1,721,274 research outputs found
The Demand for Money, Financial Innovation, and the Welfare Cost of Inflation: An Analysis with Households' Data
Full text linkHow far can shoe-leather go in explaining the welfare cost of inflation? Using a unique set of microeconomic data on households, we estimate the parameters of the demand for money derived from a generalized Baumol-Tobin model. Our data set contains information on average holdings of cash, on deposits and other interest bearing accounts, on the number of trips to the bank, on the size of withdrawals and on the ownership and use of ATM cards. We model the adoption of new transaction technologies and use these estimates to correct for the selectivity bias induced by some households choosing to hold no interest bearing assets and some to use an ATM card. The interest rate and expenditure flow elasticities of the demand for cash are close to the theoretical values implied by standard inventory models. However, we find significant differences between the individuals with an ATM card and those without. The estimates of the demand for cash allow us to calculate a measure of the welfare cost of inflation analogous to Bailey's triangle, but based on a rigorous microeconometric framework. The welfare cost of inflation varies considerably within the population, but never turns out to be very large (about 0.1 percent of consumption or less). Our results are robust to various changes in the specification. In addition to the main results based on the average stock of cash held, we provide some evidence based on the number of trips to the bank and on the average withdrawals that confirm our basic findings.demand for money, financial innovation, welfare cost of inflation
The role of intuition and reasoning in driving aversion to risk and ambiguity
Full text linkUsing information on a large sample of retail investors and experimental data we find that risk aversion and risk ambiguity are correlated: individuals who dislike risk also dislike ambiguity. We show that what links these traits is the way people handle decisions. Intuitive thinkers are less averse to risk and less averse to ambiguity than individuals who base their decisions on effortful reasoning. We confirm this finding in a series of experiments. One interpretation of our results is that the high-speed of intuitive thinking puts intuitive thinkers at a comparative advantage in situations involving high risk and ambiguity, making them less averse to both. Consistent with this view we show evidence from the field and from the lab that intuitive thinkers perform better than deliberative thinkers when making decisions in highly ambiguous and risky environments. We also find that attitudes toward risk and ambiguity are related to different individual characteristics and wealth. While the wealthy are less averse to risk, they dislike ambiguity more, a finding that has implications for financial puzzles.Risk Aversion, Risk Ambiguity, Decision Theory, Dual Systems, Intuitive Thinking
Household Portfolios in Italy
Full text linkWe provide a detailed account of the portfolio of Italian households and its evolution, using repeated cross-sectional and panel data drawn from the 1989-98 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. We offer an in-depth description of the lifetime pattern of asset holdings and their composition, the degree of asset diversification, and the propensity to invest in risky assets. The data also allow us to address some more fundamental issues on the determinants of household portfolios. We look at portfolio mobility and elaborate on the relevance of entry and exit costs. We also provide new evidence on the effect of income risk and information acquisition on portfolio choice.portfolio choice, diversification, portfolio mobility, information
Stockholding in Italy
Full text linkThe study describes the aggregate trends in Italian households' portfolios in the past decade and documents a massive shift towards riskier portfolios and an increase in stock market and mutual funds participation. The study then uses microeconomic data to analyze the pattern of direct and indirect stockholding and their determinants. It documents how stockholding evolves during the life cycle and the relation between stock market participation and wealth, education, and other demographic characteristics. A major finding is that stockholding - either direct or through mutual funds and other managed investment accounts is present only among investors with above median wealth. Even among the richest segment of the population, non-participation in stocks is quite common.
Private Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and the Timing of Homeownership
Full text linkThe 1991 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth contains detailed information on how respondents acquired their main residence and any other real estate. This information is used to estimate the impact of inter vivos transfers on the saving period required to purchase a house and on the value of the house purchased when households have limited access to mortgage markets. It is found that transfers shorten the saving time by about two years and allow households to purchase considerably larger homes. The results have implications for the debate about the source of the relation between aggregate saving and growth.intergenerational transfers, homeownership, borrowing constraints
Awareness and Stock Market Participation
Full text linkThe extent to which consumers are aware of available financial assets depends on the incentives of asset suppliers to spread information about the instruments they issue. We propose a theoretical framework in which the amount of information disseminated and the probability of individuals becoming aware of financial assets are correlated with the probability that, once informed, they will invest in the asset and negatively affected by the cost of spreading information. Social learning is a further channel through which potential investors may come to be informed about existing assets. While social learning may limit the production of financial information by assets suppliers, it increases the probability that individuals become financially aware. These predictions are supported by data on awareness of financial assets available in the 1995 and 1998 waves of the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Lack of financial awareness has important implications for understanding the stockholding puzzle and for estimating stock market participation costs.financial information, portfolio choice
The Age-Saving Profile and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis
Full text linkThe life-cycle hypothesis posits that saving is positive for young households and negative for the retired, so that wealth should be hump-shaped. Yet, if one looks at the microeconomic evidence on saving by age, dissaving by the elderly is limited or absent. But the saving measures usually computed on cross-sections or panel data are based on a concept of income that does not take into account the presence of pension arrangements. In fact, disposable income treats pension contributions as taxes, and pension benefits as transfers. But since contributions entitle the payer to receive a pension after retirement, contributions should be regarded as life-cycle saving and hence included back to income. Similarly, pension benefits accruing to the retired do not represent income produced, but a drawing from the pension wealth accumulated up to retirement. We use Italian repeated cross-sectional data from 1984 to 1995 to show the importance of this adjustment for the evaluation of the saving behavior of the elderly.Saving, Wealth accumulation, Life-Cycle Hypothesis
Populism: Demand and Supply
No full textUsing individual data on voting and political parties manifestos in European countries, we study the drivers of voting for populist parties (the demand side) as well as the presence of populist parties (the supply side). We show that economic insecurity drives the demand for populism when considering the key interactions with turnout incentives, neglected in previous studies. Economic insecurity drives consensus to populist policies directly and indirectly by causally destroying trust in politics and fostering adverse attitudes towards immigrants. On the supply side, populist parties emerge more likely when countries are faced with a systemic crisis of economic security. The orientation choice of populist parties, i.e., whether they arise on left or right of the political spectrum, is determined by the availability of political space. Mainstream parties response is to reduce the distance of their platform from that of successful populist entrants, amplifying the aggregate supply of populist policies
The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe
No full textThis paper argues that the financial crisis was a watershed in the burst of populism both on the demand side (voters behaviour) and on the supply side (political parties behaviour). On the demand side, we provide novel results on the causal effect of the financial crisis on trust, turnout and voting choices via its effects on voters economic insecurity. Economic insecurity peaks during the financial crisis and extends to segments of the population untouched by the globalization and robotization shocks. To establish causality, we use a pseudo-panel analysis and instrument the economic insecurity of different cohorts leveraging on a new methodology designed to highlight the different sensitivity to financial constraints for people in different occupations. On the supply side, we trace from manifestos the policy positions of old and new parties showing that the supply of populism had the largest jump right after the financial crisis. The size of the jump is largest in countries with low fiscal space and for parties on the left of the political spectrum. We provide a formal rationalization for the key role of fiscal space, showing how the pre-financial crisis shocks enter the picture as sources of a shrinking fiscal space
Risk Aversion, Wealth and Background Risk
Full text linkWe use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky security. We relate this measure to consumers' endowment and attributes and to measures of background risk and liquidity constraints. We find that risk aversion is a decreasing function of endowment - thus rejecting CARA preferences - but the elasticity to consumption is far below the unitary value predicted by the CRRA utility. We also find that households' attributes are of little help in predicting their degree of risk aversion, which is characterized by massive unexplained heterogeneity. However, the consumers' environment affects risk aversion. Individuals who are more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion, consistent with recent theories of attitudes towards risk in the presence of uninsurable risks.heterogeneous preferences, risk tolerance, background risk, liquidity constraints
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