619 research outputs found
A Numerical Algorithm to find Soft-Constrained Nash Equilibria in Scalar LQ-Games
No full textIn this paper we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game.The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix.The analysis follows the lines of the approach taken by Engwerda in [7] to calculate the solutions of a set of scalar coupled feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations.C63;C72;C73
A Numerical Algorithm to find Soft-Constrained Nash Equilibria in Scalar LQ-Games
No full textIn this paper we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game.The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix.The analysis follows the lines of the approach taken by Engwerda in [7] to calculate the solutions of a set of scalar coupled feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations
Linear Quadratic Games: An Overview
No full textIn this paper we review some basic results on linear quadratic differential games.We consider both the cooperative and non-cooperative case.For the non-cooperative game we consider the open-loop and (linear) feedback information structure.Furthermore the effect of adding uncertainty is considered.The overview is based on [9].Readers interested in detailed proofs and additional results are referred to this book.linear-quadratic games;Nash equilibrium;affine systems;solvability conditions;Riccati equations
Stayng together of breaking apart: Policy-makers' endogenous coalition in the European Monetary Union
No full textCalculation of an approximate solution of the infinite time-varying LQ-problem
No full textLinear Programming;Algorithm;Optimal Control;operations research
Local strong D-Monotonicity of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solution
No full textbargaining
On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution
No full textIn this note we derive the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d.This first order derivative is completely specified in terms of the Pareto frontier function.We show that whenever one player increases his threatpoint always at least one player will loose utility: i.e. the dual result of Pareto optimality.Furthermore,the dmonotonicity property is easily re-established from this matrix.This matrix also enables us to consider the concept of local strong d-monotonicity.That is,under which conditions on the Pareto frontier function . an infinitesimal increase of di,while for each j = i, dj remains constant,it happens that agent i is the only one who s payoff increases.We show that for the Nash bargaining solution this question is closely related to non-negativity of the Hamiltonian matrix of . at the solution.Nash bargaining solution;d-monotonicity;diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix
Dynamic modeling of macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU: Splillovers asymmetries and institutions
No full textMacroeconomics stabilization policies in the EMU: Spillovers, asymmetries and institutions
No full textThis paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti-symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare. © Scottish Economic Society 2006
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