1,721,052 research outputs found

    Klein, Peter G.

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    Introduction to a forum on the judgment-based approach to entrepreneurship: accomplishments, challenges, new directions

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    Over the last three decades entrepreneurship has become a hot topic in economics and management. Much of the entrepreneurship research literature has built upon insights of economists such as Schumpeter, Knight, and Kirzner, each of whom has inspired a distinct strand of entrepreneurship theory and application. Schumpeterian innovation and Kirznerian alertness are the best-known concepts of entrepreneurship, but a newer research stream is building on Knight’s idea of entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-making under uncertainty. What we call the judgment-based view models entrepreneurs as owning, controlling, and combining heterogeneous assets, which differ in their attributes, and deploying these assets within a firm to produce goods and services in anticipation of economic profit. This Forum presents three papers that develop, extend, and challenge the judgment-based view of entrepreneurship, focusing on the foundations of judgment, the processes of entrepreneurial resource assembly, and the relationship between the judgment-based view and other theories of economic organization

    Entrepreneurial opportunities: who needs them?

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    Debate in management research on the status of the opportunity construct is now more than a decade old. We argue that the debate has led to little additional insight in entrepreneurship and we develop the case for abandoning the construct altogether. Uncertainty is central to entrepreneurship and innovation yet absent from opportunity-based approaches. We offer instead a “judgment-based view” of entrepreneurship which revolves around the nexus of resource heterogeneity and uncertainty and is operationalized in the “Beliefs-Actions-Results” (BAR) framework

    Why managers still matter

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    In today’s knowledge-based economy, managerial authority is supposedly in decline. But there is still a strong need for someone to define and implement the organizational rules of the game

    The entrepreneurship scholar plays with blocs: collaborative innovation or collaborative judgment?

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    Elert and Henrekson (2019) draw important connections between Austrian economics and the Schumpeterian literatures on “development blocs” and “the experimentally organized economy.” We appreciate their emphasis on experimentation and think that Austrian ideas on the time structure of production and the multiple specificities of capital offer complementary insights into why production is likely to be clustered, localized, and path-dependent. While we agree that Austrian economics can benefit from a “meso” level of analysis between individuals and market outcomes, we do not think their proposed Experimentally Organized Economy framework adds much to existing Austrian theory and policy analysis. We also suggest that, by focusing on Kirzner’s entrepreneurial discovery approach, Elert and Henrekson miss other Austrian approaches to entrepreneurship that can better inform their analysis

    Reflections on the 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize for contract theory (Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström)

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    We briefly summarize the contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, two key founders of modern contract theory, and describe their significance for the analysis of organizations and institutions. We then discuss the foundations of modern contract theory and review some criticisms related to modeling strategy, assumptions about knowledge and cognition, and relevance. We conclude with some suggestions for advancing contract theory in a world of uncertainty, complexity, and entrepreneurship

    Entrepreneurial discovery or creation? In search of the middle ground

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    We argue that Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) misconstrue the current controversy over the status of opportunies in entrepreneurship studies. They argue that the controversy is about the realism of the opportunity construct; however, it is also about the usefulness of this construct. Thus, Ramoglou and Tsang confuse the ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects of the current discussion

    The context of entrepreneurial judgment: organizations, markets, and institutions

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    The economics and management literatures pay increasing attention to the technological, competitive, and institutional environment for entrepreneurship. However, less is known about how context influences the judgment of entrepreneurs. Focusing on the emerging judgment‐based approach to entrepreneurship, we argue that economics can say much about how the organizational, market, and institutional context shapes entrepreneurial judgment. We describe entrepreneurs as individuals who deploy scarce, heterogeneous resources to service customer preferences at a profit. Because of uncertainty, this process is essentially experimental, and context influences the experimental process. Thus, entrepreneurs will seek to design the internal organization of the firm so that it facilitates internal experimentation. Moreover, the market or task environment determines the need for experimentation (e.g., how fast do consumer preferences change, how does technology evolve, which assets are available at which terms, etc.). Finally, the institutional environment influences, for example, the transaction costs of acquiring and divesting assets as firms adjust their boundaries through ongoing commercial experimentation

    Uncovering the hidden transaction costs of market power: a property rights approach to strategic positioning

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    A central construct in competitive strategy research is market power, the ability to raise price above marginal cost. Positioning research focuses on attempts to build, protect, and exercise market power. However, this approach contains hidden assumptions about transaction costs. Parties made worse off by the exercise of market power can negotiate, bargain, form coalitions, and otherwise contract around the focal firm’s attempts to appropriate monopoly profits — depending on transaction costs. We build on property-rights economics to explain how transaction costs affect positioning and offer propositions about successful positioning in an environment with transaction costs
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