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PATRIARCH KIRILL AND METROPOLITAN HILARION ON RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND SECULAR WAR IN UKRAINE: A DIACHRONIC STUDY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ MESSAGES
Get PDFThis paper analyses the public messages of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Metropolitan Hilarion 30 days before and one hundred days after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (hereinafter: invasion). The findings demonstrate that the main speaker for the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter: ROC) on issues related to secular and religious conflicts in Ukraine was Metropolitan Hilarion in the pre-invasion phase and Patriarch Kirill after the invasion had started. Their messages were identical on themes related to the ‘Russian world’ (e.g., that spiritually fraternal peoples do not fight, that war in Ukraine takes place on the Russian territory, or that Russia’s involvement in wars in history and the present day have aimed to liberate or protect spiritually fraternal peoples). They both condemn Western values, blame the West for the imposition of post-Christian values on both Russia and Ukraine, and consider the West to be the cause of both historic and present conflicts with Russia. Patriarch Kirill’s messages change mostly after 3 April 2022 when themes (such as ‘Lenin, divider of historical Russia’, ‘approval’ of Nazi ideology in Ukraine) used by Putin and Lavrov to legitimate the invasion appeared not extensively, but still one by one into Patriarch Kirill’s discourse on Ukraine. In the same period, Hilarion decreases his involvement in public discussions of war in Ukraine and becomes more amicable regarding those Local Orthodox Churches which have recognized the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter OCU). Hilarion’s discourse of the role of the ROC in ‘wartime’ also started to focus on the humanitarian mission and on a proper distance between the mission of the Church and the role of the state. Patriarch Kirill, instead, connected the Church and religion to the Russian effort more directly. He used several frames (e.g., ‘internecine strife’; peace conditioned by the unity of Russians and Ukrainians; war in defence of Russian independence; religious blessing makes [Russian] troops victorious) and a rhetorical style (e.g., religious demonization of the enemy) to emphatically contribute to the legitimacy of the Russian war effort and to the strategic narratives of Putin’s regime. The latter are virtually missing in the discourse of Hilarion
Paradygmaty polityki luterańskiej w kraju postkomunistycznym: przypadek Estonii
No full textThe article addresses two major issues: the legacy of the communist regime on the popular attitudes towards religion and the Church, and the patterns of religious politics and the political behaviour of the Lutheran Church in a traditionally Lutheran post-communist country.
In Estonia, the general alienation from organized religion has, in addition to the experience of the communist regime, also been aided by a weak relationship between the Estonian national identity and the Lutheran church of the pre-communist period.
Religious politics in post-communist Estonia follows four main types—civil religion, an unofficial neoliberal-conservative-clerical alliance, the emergence of a Christian-Protestant political party and a moderate anti-clerical left-wing religious ideology.
In general, Lutheranism in Estonia provides a framework of religious politics, where religious symbols and values culturally unite the whole political community, and allows the ‘politics of religion’ and ‘religious politics’ to be interpreted to a large extent according to the private preferences of individual politicians and activist pastors.Artykuł omawia dwa podstawowe zagadnienia: wpływ reżimu komunistycznego na obecny stosunek obywateli do religii i Kościoła oraz paradygmat polityki religijnej i zaangażowania politycznego ze strony Kościoła luterańskiego w kraju postkomunistycznym, tradycyjnie luterańskim, jakim jest Estonia. Jej obywatele w większości znajdują się poza instytucją zorganizowanej religii – spowodowane jest to doświadczeniem reżimu komunistycznego oraz słabym związkiem estońskiej tożsamości narodowej z Kościołem luterańskim przed epoką komunistyczną. Polityka religijna w postkomunistycznej Estonii przybiera cztery podstawowe formy: religii obywatelskiej, nieoficjalnego związku neoliberalno-konserwatywno-klerykalnego, chrześcijańsko-protestanckiej partii politycznej oraz umiarkowanej antyklerykalnej lewicowej ideologii religijnej. Ogólnie rzecz ujmując, luteranizm w Estonii definiuje i tworzy ramy polityki religijnej, w której symbole oraz wartości religijne stanowią kulturowy łącznik pomiędzy członkami wspólnoty politycznej. Kościół luterański poprzez swoje działania powoduje, że polityka religijna („politics of religion” i „religious politics”) może być definiowana w dużej mierze w zależności od indywidualnych preferencji poszczególnych polityków oraz zaangażowanych politycznie pastorów
Kiriku mõjust religiooni politiseerumisele
Get PDFAlar Kilp, Church influence on the politicization of religion.The article analyzes the influence of churches on the politicization of religion in four post-communist countries - Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia. The main objective is to find out whether or not, in the future perspective, religious social conflict will become part of politics anyway or is this process influenced also by the tactical choices made by churches.Although the dominant churches in respective countries belong to different denominations (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist), these churches have similar institutional interests as well as challenges. Also, their everyday political choices are not directly dependent upon their theological doctrine. For the evaluation of the political influence of the churches, use is made of the religious market theory which assumes that the churches are motivated by their institutional interests.The article concludes that the tactical choices made by the churches have influenced the development of religious political cleavage. The backing of the radical Christian political parties in Poland or a close alliance with only one political party in the Czech Republic, have been tactical choices of the churches that have reduced the importance of religious political cleavage. The tactical choice of the dominant Hungarian churches, however, yielded the opposite result. Their choice to abandon the radical Christian parties for the moderate Christian Democratic parties increased the importance of the religious political cleavage
Religion enters politics: the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-communist countries : master thesi
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Estonia: Religious Association Restrictions of Same-Sex Couple Religious Rights
Get PDFEU law on same-sex unions (SSU) expects Member States to legally recognize the family life of same-sex couples in the form of marriage, partnership, or cohabitation. The normative expectation, which in about 2010 became a principled position of the EU institutions and the European Court of Human Rights, has not been endorsed by one Western European Member State (Italy) as well as the majority of the post-Communist Member States (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). There are a number of causes behind the failure to enact SSU laws: the legacies of the communist regimes, the prevalence of a certain interpretation of Christian doctrine, the medium level of economic affluence, and an unfavorable balance of power between the change and blocking coalitions of social, religious, and political actors.
Unlike Western European countries, where the family life of same-sex unions was legally recognized primarily due to pressures from below (due to changes in public opinion and shifts in cultural values), governments and legislatures in most Central and Eastern European Member States are encouraged more from above (by the European Union and the Council of Europe). Therefore, the prospects for legal recognition of same-sex unions are slim in countries where the European normative agenda meets no significant support from domestic social values or religious and political actors. This conflict of national and EU forces is most likely to persist in Member States which are post-Soviet, culturally Orthodox, not shifted from materialist to post-materialist values, and governed by right-wing governmental coalitions
Sekulaarne fundamentalism
No full textBeSt programmi toetusel loodud videoloeng kursusel "Religioosne fundamentalism"(USUS.02.080
Making Identity Count: Estonia 1990
Get PDFIn 1990, Estonian national identity strongly centered on independence, unity, and cultural heritage, with cultural symbols like national literature, holidays, and traditions playing a critical role. While independence was the primary goal, uncertainty persisted due to divisions among the political establishment, fears of being a small state dominated by great powers, and differing views between the Congress of Estonia and the Supreme Soviet regarding the path forward.
The public admired both national traditions and Western culture but criticized ineffective governance amid a deepening economic crisis, rising crime, and social inequality. The Soviet Union was overwhelmingly viewed in negative terms for its role in occupation, repression, and environmental damage. While some nostalgia for the stagnation era remained, aspirations for national independence were underpinned by a strong anti-colonial sentiment, as the Soviet Union was portrayed as a colonial occupier. Russian speakers in Estonia had not yet formed a distinct social or political identity, as they were largely identified with the Soviet regime, its institutions (such as the Soviet army), or pro-Soviet movements like the Intermovement
Making Identity Count: Estonia 2010
No full textIn 2010, Estonia’s national identity was framed around cultural nationalism and a sense of indigenous independence, embraced by both elites and the broader population. Widespread disillusionment with the political elite was evident, alongside a shared demand for better social welfare and reduced regional inequality.
Value debates largely reflected consensus between elites and the public. Both groups supported issues like environmental sustainability but remained divided or uncertain on conservatism and traditional gender roles.
An elite-led identity project emphasized economic development, austerity as a marker of effective governance, and digital modernization, culminating in Estonia’s adoption of the euro in January 2011. In contrast, popular discourse focused more on Estonian language, the presence of Russians in Estonia, poverty, inequality, and skepticism toward the market economy.
“Significant Others” included the West and the EU—favored more by elites—as well as the Soviet Union and Russia, generally viewed in a negative light. However, the Soviet era was occasionally credited for high living standards and conservative values, while historical Russia was sometimes viewed as supportive of Estonian national aspirations
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