229 research outputs found
Intelligence memorandum by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.
No full textThis document is a compiliation of intelligence memorandums published by the United States War Department, Office of the Chief of Engineers. These memos contain collected information on foreign military engineers to include equipment, translations of doctrine, and operations. French, German, British, Australian, and Japanese engineers are among those discussed.
Note: Collection only includes No. 1 (June 24, 1940), No. 5, No. 7-13, No. 15-21, and No. 24 (November 10, 1941)
Open source intelligence (OSINT): a contemporary intelligence lifeline
No full textTraditionally, intelligence has been distinguished from all other forms of information working by its secrecy.Secret intelligence is about the acquisition of information from entities that do not wish that information to be acquired and,ideally,never know that it has. However, the transformation in information and communication technology(ICT)over the last two decades challenges this conventionally held perception of intelligence in one critical aspect: that information can increasingly be acquired legally in the public domain-‘open source intelligence’(OSINT).
The intelligence community has recognised this phenomenon by formally creating discrete open source exploitation systems within extant intelligence institutions. Indeed,the exploitation of open source of information is reckoned by many intelligence practitioners to constitute 80 percent or more of final intelligence product. Yet,the resource committed to, and status of, open source exploitation belies that figure.
This research derives a model of the high order factors describing the operational contribution of open source exploitation to the broader intelligence function: context; utility; cross-check; communication; focus; surge; and analysis. Such a model is useful in three related ways: first, in determining appropriate tasking for the intelligence function as a whole; second, as a basis for optimum intelligence resource allocation; and third, as defining objectives for specifically open source policy and doctrine. Additionally, the research details core capabilities, resources, and political arguments necessary for successful open source exploitation.
Significant drivers shape the contemporary context in which nation-state intelligence functions operate: globalisation; risk society; and changing societal expectation. The contemporary transformation in ICT percolates each of them. Understanding this context is crucial to the intelligence community. Implicitly, these drivers shape intelligence, and the relationship intelligence manages between knowledge and power within politics,in order to optimise decision-making. Because open source exploitation obtains from this context, it is better placed than closed to understand it.Thus, at a contextual level,this thesis further argues that the potential knowledge derived from open source exploitation not only has a unique contribution by comparison to closed, but that it can also usefully direct power towards determination of the appropriate objectives upon which any decisions should be made at all
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The United States Marines
No full textFront: Text describes American advancement and control of Korean and Japanese cities after Japan's formal surrender on 1 Sept., United States time
Map shows Japan and Korea.
Photographs: Gen. MacArthur signs Japanese surrender terms on Battleship Missouri; Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu signs at Tokyo Bay ceremony; Allied prisoners of war at Omori, Japan, hail their liberators.
Back: Text and color illustrations show United States Marines' activities
German medals and decorations.
No full textPart 1 presents in detail all the pertinent information available on German military medals, awards, and decorations. Part 2 consists of photographic plates of illustrations
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Britain's exploitation of Occupied Germany for scientific and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union
No full textAt the beginning of the Cold War, the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Union's
current and future military capability seemed a near-impossibility. Soviet high-level
communications were secure against decryption. Agent networks in the USSR were
very difficult to establish and of uncertain reliability. Aerial reconnaissance of warrelated
targets in the Soviet Union was risky and could only be occasional. But
valuable intelligence was gathered in the years 1945-55 on the USSR's frantic arms
build-up, thanks to its policy towards Germans and their country. Its exploitation of
Germans and its Zone of Germany in its war-related research and development and
the reconstruction of its war-related industries gave British Intelligence penetrable
targets in the Soviet Zone and gave great numbers of Germans sought-after
information on the USSR itself. The ease of recruiting age nts in East Germany and
the flight (including enticed defections) of refugees from it allowed research and
development projects and uranium.-mining operations there to be penetrated.
Intelligence of Soviet weapons development and of the quality of Soviet military
technology was obtained. The mass interrogation of prisoners-of-war returned by the
Soviets to the British Occupation Zone in the late 1940s yielded a wealth of valuable
information on war-related construction and the locations of numerous intelligence
targets in the Soviet Union: most importantly, those of atomic and chemical plants,
aircraft and aero-engine factories, airfields, rocket development centres and other
installations. When, in the period 1949-58, some 3,000 deported German scientists ,
engineers and technicians were sent back to their homeland from the USSR,
promising sources among them were enticed West and interrogated for their
knowledge of the Soviets' research and development projects. The cream of the
information they provided was crucial intelligence on the locations of atomic plants
and laboratories and uranium deposits; useful information on structural weaknesses in
the Soviet system of scientific and economic management; expert (if out-of-date)
assessments of the quality of Soviet accomplishments in atomic science, electronics
and other fields; and well-informed indications as to possible lines of development in
guided missile and aircraft design. One Soviet scientific defector in Germany
provided similar information which influenced British perceptions of the Soviet
Union's scientific potential and missile development plans. Refugees entering the
British Zone from East Germany, intercepted letters and monitored
telecommunications, informal contacts and, of course, secret agents all made
significant contributions to the gathering of scientific and technical intelligence in
Germany too. The British passed to the Americans much of the intelligence they
acquired in Germany and the installations identified and located by German sources
were overtlown by spyplanes in the 1950s and particularly by U-2s in the latter half
of-the decade. Priceless information was obtained, which establi shed that the USSR's
war-related scientific research and development and its actual military capability were
both inferior to those of the West. Thus the Germans enabled Soviet security to be
deeply penetrated and helped to stabilize the Cold War. They are the missing link
between Ultra and the U-2
The collectors : Naval, Army and Air Intelligence in the New Zealand Armed Forces during the Second World War
No full textThis thesis examines the performance of the intelligence collection organisations of the armed services of New Zealand during the Second World War. It considers the intelligence bodies of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force and looks at their growth, development and demise, and assesses their effectiveness as intelligence organisations. The question of how much New Zealand could be expected to achieve in the field of intelligence arises, not least because New Zealand was demographically small, had a long coastline and was geographically relatively remote. How much could New Zealand contribute to the Allied cause in intelligence terms is another issue, and what forms did any participation take? Were there lessons to be learned from the wartime experience (there were, but they went for the most part largely unheeded)?
New Zealand, like other countries, had a fragmented approach to intelligence collection, making for a degree of complexity over a range of activity, despite the intelligence organisations being of modest size. The examination of the organisations in this thesis includes multi-service and multi-departmental dimensions along with the production of useful intelligence. Whether good use was made of intelligence collected is another matter. There was a substantial amount of liaison, contact and practice between departments of state as to various aspects of intelligence, the Organization for National Security and coastwatching being two notable areas. The overarching role and limitations of the Organization for National Security with regard to intelligence is explored, and the development of a combined intelligence centre examined. The participation of New Zealand signals intelligence organisations in the great Allied interception offensive is detailed, along with the mundane but fundamental task of coastal surveillance. The establishment and spectacular decline of the first local independent security service is traced. Both the intelligence and security aspects of the Army's operationally deployed units are covered, along with the growth of RNZAF air intelligence.
The effectiveness of all of these organisations could hardly be expected to be uniform, and indeed it was not. Some bodies succeeded in their collection roles beyond expectations, others were reasonably effective, and two organisations failed dismally in different ways, for a number of reasons. If a pattern emerges at all, it is that small single service component-type intelligence sections collecting operational intelligence were the most effective New Zealand intelligence organisations. Operational focus and. operational requirements underlay the drive for successful collection. Most significant within the Allied context were the signals intelligence bodies. At the other end of the scale, larger co-operative interdepartmental New Zealand intelligence ventures failed to deliver projected results.
New Zealand's armed forces had an interesting variety of intelligence contributions during the Second World War. Of these, the most effective organisations collected intelligence to meet directed operational requirements
CDC influenza surveillance report no. 50, January 5, 1960
No full text"CDC, from three separate states: Texas, Ohio, and Tennessee. One of these outbreaks has been confirmed as being due to A2 influenza virus. Responsible public health officers are urged to be alert for outbreaks of febrile respiratory disease, and the possibility that influenza may appear in epidemic form on a broader scale. All laboratories collaborating with the International Influenza Center are urged to report any isolations of influenza virus and to submit strains to Dr. Roslyn Q. Robinson, CDC Virus and Rickettsia Section, P.O. Box 61, Montgomery, Alabama for strain characterization." - p. 2January 5, 1960.This report was prepared by Theodore C. Eickhoff, M. D., Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, Surveillance Section, Epidemiology Branch, CDC."For administrative use." - cover"Information contained in this report is a summary of data reported to CDC by State Health Departments, Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers, collaborating influenza diagnostic laboratories, and other pertinent sources. Much if it is preliminary in nature and is primarily in nature and is primarily intended for those involved in influenza control activities. It is understood that the contents of these report will not be released to the press, except by the Office of the Surgeon General, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. State Health Officers, of course, will judge the advisability of releasing any information from their own state." - cove
Union Jacks and Red Stars on Them : UK Intelligence, the Soviet Nuclear Threat and British Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1970.
No full textPhDThis thesis is a study of the British intelligence assessments produced by the UK's Joint
Intelligence Committee regarding the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities and intentions.
It examines the origins of such intelligence, the various organisations that collected,
collated and analysed it and how it fed into the Joint Intelligence structure. The thesis
seeks both to synthesise existing historical analysis and add new evidence on
intelligence organisation, collection, analysis and dissemination by examining the
development of such assessments over a twenty-five year period and considering how
well they reflected and informed British governments about the status and progress of
the Soviet nuclear threat. Lastly, it analyses how this intelligence fed into and may have
affected wider British military and ministerial decision-making regarding the course of
the UK's nuclear weapons policy between 1945 and 1970
CDC influenza surveillance report no. 57, April 13, 1960
No full text"Since the publication of the last CDC Influenza Surveillance Report No. 56, February 26, l960, the number of outbreaks of influenza and influenza-like diseases reported has diminished markedly. During the past 4 weeks, no reports of epidemic influenza have come to the attention of the Surveillance Section, CDC. The current analysis of influenza and pneumonia mortality, as reported from 108 United States cities, reveals that mortality due to these causes is again below the epidemic threshold, thus ending an unexpectedly high epidemic wave that extended over the preceding 13 weeks. As will be shown in Section III, the amount of excess mortality during the Winter 1959-60 epidemic was greater than in either of the waves of excess mortality associated with the 1957-58 Asian pandemic although the combined total of excess mortality of the two waves exceeded the excess mortality during the past Winter. A summary of data relating to the laboratory characterization of strains of influenza virus received at the WHO International Influenza Center for the Americas has been prepared by Dr. Roslyn Q. Robinson, Virus and Rickettsia Section, CDC, Montgomery, Alabama, and is included in this issue. During the first three months of 1960, epidemic influenza was reported from widespread areas of Europe and Scandinavia, as well as the Far East. Type A2 influenza virus has been identified in association with many of these outbreaks. This will be the last Influenza Surveillance Report of the current series. Although the surveillance of acute respiratory diseases will be issued, barring unusual developments, until the Fall of 1960. The Surveillance Section wishes to take this opportunity to thank all those who contributed so effectively to the surveillance of influenza during the recent outbreak and in making the influenza surveillance program operative in assessing the trends of epidemic influenza within the United States." - p. 2April 13, 1960.This report was prepared by Theodore C. Eickhoff, M. D., Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, Surveillance Section, Epidemiology Branch, CDC."For administrative use." - cover"Information contained in this report is a summary of data reported to CDC by State Health Departments, Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers, collaborating influenza diagnostic laboratories, and other pertinent sources. Much if it is preliminary in nature and is primarily in nature and is primarily intended for those involved in influenza control activities. It is understood that the contents of these report will not be released to the press, except by the Office of the Surgeon General, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. State Health Officers, of course, will judge the advisability of releasing any information from their own state." - cove
CDC influenza surveillance report no. 49, November 18, 1959
No full text"During the 6 month interval since the publication of the last CDC Influenza Surveillance Report in May, 1959, the occurrence of influenza in the United States has been extremely limited, both in distribution and frequency. The laboratory confirmed cases are tabulated by States in Section II, the majority of these reports were received in early and mid-summer, and, although no dates of onset are included in the laboratory reports, the predominance of Type B infections and the time suggest that most of these cases represent the last few sporadic infections of the Type B outbreaks last spring. As of this date there is no evidence that influenza is again becoming active in the United States. The analysis of influenza and pneumonia deaths from 108 selected cities, detailed in Section III, reveals an essentially normal curve, with no significant excesses in influenza and pneumonia mortality, Elsewhere during the summer months, widespread outbreaks were reported from Central and South America, Australia, the Philippines, India, and Africa. These reports are presented in Section IV. The outbreaks in the Far East and Western Pacific were primarily due to type A2, whereas those occurring in the Americas were of a mixed etiology, A2 and B. The present Public Health Service policy regarding influenza immunization is defined in a statement by the Surgeon General, appearing in Section V. Selected groups are described for whom influenza vaccination may be desirable, As the current influenza season begins, this CDC Influenza Surveillance Report will again be published regularly, with a frequency as determined by the extent and nature of occurrence of influenza this winter." - p. 2November 18, 1959.This report was prepared by Theodore C. Eickhoff, M. D., Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, Surveillance Section, Epidemiology Branch, CDC"For official use only; not for publication." - cover"Information contained in this report is a summary of data reported to CDC by State Health Departments, Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers, collaborating influenza diagnostic laboratories, and other pertinent sources. Much if it is preliminary in nature and is primarily in nature and is primarily intended for those involved in influenza control activities. It is understood that the contents of these report will not be released to the press, except by the Office of the Surgeon General, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. State Health Officers, of course, will judge the advisability of releasing any information from their own state." - cove
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