1,720,962 research outputs found
Truth in a Logic of Formal Inconsistency: How classical can it get?
No full text10.1093/jigpal/jzy059Logic Journal of the IGPL285771-80
Yablo’s Paradox in Second-Order Languages: Consistency and Unsatisfiability
No full text10.1007/s11225-012-9399-6Studia Logica1013601-61
DEFLATIONISM AND THE FUNCTION OF TRUTH
No full text10.1111/phpe.12113Philosophical Perspectives321326-35
Is deflationism compatible with compositional and tarskian truth theories?
Get PDFWhat requirements must deflationary formal theories of truth satisfy? This chapter argues against the widely accepted view that compositional and Tarskian theories of truth are substantial or otherwise unacceptable to deflationists. First, two purposes that a formal truth theory can serve are distinguished: one descriptive, the other logical (i.e., to characterise the correctness of inferences involving ‘true’). The chapter argues that the most compelling arguments for the incompatibility of compositional and Tarskian theories concern descriptive theories only.
Second, two requirements that any deflationist truth theory intended to serve a logical purpose must satisfy are put forward. These requirements, it is argued, suggest that (i) many well-known compositional and Tarskian theories are acceptable from a deflationist standpoint (including CT); (ii) certain other popular theories of truth (including KF and FS) are not similarly acceptable; (iii) there are no conclusive reasons to impose a conservativeness requirement on deflationary theories of truth
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