13,220 research outputs found
Jere Nash Interview with Thomas H. Walman
No full textInterview conducted by author Jere Nash with former Mississippi legislator Thomas H. Walman in the process of writing Mississippi Politics: The Struggle for Power, 1976-2006. Walman was vice-chair of the Education Committee during the passage of the 1982 education reform legislation. Topics covered include educational reform; Walman\u27s elections to the state legislature; Walman\u27s family and background; Buddie Newman; network created by University of Mississippi law school alumnus; William Winter; rules changes in the House; Tim Ford; House Ways and Means Committee; John Hampton Stennis; reapportionment; Sonny Meredith; gambling legislation for casinos; Ray Mabus; and Walman as mayor of McComb, Mississippi
Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences.
No full textIn the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 437–470] to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of the seminal existence results by Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive preferences, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 237–246], Gale and Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 9–15], Shafer and Sonnenschein [Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 345–348], Borglin and Keiding [Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: a note on the “new” existence theorems, J. Math. Econ. 3 (1976) 313–316] and Yannelis and Prabhakar [Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces, J. Math. Econ. 12 (1983) 233–245].Pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium; Continuum games; Non-ordered preferences; Feeble topology;
Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result
No full text[Moore and Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294, \emph{Inter. J. Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the Maskin's theorem will no longer hold by using a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this result holds in the macro world by using an algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Nash implementation.
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Discrete-Time Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games with Risk-and Effort-Averse Players
No full textThe objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.Dynamic Nash game, optimal path, closed-loop control, endogenous risk-and effort-aversion, adaptive risk-and effort management, optimal risk-and effort-sharing.
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
No full textHaake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 399. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable
A Distributed Algorithm for Optimising over Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
No full textWe develop an efficient algorithm for computing pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy various criteria (such as the utilitarian or Nash--Bernoulli social welfare functions) in games with sparse interaction structure. Our algorithm, called Valued Nash Propagation (VNP), integrates the optimisation problem of maximising a criterion with the constraint satisfaction problem of finding a game's equilibria to construct a criterion that defines a c-semiring. Given a suitably compact game structure, this criterion can be efficiently optimised using message-passing. To this end, we first show that VNP is complete in games whose interaction structure forms a hypertree. Then, we go on to provide theoretic and empirical results justifying its use on games with arbitrary structure; in particular, we show that it computes the optimum >82% of the time and otherwise selects an equilibrium that is always within 2% of the optimum on average
Barney McGee /
No full text250 copies printed by John Henry Nash.BarrMode of access: Internet.Bancroft fZ239.2.N28 1917h: From the John Henry Nash Librar
Including Social Nash Equilibria in Abstract Economies
No full textWe consider quasi-variational problems (variational problems having constraint sets depending on their own solutions) which appear in concrete economic models such as social and economic networks, financial derivative models, transportation network congestion and traffic equilibrium. First, using an extension of the classical Minty lemma, we show that new upper stability results can be obtained for parametric quasi-variational and linearized quasi-variational problems, while lower stability, which plays a fundamental role in the investigation of hierarchical problems, cannot be achieved in general, even on very restrictive conditions. Then, regularized problems are considered allowing to introduce approximate solutions for the above problems and to investigate their lower and upper stability properties. We stress that the class of quasi-variational problems include social Nash equilibrium problems in abstract economies, so results about approximate Nash equilibria can be easily deduced.quasi-variational, social Nash equilibria, approximate solution, closed map, lower semicontinuous map, upper stability, lower stability
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results
No full textThis paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest agents, which presume that there is at least one individual in society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.Nash implementation, canonical-mechanisms, s-mechanisms, self-relevant mechanisms, partial-honesty, permissive results
Feedback Nash Equilibria for Linear Quadratic Descriptor Differential Games
No full textIn this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium.linear-quadratic games;linear feedback Nash equilibrium;affine systems;solvability conditions;Riccati equations
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