1,720,975 research outputs found
Three Essays in Competition and Banking.
Full text linkNo abstract availableFinancial services industry; Banks and banking; International Competition;
Deposit Insurance and Risk Taking
No full textWe review the theory of deposit insurance, highlighting the underlying assumptions that were not satisfied during the recent financial crisis and that may have led to serious policy mistakes. In theoretical models, deposit insurance is mostly seen as an equilibrium selection device to avoid panic-based runs. In such a context, it is not drawn on and is thus costless and fully credible. However, if bank runs are linked to a fall in asset values, providing deposit insurance can be very costly and, as the case of Ireland has shown, can even threaten sovereign solvency. This perspective indicates a need for new research on the relation between bank failures, deposit insurance schemes, sovereign default, and currency depreciation, and for reforms of deposit insurance schemes
Market power in banking
Full text linkBank market power, in both loan and deposit markets, has important implications for credit provision and for financial stability. This article discusses these issues through the lens of a simple theoretical framework. On the asset side, banks choose the quality and quantity of loans. On the liability side, they may be subject to depositor runs whenever they offer demandable contracts. This structure allows us to review the literature on the role of market power for credit provision and stability and also highlight the interactions between the two sides of banks' balance sheets. Our approach identifies relevant channels that deserve further analysis, especially given the rising importance of bank market power for monetary policy transmission and the rise of the digital economy
Regulatory reforms in the European banking sector
No full textThis handbook presents a timely collection of original studies on relevant themes, policies and developments in European banking. The contributors analyse how the crisis years have had a long lasting impact on the structure of European banking and explore the regulatory architecture that has started to take form in their wake. Academic experts and senior policy makers have contributed to this volume, which is organized in five main parts. The first part presents an overview of European banking through the crisis and beyond. The second part analyses performance and innovation in EU banking markets. The third part discusses the key regulatory changes aimed at fostering financial stability. Part four looks at the relevance of cross-border banking and part five presents a detailed analysis of the main EU banking markets. This is a highly informative and carefully presented handbook, which provides thought-provoking insights into the past, present and future landscapes of European banking. It will appeal to a wide readership, from scholars and students, through to researchers, practitioners and policy-makers
Moral hazard and government guarantees in the banking industry
No full textFirst published online: 3 February 2015The massive use of public funds in the financial sector and the large costs for taxpayers are often used to justify the idea that public intervention should be limited. This conclusion is based on the idea that government guarantees always induce financial institutions to take excessive risk. In this article, we challenge this conventional view and argue that it relies on some specific assumptions made in the existing literature on government guarantees and on a number of modelling choices. We review the theory of government guarantees by highlighting and discussing the role that these underlying assumptions play in the assessment of the desirability and effectiveness of government guarantees and propose a new framework for thinking about them
Loan guarantees, bank underwriting policies and financial stability
Full text linkLoan guarantees represent a form of government intervention to support bank lending. However, their use raises concerns as to their effect on bank risk-taking incentives. In a model of financial fragility that incorporates bank capital and a bank incentive problem, we show that loan guarantees reduce depositor runs and improve bank underwriting standards, except for the most poorly capitalized banks. We highlight a novel feedback effect between banks’ underwriting choices and depositors’ run decisions, and show that the effect of loan guarantees on banks’ incentives is different from that of other types of guarantees, such as deposit insurance
Savings, efficiency and bank runs
Full text linkDoes the level of deposits matter for bank fragility and efficiency? By augmenting
a standard model of endogenous bank runs with a consumption-saving decision, we
obtain two novel results. First, depositors’ incentives to run are a function of the
level of savings held as bank deposits. Second, a saving externality emerges in that
individual depositors do not internalize the effect of their saving decisions on the
bank-run probability. As a result, the economy features an inefficient level of savings
and bank liquidity provision as well as excessive bank fragility. These results are
robust to different sources of bank fragility, as they emerge both when runs are
panic- and fundamental-driven
Government guarantees and financial stability
Full text linkBanks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the effect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks.and depositors' behavior are endogenous and affected by the amount and form of guarantee. The main insight of our analysis is that guarantees are welfare improving because they induce banks to improve liquidity provision although in a way that sometimes increases the likelihood of runs or creates distortions in banks' behavior
The economics of central bank digital currency
No full textThis paper provides a structured overview of the burgeoning literature on the economics of CBDC. We document the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and review motives for the issuance of CBDC. We then study the implications for the financial system and discuss of a number of policy issues and challenges. While the academic literature broadly echoes policy makers' concerns about bank disintermediation and financial stability risks, it also provides conditions under which such adverse effects may not materialize. We also point to several knowledge gaps that merit further work, including data privacy and the study of end-user preferences for attributes of digital payment methods
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