1,721,044 research outputs found
The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases
No full textThe appropriate standard for supervisory liability in Section 1983 cases has been a source of considerable disagreement among federal courts of appeals. In the absence of established Supreme Court authority on the subject, courts have rejected vicarious and negligence liability in favor of a higher culpability requirement, but they have not agreed on precisely what form this higher standard should take. In this article, the Author addresses the need for a uniform standard consistent with the statute\u27s twin goals of compensating the victims of constitutional violations and deterring constitutional infractions.
The author notes at the outset that lower courts have unjustifiably relied on Supreme Court opinions discussing state-of-mind requirements for particular constitutional violations and cases addressing municipal liability in Section 1983 suits in formulating the requirements for supervisory liability. She then identifies five factors considered by courts in determining whether supervisory liability should be imposed on the facts of particular cases: (1) the existence of prior similar incidents; (2) the supervisor\u27s response to such incidents; (3) the supervisor\u27s response to the specific incident involved in the suit; (4) the extent to which the supervisor caused the violation; and (5) the supervisor\u27s awareness of the constitutional wrongdoing. Application of these factors has led to inconsistent results in similar cases, the author argues. She further contends that the courts in general have to readily ruled in favor of supervisory officials.
As a substantive matter, the author asserts, the standard of supervisory liability should be a national one. In addition, the author advocates a meaningful standard of culpability, which she concludes is best satisfied by a negligence standard. Liability for supervisory negligence is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as Section 1983\u27s causation requirement, and concerns about protecting blameless supervisors are already assuaged by the qualified immunity defense available to executive branch officials, which the author suggests should shield supervisors if a reasonable public official in their position would not have realized that the actions taken by their subordinates violated the Constitution. The author thus concludes that it makes sense to hold supervisory officials accountable for constitutional violations caused by their negligence in supervising, training, or disciplining their subordinates
The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases
No full textThe appropriate standard for supervisory liability in Section 1983 cases has been a source of considerable disagreement among federal courts of appeals. In the absence of established Supreme Court authority on the subject, courts have rejected vicarious and negligence liability in favor of a higher culpability requirement, but they have not agreed on precisely what form this higher standard should take. In this article, the Author addresses the need for a uniform standard consistent with the statute\u27s twin goals of compensating the victims of constitutional violations and deterring constitutional infractions.
The author notes at the outset that lower courts have unjustifiably relied on Supreme Court opinions discussing state-of-mind requirements for particular constitutional violations and cases addressing municipal liability in Section 1983 suits in formulating the requirements for supervisory liability. She then identifies five factors considered by courts in determining whether supervisory liability should be imposed on the facts of particular cases: (1) the existence of prior similar incidents; (2) the supervisor\u27s response to such incidents; (3) the supervisor\u27s response to the specific incident involved in the suit; (4) the extent to which the supervisor caused the violation; and (5) the supervisor\u27s awareness of the constitutional wrongdoing. Application of these factors has led to inconsistent results in similar cases, the author argues. She further contends that the courts in general have to readily ruled in favor of supervisory officials.
As a substantive matter, the author asserts, the standard of supervisory liability should be a national one. In addition, the author advocates a meaningful standard of culpability, which she concludes is best satisfied by a negligence standard. Liability for supervisory negligence is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as Section 1983\u27s causation requirement, and concerns about protecting blameless supervisors are already assuaged by the qualified immunity defense available to executive branch officials, which the author suggests should shield supervisors if a reasonable public official in their position would not have realized that the actions taken by their subordinates violated the Constitution. The author thus concludes that it makes sense to hold supervisory officials accountable for constitutional violations caused by their negligence in supervising, training, or disciplining their subordinates
The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases
No full textThe appropriate standard for supervisory liability in Section 1983 cases has been a source of considerable disagreement among federal courts of appeals. In the absence of established Supreme Court authority on the subject, courts have rejected vicarious and negligence liability in favor of a higher culpability requirement, but they have not agreed on precisely what form this higher standard should take. In this article, the Author addresses the need for a uniform standard consistent with the statute\u27s twin goals of compensating the victims of constitutional violations and deterring constitutional infractions.
The author notes at the outset that lower courts have unjustifiably relied on Supreme Court opinions discussing state-of-mind requirements for particular constitutional violations and cases addressing municipal liability in Section 1983 suits in formulating the requirements for supervisory liability. She then identifies five factors considered by courts in determining whether supervisory liability should be imposed on the facts of particular cases: (1) the existence of prior similar incidents; (2) the supervisor\u27s response to such incidents; (3) the supervisor\u27s response to the specific incident involved in the suit; (4) the extent to which the supervisor caused the violation; and (5) the supervisor\u27s awareness of the constitutional wrongdoing. Application of these factors has led to inconsistent results in similar cases, the author argues. She further contends that the courts in general have to readily ruled in favor of supervisory officials.
As a substantive matter, the author asserts, the standard of supervisory liability should be a national one. In addition, the author advocates a meaningful standard of culpability, which she concludes is best satisfied by a negligence standard. Liability for supervisory negligence is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as Section 1983\u27s causation requirement, and concerns about protecting blameless supervisors are already assuaged by the qualified immunity defense available to executive branch officials, which the author suggests should shield supervisors if a reasonable public official in their position would not have realized that the actions taken by their subordinates violated the Constitution. The author thus concludes that it makes sense to hold supervisory officials accountable for constitutional violations caused by their negligence in supervising, training, or disciplining their subordinates
Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Tests or Rigid Rules?
Get PDFThis piece argues that the Supreme Court\u27s April 2014 decision in Navarette v. Calfornia, like last Term\u27s opinion in Florida v. Harris, deviates from longstanding Supreme Court precedent treating probable cause and reasonable suspicion as totality-of-the-circumstances tests. Instead, these two recent rulings essentially rely on rigid rules to define probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The article criticizes the Court for selectively endorsing bright-line tests that favor the prosecution, and argues that both decisions generate rules that oversimplify and therefore tend to be overinclusive
Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity
Get PDFThe confluence of two widely invoked federal statutes – one governing accomplice liability, the other imposing a sentencing enhancement when firearms are involved in a violent or drug-trafficking crime – reached the Supreme Court this past Term in Rosemond v. United States. The Court’s analysis of the mens rea issues raised in that case starkly illustrates the confusion characterizing this area of complicity law, which has attracted surprisingly little attention from courts, legislators, or scholars. The lack of clarity is particularly acute for crimes like the weapons offense in Rosemond that can plausibly be interpreted to include a circumstance element. This Article attempts to fill the gap in the law and academic literature, analyzing the competing ways in which the elements of the crime in question in Rosemond can be classified. Moving beyond the confines of Rosemond, the Article proposes generally that the mens rea of purpose traditionally required for accomplice liability extend to every conduct element of a crime, as well as to circumstance elements if criminal law narrowly defines the concept of conduct as the defendant’s willed movements. If, however, the line between conduct and circumstance elements is drawn such that conduct is more broadly conceived, this Article would attach the same mens rea vis-a-vis attendant circumstances to both the principal and her accessories. This approach, the Article concludes, appropriately limits accomplice liability to those demonstrating sufficient culpability with respect to the gravamen of the crime and thus preserves the rationales underlying complicity law’s imposition of a relatively onerous mens rea burden on the prosecution
Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law
No full textAfter describing the basic legal and policy issues surrounding the qualified immunity defense and the use of novelty to explain procedural defaults in habeas cases, Part I of this article advocates a standard for both types of cases that asks whether a person exercising reasonable diligence in the same circumstances would have been aware of the relevant constitutional principles. With this standard in mind, Part II examines the qualified immunity defense in detail, concluding that in many cases public officials are given immunity even though they unreasonably failed to recognize the constitutional implications of their conduct. Part III compares the courts\u27 definition of novelty in the habeas context and finds the opposite problem: most cases needlessly require that prisoners and their trial counsel have an uncanny ability to predict future developments in the law. Part IV then addresses the concept of new rules introduced in Supreme Court\u27s recent retroactively decisions to limit the scope of habeas. While questioning the general wisdom of this new approach, this part of the article also concludes that as applied the new retroactivity doctrine precludes habeas relief even in cases when the state courts unreasonably interpreted existing precedent. Finally, Part V compares the three sets of cases and criticizes the courts\u27 differing expectations regarding the ability of public officials, defense attorneys, and state court judges to predict developments in constitutional law
The Supreme Court\u27s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda
No full textIn recent years, the Supreme Court has enjoyed a love-hate relationship with its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona. While the Court has not hesitated to narrow Miranda’s reach, it has also been wary of deliberate efforts to circumvent it. This pragmatic approach to Miranda can be doctrinally unsatisfying and even incoherent at times, but it basically maintains the core structure of Miranda as the police have come to know and adapt to it. Last Term provided the first glimpse of the Roberts Court’s views on Miranda, as the Court considered three Miranda cases: Maryland v. Shatzer, Florida v. Powell, and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article examines each opinion through a pragmatic lens, with an eye towards ascertaining whether the Roberts Court remains committed to the pragmatic approach taken by its predecessors. While the government prevailed on every issue raised by the three cases, the opinions vary in their fidelity to pragmatic norms. The Article concludes that, even if Shatzer and Powell can be dismissed as effecting only incremental changes in the law – in the rules protecting those who invoke their Miranda rights, defining custody, and requiring that the warnings reasonably convey each of the rights Miranda guarantees – Thompkins cannot be defended on pragmatic grounds. In effect, the decision in Thompkins allows the police to begin interrogating a suspect immediately after reading the Miranda warnings, without first securing a waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights, and then to use anything she says – even hours later – to demonstrate that she impliedly waived her rights. Thompkins thus essentially reduces Miranda to a mere formality, requiring that warnings be read and otherwise leaving criminal defendants with the same voluntariness due process test that Miranda was designed to replace. To the extent Thompkins signals a change in the Court’s attitude towards Miranda, it comes at a particularly critical time given reports that the Obama administration is considering proposing an exception to Miranda for terrorism suspects
Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law
No full textAfter describing the basic legal and policy issues surrounding the qualified immunity defense and the use of novelty to explain procedural defaults in habeas cases, Part I of this article advocates a standard for both types of cases that asks whether a person exercising reasonable diligence in the same circumstances would have been aware of the relevant constitutional principles. With this standard in mind, Part II examines the qualified immunity defense in detail, concluding that in many cases public officials are given immunity even though they unreasonably failed to recognize the constitutional implications of their conduct. Part III compares the courts\u27 definition of novelty in the habeas context and finds the opposite problem: most cases needlessly require that prisoners and their trial counsel have an uncanny ability to predict future developments in the law. Part IV then addresses the concept of new rules introduced in Supreme Court\u27s recent retroactively decisions to limit the scope of habeas. While questioning the general wisdom of this new approach, this part of the article also concludes that as applied the new retroactivity doctrine precludes habeas relief even in cases when the state courts unreasonably interpreted existing precedent. Finally, Part V compares the three sets of cases and criticizes the courts\u27 differing expectations regarding the ability of public officials, defense attorneys, and state court judges to predict developments in constitutional law
Pretrial Custody and Miranda
No full textIn two recent opinions, Maryland v. Shatzer and Howes v. Fields, the Supreme Court concluded that inmates serving prison sentences were not in custody for purposes of Miranda—in Shatzer’s case while he was living among the general prison population and in Fields’s case while he was undergoing police interrogation. The question addressed in this Article is one that has divided the lower courts in the wake of those two decisions: the impact of the Court’s rulings on the hundreds of thousands of pretrial detainees in this country, many of whom are poor, Black, and Brown. This Article maintains that the Court’s language and reasoning in Shatzer and Fields, as well as the relevant policy considerations, call for limiting the reach of those opinions to prisoners serving time.
This Article therefore concludes that pretrial detainees should be deemed to be in Miranda custody for the duration of their confinement prior to trial. Any other result would allow gamesmanship on the part of prosecutors in making charging decisions and bail recommendations and would enable law enforcement to trade on the coerciveness of pretrial detention to elicit unwarned confessions from suspects who are especially susceptible to the threats and promises that are a leading cause of false confessions and who disproportionately represent communities of color and financially vulnerable populations
\u3ci\u3eHeien\u3c/i\u3e\u27s Mistake of Law
No full textThe Supreme Court has been whittling away at the Fourth Amendment for decades. The Court\u27s 2014 ruling in Heien v. North Carolina allowing the police to make a traffic stop based on a reasonable mistake of law generated little controversy among the Justices and escaped largely unnoticed by the press-perhaps because yet another Supreme Court decision reading the Fourth Amendment narrowly is not especially noteworthy or because the opinion\u27s cursory and overly simplistic analysis equating law enforcement\u27s reasonable mistakes of fact and law minimized the significance of the Court\u27s decision. But the temptation to dismiss Heien as just another small chink in the Fourth Amendment\u27s armor ought to be resisted. The Court\u27s ruling substantially expands police officers\u27 already broad discretion to make traffic stops, including pretextual ones, to now include circumstances where no violation of law even occurred.
Drawing on both criminal procedure jurisprudence and the criminal law literature discussing mistake of law, this Article begins with a critique of the Court\u27s reasoning in Heien. The Article then addresses the potential reach of the Court\u27s ruling. Examining the lower courts\u27 application of Heien in the eighteen months after it was decided, the Article points out that the decision can be read broadly to forgive a wide variety of reasonable police mistakes of law. Even more problematic, the cumulative impact of Heien and some of the Supreme Court\u27s other recent Fourth Amendment opinions could potentially lead courts to tolerate even unreasonable mistakes law enforcement officials make in interpreting the law. The Article concludes that, if the Fourth Amendment is construed to allow any mistakes of law, it should borrow from criminal law and ignore police officers\u27 legal errors only when they relied on an official interpretation of the law made by an independent, authoritative third party. Affording the police broader leeway to act based on their own misunderstandings of law is unjustifiable and threatens to further fuel the growing tensions between law enforcement and communities of color
- …
