66 research outputs found
Correspondence, J. Kenneth Cummiskey, President, New England College to Richard F. Spavins, Executive Director, New England Foundation for Osteopathic Medicine, 1975 March 26
No full textLetter from J. Kenneth Cummiskey, President, New England College to Richard Spavins, D.O., Executive Director, New England Foundation for Osteopathic Medicine expressing New England College\u27s interest in being the site of the future New England College of Osteopathic Medicine.https://dune.une.edu/bergen/1045/thumbnail.jp
Correspondence, Richard Spavins, Executive Director, New England Foundation for Osteopathic Medicine to J. Kenneth Cummiskey, President, New England College, 1975 April 3
No full textLetter from Richard F. Spavins, Executive Director, New England Foundation for Osteopathic Medicine to J. Kenneth Cummiskey, President, New England College indicating that NEFOM would be pursuing a New England College of Osteopathic Medicine in Maine.https://dune.une.edu/bergen/1046/thumbnail.jp
Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey’s Kantian Consequentialism)
No full textIn his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between
Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David
Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism
(1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on
the basis of Kant’s ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such
as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of
the possible compatibility of Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. On the other
hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the
similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on
the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism
claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s ethics
and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the
Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social
consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value
Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey’s Kantian Consequentialism)
No full textIn his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between
Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David
Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism
(1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on
the basis of Kant’s ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such
as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of
the possible compatibility of Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. On the other
hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the
similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on
the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism
claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s ethics
and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the
Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social
consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value
Matthew J. Moore : Buddhism and Political Theory. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 198.)
No full textRecommended from our members
Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: A Reply to Arroyo, Cummisky, Molan, and Bird-Pollan
No full textIn response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good previously described. In response to Moland, I explain why I think Hegelian worries about the supposed emptiness of the Kantian self do not apply to my account. And in response to both Moland and Bird-Pollan, I argue that, contrary to the view of some Hegelians, the intersubjective normativity of reason is not something developed through actual social relations; rather, it is something essential to an individual's relations with himself or herself. I want to begin by thanking Christopher Arroyo, David Cummiskey, Lydia Moland, and Stefan Bird-Pollan for their interesting and provocative comments in this symposium. There's more in their papers than I can possibly respond to in a reasonable space, so I'm just going to pick and choose. “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature” spells out some of my current thinking on the good, so a summary of that paper will put me in a position to begin by addressing some of Arroyo's and Cummiskey's points.PhilosophyAccepted Manuscrip
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