101 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Climate finance intermediation: interest spread effects in a climate policy model
No full textCode and data for the replication of figures and tables in Climate finance intermediation. The model is coded in GAMS, post-processing scripts are written in R. It is recommended to download all files as a ZIP archive to maintain the folder structure, and to use GNU make to build the figures/tables, but see details for individual figures/tables in 00README
Knüttelversiges Disputatorium. : Eine disharmonische Introduktions-Phantasie.
No full textHandwritten 20-page manuscript by Daniel Lessmann. Also included are a typed transcript and an explanatory letter by
H.G. Reissner.Daniel Lessmann wrote this play for his student Adolf Herz and his siblings Emmy, Toni, Luise, Jette, Emanuel, and
Betty, the children of the banker Leopold Edler von Herz, in whose house in Vienna Lessmann lived from the fall of 1817 to the spring
of 1820. The entire action takes place in Herz’s house, where the children and Lessmann himself appear, as does Ignaz v. Neuwall , who
belongs to one of nine ennobled Jewish families residing in Vienna at that time.Born in Soldin, Neumark (today Myślibórz, Poland) on January 18, 1794, Lessmann was an author who took part in the
German national uprising against Napoleonic rule. He committed suicide in Wittenberg on September 1, 1831.The original German-language inventory is available in the folde
Climate thresholds and heterogeneous regions: implications for coalition formation
No full textThe threat of climate catastrophes has been shown to radically change optimal climate policy and prospects for international climate agreements. We characterize the strategic behavior in emissions mitigation and agreement participation with a potential climate catastrophe happening at a temperature threshold. Players are heterogeneous in a conceptual and two numerical models. We confirm that thresholds can induce large, stable coalitions. The relationship between the location of the threshold and the potential for cooperation is non-linear, with the highest potential for cooperation at intermediate temperature thresholds located between 2.5 and 3 degrees of global warming. We find that some regions such as Europe, the USA and China are often pivotal to keeping the threshold because the rest of the world abandons ambitious mitigation and the threshold is crossed without their participation. As a result, their incentives to cooperate can be amplified at the threshold. This behavior critically depends on the characteristics of the threshold as well as the numerical model structure. Conversely, non-pivotal regions are more likely to free-ride as the threshold inverts the strategic response of the remaining coalition
Avoiding Carbon Lock-In: Policy Options for Advancing Structural Change
No full textA major obstacle for the transformation to a low-carbon economy is the risk of a carbon lock-in: fossil fuel-based ('dirty') technologies dominate the market although their carbon-free ('clean') alternatives are dynamically more efficient. We study the interaction of learning-by-doing spillovers and the substitution elasticity between the clean and the dirty sector in an intertemporal general equilibrium model. We find that the substitution possibilities between the two sectors have an ambivalent effect: although a high substitution elasticity requires less aggressive mitigation policies than a low one, it creates a greater lock-in in the absence of regulation. The optimal policy response consists of a permanent carbon tax as well as a learning subsidy for clean technologies. A single policy instrument can also avoid high welfare losses, but a more stringent mitigation target can only be achieved at painful costs. We demonstrate that the policy implication of [Acemoglu et al. 2012] is limited in scope. Our numerical results also highlight that infrastructure provision is crucial to facilitate the low-carbon transformation.structural change, low-carbon economy, carbon lock-in, mitigation policies, learning-by-doing
Renewable Energy Subsidies: Second-Best Policy or Fatal Aberration for Mitigation?
No full textThis paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil resource sector. We calculate the optimal second-best renewable energy subsidy and compare the resulting welfare level with an efficient first-best carbon pricing policy. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by a multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range of parameters describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitution possibilities and normative attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small deviations from the second-best subsidy can lead to strong increases in emissions and consumption losses. This confirms the rising concerns about the occurrence of unintended side effects of climate policy { a new version of the green paradox. We extend our second-best analysis by considering two further types of policy instruments: (1) temporary subsidies that are displaced by carbon pricing in the long run and (2) revenue-neutral instruments like a carbon trust and a feed-in-tariff scheme. Although these instruments cause small welfare losses, they have the potential to ease distributional conflicts as they lead to lower energy prices and higher fossil resource rents than the optimal carbon pricing policy.Feed-in-Tariff, Carbon Trust, Carbon Pricing, Supply-Side Dynamics, Green Paradox, Climate Policy
Renewable Energy Subsidies
No full textRenewable Energy Subsidies: Second-Best Policy or Fatal Aberration for Mitigation? / Matthias Kalkuhl, Ottmar Edenhofer, Kai Lessmann. FEEM, 2011, 32 p. (Note di lavoro ; 2011.048) http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/2011620942454NDL2011-048.pdf This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global genera..
Mitigation Strategies and Costs of Climate Protection: The effects of ETC in the hybrid Model MIND
No full textMIND is a hybrid model incorporating several energy related sectors in an endogenous growth model of the world economy. This model structure allows a better understanding of the linkages between the energy sectors and the macro-economic environment. We perform a sensitivity analysis and parameter studies to improve the understanding of the economic mechanisms underlying opportunity costs and the optimal mix of mitigation options. Parameters representing technological change that permeates the entire economy have a strong impact on both the opportunity costs of climate protection and on the optimal mitigation strategies, e.g. parameters in the macro-economic environment and in the extraction sector. Sector-specific energy technology parameters change the portfolio of mitigation options but have only modest effects on opportunity costs, e.g. learning rate of the renewable energy technologies. We conclude that feedback loops between the macro-economy and the energy sectors are crucial for the determination of opportunity costs and mitigation strategies.Endogenous technological change, Climate change mitigation costs, Integrated assessment, Growth model, Energy sector, Integrated assessment
The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models
No full textIn this paper we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. Specifically, by means of this ensemble of models we are able to identify robust results concerning incentives of nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement, and to estimate what stable agreements can achieve in terms of greenhouse gas mitigation. We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation in order to foster stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives
Learning or Lock-in: Optimal Technology Policies to Support Mitigation
No full textWe investigate conditions that aggravate market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that “small” market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a “lock-in” into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies in addition to carbon pricing with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations.renewable energy subsidy, renewable portfolio standard, feed-in-tariffs, carbon pricing
Climat : papiers de recherche moissonnés (9 juin 2015)
No full textWhy Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even if They Do not Take Climate Change into Account / Max Franks, Ottmar Edenhofer, Kai Lessmann. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2015, 52 p. (nota di lavoro ; 2015.037) Authors's abstract : Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: Finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-r..
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