1,721,098 research outputs found
FDI and Trade -- Two Way Linkages?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal linkages between FDI and disaggregated measures of international trade. We outline a model exemplifying some of these linkages, describe several methods for investigating two-way feedbacks between various categories of trade, and apply them to the recent experience of developing countries. After controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional effects, we find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is between FDI and manufacturing trade. More precisely, applying Geweke (1982)%u2019s decomposition method, we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI (81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to simultaneous correlation between the two annual series.
FDI and Trade – Two Way Linkages?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal linkages between FDI and disaggregated measures of international trade. We outline a model exemplifying some of these linkages, describe several methods for investigating two-way feedbacks between various categories of trade, and apply them to the recent experience of developing countries. After controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional effects, we find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is between FDI and manufacturing trade. More precisely, applying Geweke (1982)’s decomposition method, we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI (81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to simultaneous correlation between the two annual series.financial openness, commercial openness, trade, foreign direct investment
Endogenous Financial and Trade Openness: Political Economy Considerations
This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness. First, we outline channels leading to two-way feedbacks between the different modes of openness; next, we identify these feedbacks empirically. We find that one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), controlling for political economy and macroeconomic factors. Similarly, increase in de-facto financial openness has powerful effects on future trade openness. While de-jure restrictions on capital mobility do not impact de-facto financial openness, de-jure restrictions on the current account have large adverse effect on commercial openness, suggesting that it is much easier to overcome restrictions on capital account convertibility than restrictions on commercial trade. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using the decomposition test developed in Geweke (1982). We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). The residual is due to simultaneous correlation between the two measures.
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Disasters
The aim of this study is to describe the macroeconomic dynamics of natural disasters and their determinants in a large sample of disaster events, the first such attempt we are aware of. Our research shows that natural disasters have a statistically observable adverse impact on the macroeconomy in the short-run. Not surprisingly, costlier events cause more pronounced slowdowns in production. Yet, interestingly, developing countries, and smaller economies, face much larger output declines following a disaster of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies. A close study of the determinants of these adverse macroeconomic output costs reveals several interesting patterns. Countries with a higher literacy rate, better institutions, higher per capita income, higher degree of openness to trade, and higher levels of government spending are better able to withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the macroeconomy. These all suggest an increased ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction. Financial conditions also seem to be of importance; countries with more foreign exchange reserves, and higher levels of domestic credit, but with less-open capital accounts appear more robust and better able to endure natural disasters, with less adverse spillover into domestic production.Natural disasters, growth
Unchained Melody: East Asia in Performance
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand continue to perform unsatisfactorily today, ten years after 1997 Asian Crisis. As of 2007, these crisis-affected economies have not fully recouped their losses from the lost opportunities from the Crisis. Unless economic performances return to past trends, another type of economic miracle story may be needed to reclaim their past economic standings. Unless GDP per capita expands faster than present trends, they will continue to face the costs of the lost opportunities. A positive combination of policies is needed: taking up the useful components of the past arrangements and putting in the missing instruments for sound macroeconomic management and international cooperation.Post-Asian Crisis Performance, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand
Endogenous Financial and Trade Openness
This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness. First, we outline a theoretical framework leading to two-way feedbacks between the different modes of openness; next, we identify these feedbacks empirically. We find that one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), controlling for political economy and macroeconomic factors. Similarly, increase in de-facto financial openness has powerful effects on future trade openness. De-jure restrictions on capital mobility have only a weak impact on de-facto financial openness, while de-jure restrictions on the current account have large adverse effect on commercial openness. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using Geweke's (1982) decomposition methodology. We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). We conclude that in an era of rapidly growing trade integration countries cannot choose financial openness independently of their degree of openness to trade. Dealing with greater exposure to financial turbulence by imposing restrictions on financial flows will likely be ineffectual.
Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: currency crises, capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets
Sudden Stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows (Calvo, 1998). We investigate the output effects of financial crises in emerging markets, focusing on whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Despite an emerging theoretical literature on Sudden Stops, empirical work to date has not precisely identified their occurrences nor measured their subsequent output effects in broad samples. Analysis of Sudden Stops may provide the key to understanding why some currency/balance of payments crises entail very large output losses, while others are frequently followed by expansions. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. We find that sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2-3 percent, while a Sudden Stop reduces output by an additional 6-8 percent in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a Sudden Stop is even larger, around 13-15 percent over a three-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997-98 Asian Crisis. The empirical results are robust to alternative model specifications, lag structures and using estimation procedures (IV and GMM) that correct for bias associated with simultaneity and estimation of dynamic panel models with country-specific effects.Financial crises - Mexico ; Developing countries
Fiscal and Monetary Policies and the Cost of Sudden Stops
This article investigates the effects of macroeconomic policy (monetary and fiscal) on output growth during financial crises characterized by a “sudden stop” in net capital inflows in developing and emerging market economies. We investigate 83 sudden stop crises in 77 countries over 1982-2003 using a baseline empirical model to control for the various determinants of output losses during sudden stop crises. Extending the baseline model to account for policies-- contractionary as well as expansionary-- we measure the marginal effects of policy on output losses. Simple descriptive statistics indicate no apparent correlation between the costs of financial crises and the economic policies pursed at the time. Once controlling for various pre-conditions and other factors, however, we find that monetary and fiscal tightening at the time of a sudden stop crisis significantly worsens output losses.Output losses, financial crises, sudden stops, fiscal policy, financial policy
The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows
We evaluate the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely. Using data from a panel of developing economies from 1982-98, we examine whether the changes in the regime governing capital flows took place during participation in IMF programs. We find evidence that IMF program participation is correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. We verify the robustness of our results using alternative indicators of capital account openness. To determine whether decontrol was premature, we compare the economic and financial characteristics of countries that decontrolled during IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently and find some evidence of IMF-led premature liberalizations.IMF programs; capital account liberalization
The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows
Using data from a panel of developing economies from the 1982-98 period, the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely is evaluated. Examining whether the changes in the regime governing capital flows took place during participation in IMF programs, evidence finds that IMF program participation is correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. Alternative indicators of capital account openness were used to test the robustness of the results by comparing the economic and financial characteristics of countries that decontrolled during IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently to determine whether decontrol was premature.
- …
