretata
Review Essay: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Post- Genocide Justice 25 Years On
No full text
Trying Sitting Heads of State
No full textThe issue of the exercise of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction over sitting heads of state is one of the major bones of contention in the tense relationship between the ICC and Africa. Legally, the disagreement revolves around the interpretation of the two rules of the Rome Statute, that is, article 27(2) and article 98(1), concerning the personal immunities. The Al Bashir and Kenyatta cases constitute the litmus test with which the analysis of these rules of the Rome Statute can be carried out to clarify the scope and purport of these two provisions. The Al Bashir case raises two different issues: (i) whether the same immunities preclude the ICC from exercising its adjudicatory jurisdiction over a sitting head of state of a non-member state; (ii) if this is not the case, whether the ICC member states are obliged under the Rome Statute to execute the request by the ICC to arrest and surrender him.</p
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