1,721,003 research outputs found

    Price Distortion under Fixed-Mobile Substitution

    No full text
    This paper analyses the impact of substitution between fixed and mobile telephony on call prices. We develop a model where consumers differ in the benefits of mobility and firms price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. We find that call prices are distorted downwards due to substitution possibilities and customer heterogeneity, and that this distortion increases with the fixed-mobile termination mark-up

    National FTTH Plans in France, Italy and Portugal

    No full text
    In this paper, we analyse the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage coinvestment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries

    Geographic Access Rules and Investment

    No full text
    We analyze competition between vertically integrated infrastructure operators that provide access in different geographical areas. A regulator may impose a uniform access price, set local access rates, or deregulate access locally. We analyze the impact of these alternative regulatory regimes on network investments. While cost-based access leads to both suboptimal rollout and duplication, uniform access prices bring too much duplication. Deregulation in competitive areas can spur investment and lead to social optimum, or call for continued regulatory intervention, depending on the resulting wholesale equilibrium

    Cooperative Investment, Access, and Uncertainty

    No full text
    This paper compares the impacts of traditional one–way access obligations and the new regulatory scheme of co-investment on the roll-out of network infrastructures. We show that compulsory access leads to smaller roll-out, first because it reduces the returns from investment, and second because in the presence of uncertainty it provides access seekers with an option whose exercise hurts investors. Co-investment without access obligations leads to risk sharing and eliminates the access option, implying highest network coverage. Allowing for access on top of co-investment actually decreases welfare if the access price is low

    Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access

    No full text
    We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for coinvestment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition

    Geographic Access Markets and Investments

    No full text
    We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investmen

    Fixed-Mobile Integration

    No full text
    Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains

    Ex-ante Regulation and Co-investment in the Transition to Next Generation Access

    Full text link
    Investments in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, we discuss arguments and proposals for guidelines that might be useful to regulators and policy makers
    corecore