1,720,986 research outputs found
The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets : loss aversion or 'bad-deal' aversion?
Full text linkSeveral experimental studies have reported that an otherwise robust regularity-the disparity between Willingness-To-Accept and Willingness-To-Pay-tends to be greatly reduced in repeated markets, posing a serious challenge to existing reference-dependent and reference-independent models alike. This article offers a new account of the evidence, based on the assumptions that individuals are affected by good and bad deals relative to the expected transaction price (price sensitivity), with bad deals having a larger impact on their utility ('bad-deal' aversion). These features of preferences explain the existing evidence better than alternative approaches, including the most recent developments of loss aversion models
Reciprocity and the Paradox of Trust in psychological game theory
Full text linkRabin's psychological game-theoretic model of ‘fairness’ has been the starting point for a literature about preferences for reciprocity. In this literature, reciprocity is modelled by defining an individual's ‘kindness’ or ‘unkindness’ in terms of the consequences of his actions for others, and assuming a motivation to reward (punish) other people's kindness (unkindness). Contrary to intuition, this form of reciprocity cannot explain mutually beneficial trust and trustworthiness in a simple Trust Game. We formalise and offer a diagnosis of this ‘Paradox of Trust’. We distinguish between two kinds of reciprocity. Rabin's concept of reciprocal kindness is a psychologically plausible motivation, and the paradox is an informative result about the implications of this motivation. However, trust is better understood in terms of reciprocal cooperation – the motivation to play one's part in mutually beneficial practices, conditional on others playing their parts. We show that a theory of reciprocal cooperation can avoid the paradox
The pizza night game : conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points
Full text linkWe report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination
Theory of mind, perceived intentions and reciprocal behaviour : evidence from individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder
No full textEvidence suggests that departures from pure self-interest are due, at least partly, to individuals conditioning their behaviour on the perceived intentions of others. We present a new experiment that refines the study of intention-based other-regarding motives. Using a series of mini-ultimatum games that have been extensively studied in the literature, we compare the behaviour of normally-developing (ND) children to that of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), who typically lack the ability to attribute intentions to the observed actions of others. We find that ND children’s rejection behaviour responds systematically to changes in the set of available options, in line with previous findings. ASD children’s rejections are virtually unaffected by the intentions that could be inferred from the games’ strategy space. These differences are mainly driven by ASD children with low mentalising abilities
Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining
Full text linkSchelling proposed that payoff-irrelevant cues can affect the outcome of tacit bargaining games by creating focal points. Tests of this hypothesis have found that conflicts of interest between players inhibit focal-point reasoning. We investigate experimentally whether this effect is reduced if players have imperfect information about each other's payoffs. When players know only their own payoffs, they fail to ignore this information even though it cannot assist coordination; the effects of payoff-irrelevant cues on coordination success are small. When no exact information about payoffs is provided, payoff-irrelevant cues are more helpful, but not as much as when conflict is absent
The willingness to pay — willingness to accept gap, the “endowment effect,” subject misconceptions, and experimental procedures for eliciting valuations : comment
No full textPlott and Zeiler (2005) report that the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept disparity is absent for mugs in a particular experimental setting, designed to neutralize misconceptions about the procedures used to elicit valuations. This result has received sustained attention in the literature. However, other data from that same study, not published in that paper, exhibit a significant and persistent disparity when the same experimental procedures are applied to lotteries. We report new data confirming both results, thereby suggesting that the presence or absence of a disparity may be a more complex issue than some may have supposed. (JEL C91, D12, D81, D83
Testing the 'standard' model of stochastic choice under risk
Full text linkModels of stochastic choice are intended to capture the substantial amount of noise observed in decisions under risk. We present an experimental test of one model, which many regard as the default—the Basic Fechner model. We consider one of the model’s key assumptions—that the noise around the subjective value of a risky option is independent of other features of the decision problem. We find that this assumption is systematically violated. However the main patterns in our data can be accommodated by a more recent variant of the Fechner model, or within the random preference framework
Voluntary interaction and the principle of mutual benefit
Full text linkMost social preference theories are based on observations of nonvoluntary interactions. Nonselfish behavior may take fundamentally different forms in voluntary interactions, such as market transactions. We investigate the “Principle of Mutual Benefit”—an injunctive norm requiring individuals who enter interactions voluntarily to conform to common expectations about behavior within them. This norm induces patterns of behavior inconsistent with existing social preference theories and allows extrinsic incentives to crowd in trustworthiness. We embed this norm in a model consistent with evidence about promise keeping, gift exchange, and “avoiding the ask.” We present new experimental evidence that people adhere to it
Does the Allais Paradox Survive with Non-Monetary Consequences?
Full text linkThe form of the Allais paradox known as the common ratio effect (CRE) is a violation of deterministic expected utility theory that has been widely replicated with monetary outcomes. Its robustness has stimulated the development of numerous alternative models of risky choice. However, much less is known about the prevalence of the CRE in decisions involving non-monetary outcomes. We conduct a controlled laboratory comparison of the CRE for money versus consumer goods. The CRE is very strong with money, but largely disappears for goods, primarily as a result of differences in risk attitudes between goods and money. We caution against assuming that findings from experiments involving monetary lotteries will reliably generalise to other types of consequences
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