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Il noto e il conosciuto. Ontologia ed epistemologia nella filosofia di Hegel
Get PDFIn this paper, I want to show that Hegel’s philosophy is not reducible to a kind of subjective idealism according to which the reality of world (the ontological dimension) is merged into the structure of subjectivity (the epistemological dimension), or which think that the reality of world is a construction of the thinking subject. I want to show how Hegel’s philosophy can be read as a radical attempt to save the world from its reduction to a mere projection, a simulacrum or a subjective construction. That of Hegel is a very radical attempt, because he wants to save the autonomy of the world recognizing at the same time the role of the epistemic structures of subjectivity to the constitution of reality. The subjective epistemic structure are not extraneous, according to Hegel, to the very concept of the world and this non-extraneity is the condition of possibility, in order to think the access to the world by the subject
Pensiero e realtà. La problematizzazione del rapporto tra soggetto e mondo tra Kant e Hegel.
No full textIn the present contribution the author will take issue with the simplistic view that understands the philosophical movement that goes from Kant to Hegel as a form of “subjectivist idealism” - the latter being a philosophical theory according to which the reality of the world is entirely absorbed within the framework of subjectivity, making the world nothing but a construction of the thinking subject. Both Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies are, on the contrary, the radical attempt to save the world from being reduced to a projection, construction or appearance made up by the subject. The radical nature of these attempts lies in the fact that they are at the same time committed to the following claim: the epistemic structures of subjectivity are far from being alien to the inner structures of reality. This proximity is rather the very condition of possibility for a subject to access the world, and a fortiori for a true knowledge of the world itself
L'oggettività del pensiero. La filosofia di Hegel tra idealismo, anti-idealismo e realismo: un'introduzione.
Get PDFThought, according to Hegel, is not only the product of a faculty of a subject, or a means by which a thinking subject tries to grasp a world that is alien to him. It is also the very structure of the world, that is disclosed to a subject through the thinking activity of a subject. The fundamental question that crosses the whole post-Kantian philosophy is that of the relation between thought and reality, i.e. the question of whether reality depends on the categorial requirements imposed by the thinking subject, or whether reality maintains some form of independence from the thinking subject. Seen from this standpoint, Hegel can be read both as an author who radicalizes Kant’s transcendental perspective, and also as a critic of that perspective. In other words, he can be seen as an idealist: according to Hegel, any philosophy is idealist if it claims that something finite, qua finite, is essentially connected with something other. He can also be seen as an anti-idealist: insofar as his philosophy aims to overcome a hyper-transcendentalist perspective, i.e. it is so since it rejects idealism as subjective idealism. Moreover, Hegel’s anti-idealism can be characterized as realism.
This is because, if we admit that overcoming transcendentalism without falling back again on a pre-critical conception of thought and of reality involves an idea of thought which is not reducible to a "mentalistic" conception of it, we need to conceive of thought as something that is not alien to reality. Hegel conceives of thought as intimately connected with the world, as its own rational structure. This “realism” of thought is what makes Hegelian idealism, so to speak, anti-idealistic. Through this "realism" of thought Hegel pursues two goals. On the one hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought, according to which a subject talks and relates to a reality that is always only a construction of him, and so it is necessarily the simulacrum of something that remains inaccessible in its truth. On the other hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a conception of reality characterized merely as alien and opposite to thought itself, and which is the counterpart of the subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought. By pursuing these two goals it should be gained a conception of reality which could warrant some form of objectivity, but which cannot be equated with the substantialistic conception of the pre-Kantian metaphysics
Finitezza, alterità , differenza. Note in margine alla proposta ermeneutica di Mario Ruggenini
No full textIl saggio discute alcuni dei concetti portanti la proposta ermeneutica di Mario Ruggenini cercando di metterne in evidenza le strutture portanti
Il sistema come forma della libertà nella filosofia di Hegel (Razionalità e improvvisazione)
No full textThis paper is aimed at clarifying the connection between two notions that are inherently related in Hegel's philosophy, namely system and freedom. I will show how these two notions are mutually supportive, that is to say, they imply one another. I believe this dynamic can shed light on the relationship between rationality and improvisation. More specifically, through the discussion of the relationship between freedom and system, that is, the relationship between freedom and reason, I will investigate the peculiar form of rationality that is active in the practice of conscious improvisation. Moreover, I will explore the inherent necessity enlivening and constituting the experience of freedom that is embodied in this practice
Tra scienza e saggezzza. Intorno allo statuto della filosofia in kant
No full textAim of the paper is to analyze the status of philosophy with reference to Kant. Through the distinction between 'rational knowledge' and 'historical knwoledge' and through the distinction between rational knokwledge proceeding through costrunction of notions (mathematics) and a rational discursive knowledge (philosophy) it is possible to show in what sense according to Kant philosophy is identical with philosophize
Centro interuniversitario di didattica della filosofia
No full textl'articola argomenta a favore della necessità di una riflessione propriamente filosofica in rapporto alla didattica della filosofi
A proposito di una recente critica alla filosofia della natura di Hegel
No full textIl contributo si propone come una discussione critica del lavoro di Wolfgang Bonsiepen sulla Naturphilosophie tedesca
Between Science and Wisdom. On the Kantian Notion of Philosophy
No full textIn order to analyze Kantian notion of philosophy, the paper moves from the difference between mathematics and philosophy, between natural sciences and philosophy, between the 'scholastic' and the 'cosmoplitical' notion of philosophy. In this articulation philosophy (which is identified with philosophize) implies a link with the dimension of wisdom
Per un naturalismo non naturalistico. Pensare la natura fra epistemologia e ontologia
No full textIn this paper, I present a philosophical perspective that I call «non-naturalistic naturalism». By juxtaposing these seemingly contradictory concepts, I aim to emphasize both the relevance of the concept of nature – which, I argue, should be kept in our conceptual frameworks – and the need for its redefinition, particularly in contrast to its reductive naturalistic interpretation, which posits it as a separate realm from human dimension. I argue that contemporary trends advocating for the abandonment of the concept of nature in favor of alternative notions risk conflating the ontological and epistemological dimensions of their discourse, thereby ending up into a radicalization of a modern dualist paradigm rather than into its dissolution. To advance the denaturalization of nature – which amounts to its decolonization from its naturalistic interpretation – I will critically examine contemporary attempts to deconstruct the concept of nature. Drawing on examples from classical German philosophy, I will focus on the notion of agency, interpreting it not as something in opposition to the dimension of nature but rather as a fundamental constituent thereof
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