388 research outputs found
From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners. Experimental Economics_stata data and do file
No full textStata dta and do file of the paper "Stoop, J. (2014). From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners. Experimental Economics, 17(2), 304-313.".The do file shows the statistical analyses of this paper, showed in the order in which they appear in the paper.</div
Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field? European Economic Review_stata dta and do file
No full textStata dta and do file that shows the data analysis of the paper "Potters, J., and Stoop, J. (2016). Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field?. European Economic Review, 87, 26-33"The do file shows the statistical
analyses of this paper, showed in the order in which they appear in the paper.</div
Time as a medium of reward in three social preference experiments. Experimental Economics_data
No full textExcel file with data used in "Noussair, C. N., and Stoop, J. (2015). Time as a medium of reward in three social preference experiments. Experimental Economics, 18(3), 442-456".The excel file shows all the variabels that are used in this paper.</div
Higher socioeconomic status does not predict decreased prosocial behavior in a field experiment_stata
No full textThis is the data and do file of the paper Andreoni, J., Nikiforakis, N., & Stoop, J. (2021). Higher socioeconomic status does not predict decreased prosocial behavior in a field experiment. Nature communications, 12(1), 1-8
Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management_stata data and do file
No full textStata dta and do file of the paper "Stoop, J., Van Soest, D., and Vyrastekova, J. (2018). Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 88, 300-310".
The do file shows the statistical
analyses of this paper, showed in the order in which they appear in the paper.</div
Towards a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management_stata dta and do file
No full textStata dta and do file of the paper "van Soest, D., Stoop, J. and Vyrastekova, J. (2016). Towards a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 77, 1-13".The do file shows the statistical
analyses of this paper, showed in the order in which they appear in the paper.</div
Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings_data
No full textExcel file with data of the paper "Noussair, C. N., van Soest, D., and Stoop, J. (2015). Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 105(5), 408-13.".It contains all the variables that were used in this paper.</div
On The Role of Group Size in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments, Management Science_stata data and do file
No full textStata dta and do file of the paper "List, J. van Soest, D., Stoop, J. and Zhou, H. (2020). On The Role of Group Size in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments, Management Science, 66(10), 4359-4919".The do file shows the statistical
analyses of this paper, showed in the order in which they appear in the paper.</div
Do People Want To Be Informed_stata
No full textThis repository contains the data and scripts to reproduce Espinosa & Stoop, Experimental Economics, 2021: Do people really want to be informed?The project contains folders wit data, Stata codes (do-files), and R scripts.DoFiles:[ABD] Results: computes the estimates shown in the paper for Diet treatmentTable C1: column 1Table C2: column 1Table C3: columns 1 & 2[Alcohol] Results: computes the estimates shown in the paper for Alcohol treatmentTable C1: column 2Table C2: column 2Table C3: columns 3 & 4[Immigration] Results: computes the estimates shown in the paper for Immigration treatmentTable C1: column 3Table C2: column 3Table C3: columns 5 & 6[InfoABD] Results: computes the estimates shown in the paper for Immigration treatmentTable C1: column 4[InfoAlcohol] Results: computes the estimates shown in the paper for Immigration treatmentTable C1: column 5[InfoImmigration] Results: computes the estimates shown in the paper for Immigration treatmentTable C1: column 6[DiD] InfoImpact: difference-in-difference estimationTable 5[HeavyDrinkers] Results: Impact of incentives on heavy drinkersRobustness check #6[Impact] Results: regression of the information campaigns' impactTable 6[Placebo] Results: Look at incentive effect in placebo treatmentRobustness check #2[Pilot] Results: Look at the order effect in the pilotRobustness check #5R Scripts:MLE on full sample: computes the estimates of Table 4 (columns: 1-3-5)Robustness checks MLE.Robustness check #4 (focusing on the three first questions)Robustness check #3 (omitting one question each time)Table 8Bootstrap Process: bootstraps the MLEsAnalyze Bootstrap Results: Analyze the results of the bootstrap processTable 4: columns 2-4-6Table C5</ol
Disinformation for Hire
No full textThe replication material includes the do files and datasets to replicate the results in tables, figures and text of the main manuscript and the appendix. The code constructs the results from the field data and additional experiments we ran on Prolific and MTurk. The material contains 4 code files, all ending with “.do”. The code was last run using Stata (version 18.0) on MacOS. The replicator should expect the code to run under 5 minutes on a standard (2024) desktop machine.Background The spread of misinformation has been linked to increased social divisions and adverse health outcomes, but less is known about the production of disinformation, which is misinformation intended to mislead.Method The main data used in this paper has been collected by the authors using the Mturk interface (Field Experiment) or Qualtrics (Manipulation Check, Downstream Consequences, and Platform Interventions). It is available in the replication package. Our survey design and selection eligibility are included in the Supplementary Document in this depository.Results In a field experiment on MTurk (N=1,197), we found that while 70% of workers accepted a control job, 61% accepted a disinformation job requiring them to manipulate COVID-19 data. To quantify the trade-off between ethical and financial considerations in job acceptance, we introduced a lower-pay condition offering half the wage of the control job; 51% of workers accepted this job, suggesting that the ethical compromise in the disinformation task reduced the acceptance rate by about the same amount as a 25% wage reduction.A survey experiment with a nationally representative sample shows that viewing a disinformation graph from the field experiment negatively affected people’s beliefs and behavioral intentions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, including increased vaccine hesitancy.Conclusion Using a “wisdom-of-crowds” approach, we highlight how online labor markets can introduce features, such as increased worker accountability, to reduce the likelihood of workers engaging in the production of disinformation. Our findings emphasize the importance of addressing the supply side of disinformation in online labor markets to mitigate its harmful societal effects.</p
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