71 research outputs found
Corporate Restructuring and Governance Implications: A Case Study of the Guoco Group
No full textI study a series of restructuring activities undertaken by Guoco Group Limited in recent years and the implications on minority shareholders. The divestment of Dao Heng Bank Group to DBS Group reaped substantial benefits for Guoco, including an enormous cash reserves to fund future investments. However, the cash hoard was not implemented to the best use by Guoco’s managers. Subsequently, Guoco was involved in a number of share buybacks schemes. The share‐buybacks met strong resistance from the minority shareholders and eventually forced out the second largest shareholders. Guoco was also engaged in related party transaction involving its subsidiaries in the property development business. Overall, I find evidences suggesting that corporate restructuring activities enhance the controlling owner’s grip on the group at the expense of the minority shareholders.</jats:p
Cross-Autocorrelations and Market Conditions in Japan
No full text10.1086/508007Journal of Business7963029-305
Politically connected firms and the cash flow sensitivity of cash: International evidence
No full textSMU DART Fun
Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?
No full textThis paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors' recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.Corporate governance mechanisms Cash holdings Firm value
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