59 research outputs found
Residential Irrigation Water Costs in Osceola County and Orange County, Florida
No full textInterest in understanding water use and irrigation costs has risen in recent years. This case study is a 5-page evaluation of water use and associated costs for residential landscape irrigation in Osceola County and Orange County, Florida. Homeowners in central Florida can use the results to assess their water consumption and bills in relation to similar homes in the area. Written by Nick Taylor, Tricia Kyzar, Pierce Jones, and Kaitlin O. Robb Price, and published by the UF/IFAS Department of Agricultural and Biological Engineering, December 2019.
https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/ae53
Florida H2OSAV Insights: Home Water Use in Orange County
No full textThis fact sheet provides current, basic information about residential water use in Orange County. Written by Nick Taylor, Kaitlin Olander Robb Price, Bradley Spatz, Parker Johnson, and Pierce Jones, and published by the UF/IFAS Department of Agricultural and Biological Engineering, June 2021
Florida H2OSAV Insights: Home Water Use in Osceola County
No full textThis fact sheet provides current, basic information about residential water use in Osceola County, Florida. Written by Nick Taylor, Kaitlin Robb Price, Bradley Spatz, Parker Johnson, and Pierce Jones, and published by the UF/IFAS Department of Agricultural and Biological Engineering, November 2021
Florida H2OSAV Insights: Home Water Use in the Gainesville Regional Utilities (GRU) Service Territory
No full textThis 6-page fact sheet discusses basics about water consumption for single-family, detached homes served by Gainesville Regional Utilities, information about the highest water users, and impacts of irrigation on water consumption. Written by Nick Taylor, Kaitlin Olander Robb Price, Bradley Spatz, Tricia Kyzar, and Pierce Jones, and published by the UF/IFAS Department of Agricultural and Biological Engineering, September 2020
The Social Cost-of-Living: Welfare Foundations and Estimation
No full textWe present a new class of social cost-of-living indices and a nonparametric framework for estimating these and other social cost-of- living indices. Common social cost-of-living indices can be understood as aggregator functions of approximations of individual cost-of-living indices. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the expenditure-weighted average of first-order approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index. This is troubling for three reasons. First, it has not been shown to have a welfare economic foundation for the case where agents are heterogeneous (as they clearly are.) Second, it uses an expenditure-weighted average which downweights the experience of poor households relative to rich households. Finally, it uses only first-order approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index, and thus ignores substitution effects. We propose a “common-scaling” social cost-of-living index, which is defined as the single scaling to everyone’s expenditure which holds social welfare constant across a price change. Our approach has an explicit social welfare foundation and allows us to choose the weights on the costs of rich and poor households. We also give a unique solution for the welfare function for the case where the weights are independent of household expenditure. A first order approximation of our social cost-of- living index nests as special cases commonly used indices such as the CPI. We also provide a nonparametric method for estimating second- order approximations (which account for substitution effects).Inflation, Social cost-of-living, Demand, Average Derivatives
The Social Cost-of-Living: Welfare Foundations and Estimation
No full textWe present a new class of social cost-of-living indices and a nonparametric framework for estimating these and other social cost-of-living indices. Common social cost-of-living indices can be understood as aggregator functions of approximations of individual cost-of-living indices. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the expenditure-weighted average of first-order approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index. This is troubling for three reasons. First, it has not been shown to have a welfare economic foundation for the case where agents are heterogeneous (as they clearly are.) Second, it uses an expenditure-weighted average which downweights the experience of poor households relative to rich households. Finally, it uses only first-order approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index, and thus ignores substitution effects. We propose a “common-scaling” social cost-of-living index, which is defined as the single scaling to everyone’s expenditure which holds social welfare constant across a price change. Our approach has an explicit social welfare foundation and allows us to choose the weights on the costs of rich and poor households. We also give a unique solution for the welfare function for the case where the weights are independent of household expenditure. A first order approximation of our social cost-of-living index nests as special cases commonly used indices such as the CPI. We also provide a nonparametric method for estimating second-order approximations (which account for substitution effects).Inflation, Social cost-of-living, Demand, Average derivatives
How much water am I using for my yard?
No full textThis publication provides context and motivation for reducing outdoor water use. This is done by providing the estimated gallons of water used per irrigation cycle in Florida and then comparing the water used for irrigation to the water used for common indoor activities like showering or washing dishes
Welfare Restructuring without Partisan Cooperation: The Role of Party Collusion in Blame Avoidance
No full textThis article argues that welfare state restructuring, which is highly unpopular among voters, is politically feasible if government and opposition parties collude informally with each other. Contrary to key arguments made in the literature, restructuring does not require the formation of a formal grand coalition which diffuses blame from voters. Party collusion is a distinctive blame-avoiding strategy that differs not only from other party-oriented strategies such as building a grand coalition, but also from voter-oriented ones. By analyzing the politics of pension reform in Germany from 1995 to 2004, this article shows that party collusion, which emerges through repeated signaling and informal agreements, enables political parties to restructure the welfare state without running the risk of electoral failure. Finally, it suggests that collusion likely explains recent successes of Austrian, French and Italian governments in legislating unpopular welfare cutbacks.political parties, blame avoidance, collusion, welfare state, pension policy
¿Cuánta agua estoy usando para regar mi jardín?
No full textEsta publicación provee contexto y motivación para reducir la cantidad de agua usada para regar el jardín. Esto se hace proporcionando una estimación de los galones de agua que son utilizados por ciclo de riego en Florida, y luego comparando ese monto de agua con el agua utilizada para actividades comunes al interior del hogar, como ducharse o lavar los platos.
Home and Mortgage Ownership of the Dutch Elderly: Explaining Cohort, Time and Age Effects
No full textThe relationship between home ownership of Dutch elderly households and age is strongly negative. Other studies suggest that this age gradient should be attributed to a cohort effect. In this paper we investigate where those cohort effects come from. We also observe that mortgage ownership among elderly home-owners increased considerably during the nineties. Using panel data we estimate models explaining home and mortgage ownership by age, cohort, and time effects, as well as other factors. Cohort and time effects are modelled explicitly using macro economic and housing market related variables. We find that the level of GDP per capita when the household head was young is the main factor explaining generation effects in home ownership among the elderly. After accounting for cohort effects it also appears that home ownership decreases slightly with age. Mortgage ownership among elderly home owners rose considerably during the nineties due to house price increases and due to financial innovation in the mortgage market. Cohort effects are also important. A supplementary analysis suggests that those cohort effects are due to the fact that the accidental bequest motive is becoming less important.home ownership, mortgages, cohort effects
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