1,720,988 research outputs found
Lucro cessante ed esclusione dall'aggiudicazione di una gara d'appalto: alcune riflessioni
No full textAntitrust damages in Europe : an economic perspective
No full text"Antitrust damages in Europe: an economic perspective"
The article provides an overview of antitrust damages, discussing separately issues concerning causation, and measurement issues
Essential facilities in via di costruzione? Una riflessione sulle politiche pubbliche nei confronti delle Next Generation Networks
No full textProva e valutazione del danno antitrust : una prospettiva economica
No full textPROVING AND QUANTIFYING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
The article discusses, from an economic viewpoint, the problems to be addressed when proving and quantifying antitrust damages. First, it shows that the claimant in a follow-on action does not enjoy a substantial advantage over the claimant in a stand-alone action, as in most cases he will need to supply ad adequate proof of the harm received. Indeed, in art. 81 cases, antitrust authorities usually find agreements having a distortionary object, and this is not sufficient for establishing harm. In article 82 cases, even when illegal exclusionary conduct has been established, its effects may be difficult to disentangle from those of legitimate conduct, and in any case the competitors of the dominant firm may have been affected to varying degrees by its illicit behaviour. Thus, in most cases, the claimant will need to prove both causation and harm. While the Commission seems quite worried about such a burden, it is no heavier than the one to be discharged in any commercial litigation, and European courts are well versed in such analyses. Turning to the quantification of damages, cartel cases are relatively simple: since firm’s extra-profits and customers’ overcharge are always identical, there are two possible approaches to damages calculation. In exclusionary conduct cases, whenever possible one should try to build a but-for model of the firm, starting from detailed information concerning its plans before the abuse took place, and a careful assessment of the extent to which - absent the abuse – such plans would have been carried out. Alternatively, ‘before and after’ methods or ‘yardstick methods’ may be employed, where actual profits are compared with those obtained when the harmful behaviour was not in place, or to those obtained by a highly comparable firm. In either case, the Court must be convinced that the preponderant effect in determining higher profits is the absence of the abusive behaviour
La quantificazione del lucro cessante da illegittima esclusione dalla gara: una prospettiva economica
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La possibile responsabilità civile delle società di rating: alcune riflessioni in chiave economica
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