564 research outputs found
Equity Style Returns and Institutional Investor Flows
No full textThis paper explores institutional investor trades in stocks grouped by style and the relationship of these trades with equity market returns. It aggregates transactions drawn from a large universe of approximately $6 trillion of institutional funds. To analyze style behavior, we assign equities to deciles in each of five style dimensions: size, value/growth, cyclical/defensive, sector, and country. We find, first, strong evidence that investors organize and trade stocks across style-driven lines. This appears true for groupings both strongly and weakly related to fundamentals (e.g., industry or country groupings versus size or value/growth deciles). Second, the positive linkage between flows and returns emerges at daily frequencies, yet becomes even more important at lower frequencies. We show that quarterly decile flows and returns are even more strongly positively correlated than are daily flows and returns. However, as the horizon increases beyond a year, we find that the flow/return correlation declines. Third, style flows and returns are important components of individual stock expected returns. We find that nearby style inflows and returns positively forecast future returns while distant style inflows and returns forecast negatively. Fourth, we find strong correlations between style flows and temporary components of return. This suggests that behavioral theories may play a role in explaining the popularity and price impact of flow-related trading.
The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination
No full textThis paper examines the market for catastrophe event risk -- i.e., financial claims that are linked to losses associated with natural hazards, such as hurricanes and earthquakes. This market is in transition as new approaches for transferring risk are being explored. The paper studies several recent transactions by USAA which use reinsurance capacity from capital markets rather than only from reinsurers. We identify two puzzles concerning the cat protection purchased in these transactions: there is no coverage for the largest, most severe events; and premiums appear well above actuarial value. We demonstrate that both features deviate from what theory would predict, yet are characteristic of many transactions, not simply those of USAA. We then explore a number of possible explanations for the facts. The most compelling are combinations of capital market imperfections and market power on the part of reinsurers. Conclusions for broader capital market and risk management issues are discussed.
Currency Hedging over Long Horizons
No full textThis paper reexamines the widely-held wisdom that the currency exposure of international investments should be entirely hedged. It finds that the previously documented ability of hedges to reduce portfolio return variance holds at short horizons, but not at long horizons. At horizons of several years, complete hedging not only does not lower return variance, it actually increases the return variance of many portfolios. Hedge ratios chosen to minimize long-run return variance are not only low, they also have no perceptible impact on return variance. The paper reports and explores these results, their apparent causes, and investigates their implications for hedging practice.
Exchange Rate Dynamics Under Stochastic Regime Shifts: A Unified Approach
No full textTechniques of regulated Brownian motion are used to analyze the behavior of the exchange rate when official policy reaction functions are subject to future stochastic changes. We examine exchange-rate dynamics in alternative cases where the authorities promise (i) to confine a floating rate within a predetermined range and (ii) to peg the currency once it reaches a predetermined future level. Similarities between these and several related examples of regime switching are stressed
Insuring Against Terrorism: The Policy Challenge
No full textTerrorist attacks worldwide during the past several years have spurned an interest in understanding not only how governments can mitigate terrorism risk but also how governments might help finance future losses. This interest was buttressed by the seemingly failure of the private insurance market to provide coverage for terrorism losses after the attack on September 11, 2001. This paper surveys the evidence of the supposed private market failures after 9/11 and the arguments for government provision of terrorism insurance. The paper argues that mostly unfettered insurance and capital markets are capable of insuring large terrorism losses. If there is any "failure," it rests with government tax, accounting, and regulatory policies that have made it costly for insurers to hold surplus capital. Government policy has also hindered the implementation of instruments that could securitize the underlying risks. Correcting these policies would likely enable private insurers to cover both terrorism and war risks.
On the Pricing of Intermediated Risks: Theory and Application to Catastrophe Reinsurance
No full textWe model the equilibrium price and quantity of risk transfer between firms and financial intermediaries. Value-maximizing firms have downward sloping demands to cede risk, while intermediaries, who assume risk, provide less-than-fully-elastic supply. We show that equilibrium required returns will be "high" in the presence of financing imperfections that make intermediary capital costly. Moreover, financing imperfections can give rise to intermediary market power, so that small changes in financial imperfections can give rise to large changes in price. We develop tests of this alternative against the null that the supply of intermediary capital is perfectly elastic. We take the US catastrophe reinsurance market as an example, using detailed data from Guy Carpenter & Co., covering a large fraction of the catastrophe risks exchanged during 1970-94. Our results suggest that the price of reinsurance generally exceeds "fair" values, particularly in the aftermath of large events, that market power of reinsurers is not a complete explanation for such pricing, and that reinsurers' high costs of capital appear to play an important role.
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