117 research outputs found
The Validity of British Army counterinsurgency doctrine after the war in Iraq 2003-2009
Get PDFThis thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering insurgency is still valid in the light of the war in Iraq. Why is this important? Insurgency remains a prevalent form of instability. In the absence of a major conventional threat to British security, it is one which is likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable future. If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by the campaign in Iraq, this will have profound implications for the way the Army approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future. If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to account for the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009.
Using historiographical techniques, the thesis examines the principal influences on extant British doctrine, developed in 1995. It analyzes the principal British manuals, the influence on doctrine of the campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the theories of Sir Robert Thompson and Gen. Sir Frank Kitson in order to distil a ‘British Approach,’ against which both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq are judged. It examines the course of operations in Southern Iraq to determine the validity of Counter Insurgency Operations, and uses the U.S. Army’s experience in developing and applying new doctrine in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 as a comparator. The thesis concludes that there was a dichotomy between theory and practice: British doctrine provided a valid theory for counterinsurgency, yet British commanders followed it only in part to achieve, at best, mixed results. Conversely, U.S. commanders applied their new doctrine, based on British theory, to great effect. While British doctrine may be valid, the issue was the extent to which it had been assimilated
The development of the British army during the wars with France, 1793-1815
Get PDFThe British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was outwardly little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the Wars, twenty-two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed infantry, manoeuvred as chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley and bayonet, having spent a hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were still beautifully and often impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive charge, on their unfed and often sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his troops as 'the scum of the earth', who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for life. It would therefore appear that little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will be a study of continuity rather than change. However, this thesis will show that despite outward appearances, the Army that took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically different from the one that entered the conflict in 1793, being modernised in line with other institutions of state, and other European armies. This thesis is first and foremost intended to be a contribution to the history of the British Army from the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the reduction of the forces after the battle of Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption that the understanding of not only that history, but the history of the developing British state, will be significantly advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes which took place within, the Army during the Wars with France
'BROTHERS IN ARMS'?: The American and British Coalition on the Western Front, 1918
Get PDFThis dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of
the 27 th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the
announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed
on the two divisions after they were attached to the 11 American Corps. especiallý
their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training
received under the supervision of British officers.
The 11 American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in
the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these
were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen.
John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and
operated entirely independent of 11 American Corps. The týýo American divisions
that h, oth remained with the British, the 27t and -3 , relied heavily upon their coalition
partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly,
tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from
being th -, oth amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27 and -)
Divisions
became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Arrný during the final campaigns of
the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western
Front in 1918, the 11 American Corps suffered heavý casualties during its limited
operational experience and. in many ways. failed to take advantage of lessons
learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917.
This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American
divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the
27 th and 30'hDivisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the
British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the
tNNo ,a llies became Brothers-in-Arms
Canned vegetables: a case history in central procurement at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot during World War II. CQMD historical studies.
No full textThe mighty task of procuring subsistence for the Army, one of the main functions of the Quartermaster Corps, has undergone radical changes in method since the national defense program was intensified in mid-1940. Not the least unusual of the changes has occurred in the purchasing of canned fruits and vegetables, classed as non-perishable subsistence. Contents include: canned vegetables, procurement before World War II; procurement during the emergency, 1940-1941- development of centralized buying; procurement for war- the set aside order provides the pattern; field buying in its trial period- 1942; and development of the field buying system- 1943. Tables detail estimated government requirements out of 1942 pack of fruits and vegetables and experience and background of procurement specialists in Canned Vegetables Section, Grocery Branch, Chicago Quartermaster Depot, as of 1942
Repression, Human Rights, and US Training of Military Forces from the South
Get PDFIn order to understand whether US training of military forces from the South has resulted in the use of repression or improvements in human rights, we need to situate the training within the broader context of US foreign policy objectives and strategies. The main aims of US foreign policy are to maintain its dominant global position and to ensure control of resources and markets in the South. These objectives are being pursued through an emerging, US-led transnational state, using the instruments of legitimation at least as much as repression. This contrasts with the Cold War, during which US foreign policy strategy towards the South emphasised repression. US training of military forces from the South during the Cold War played a key role in a US-led network, through which many states in the South were connected to the US and each other by cooperation between their militaries, police and intelligence services. The training was dominated by a particular form of counterinsurgency instruction which advocated repression of groups that might potentially threaten US control of Southern economies and assets. This contributed to widespread human rights violations, particularly in Latin America. Following the end of the Cold War, reliance on coercion diminished, and it was subsumed within the emergent transnational state. In line with this shift in US foreign policy strategy in the South, some aspects of the training began to be characterised by the promotion of legitimation. In the wake of 9/11, the US has intensified both its legitimation efforts and its use of repression, and the training continues to play a significant role in the service of US foreign policy objectives
A critical analysis of the Royal Air Force air superiority campaign in India, Burma and Malaya, 1941-1945
Get PDFA thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Wolverhampton for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.The conflict in the Far East between 1941 and 1945 is occasionally referred to as the “Forgotten War” in Britain and this description extends to the way the campaign’s air war has been analysed. However, the role of air power in Burma was vitally important to the campaign, in particular the attainment of air superiority in order to facilitate supply and close support operations. The foundation of these operations was dependent on the Allies achieving and maintaining air superiority and latterly air supremacy over the Japanese. This thesis will analyse how the Allies lost air superiority during the initial exchanges, and then how technical and material difficulties were overcome before air superiority was won in 1944 and air supremacy was gained in 1945. It will analyse the importance of the RAF’s tactics, early warning systems, equipment, training and counter-air offensive in the theatre between 1941 and 1945. Furthermore, the thesis will demonstrate how Japanese industry, their war in the Pacific, and their use of air power in Burma ultimately affected the air war’s eventual outcome. The study will examine current historiography to question and corroborate existing views, as well as to reveal new information not previously published
The Development of British civil affairs and its employment in the British sector of allied military operations during the Battle of Normandy, June to August 1944
Get PDFCivil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military
organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were
maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during
the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to
focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian
problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses
the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This
contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and
diplomatic history.
If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to
the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that
in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it
was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained.
Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs
approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign
was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was
arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had
to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military
circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of
the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility.
Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was
militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider
diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The
research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the
various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the
lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the
significantly larger problems encountered later in the war
The general as statesman : exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach
Get PDFThe problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy in practice. This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to facilitate and sustain the local political process. This requires military co-operation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes.
This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building role of the military component. Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, commanders have quietly assumed a political function. Doctrine now needs to be refreshed to reflect practice. It should explain the military role in supporting the political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military relationships
The collectors : Naval, Army and Air Intelligence in the New Zealand Armed Forces during the Second World War
No full textThis thesis examines the performance of the intelligence collection organisations of the armed services of New Zealand during the Second World War. It considers the intelligence bodies of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force and looks at their growth, development and demise, and assesses their effectiveness as intelligence organisations. The question of how much New Zealand could be expected to achieve in the field of intelligence arises, not least because New Zealand was demographically small, had a long coastline and was geographically relatively remote. How much could New Zealand contribute to the Allied cause in intelligence terms is another issue, and what forms did any participation take? Were there lessons to be learned from the wartime experience (there were, but they went for the most part largely unheeded)?
New Zealand, like other countries, had a fragmented approach to intelligence collection, making for a degree of complexity over a range of activity, despite the intelligence organisations being of modest size. The examination of the organisations in this thesis includes multi-service and multi-departmental dimensions along with the production of useful intelligence. Whether good use was made of intelligence collected is another matter. There was a substantial amount of liaison, contact and practice between departments of state as to various aspects of intelligence, the Organization for National Security and coastwatching being two notable areas. The overarching role and limitations of the Organization for National Security with regard to intelligence is explored, and the development of a combined intelligence centre examined. The participation of New Zealand signals intelligence organisations in the great Allied interception offensive is detailed, along with the mundane but fundamental task of coastal surveillance. The establishment and spectacular decline of the first local independent security service is traced. Both the intelligence and security aspects of the Army's operationally deployed units are covered, along with the growth of RNZAF air intelligence.
The effectiveness of all of these organisations could hardly be expected to be uniform, and indeed it was not. Some bodies succeeded in their collection roles beyond expectations, others were reasonably effective, and two organisations failed dismally in different ways, for a number of reasons. If a pattern emerges at all, it is that small single service component-type intelligence sections collecting operational intelligence were the most effective New Zealand intelligence organisations. Operational focus and. operational requirements underlay the drive for successful collection. Most significant within the Allied context were the signals intelligence bodies. At the other end of the scale, larger co-operative interdepartmental New Zealand intelligence ventures failed to deliver projected results.
New Zealand's armed forces had an interesting variety of intelligence contributions during the Second World War. Of these, the most effective organisations collected intelligence to meet directed operational requirements
'The report on her transfer was shell shock': a study of the psychological disorders of nurses and female Voluntary Aid Detachments who served alongside the British and Allied Expeditionary Forces during the First World War, 1914-1918
No full textShell Shock, described as the ‘emblematic psychiatric disorder’ of the First World War has long been synonymous with its soldiers. Its association with close proximity to exploding shells and thus the front lines, leading to the various symptoms of ‘shock’, has both facilitated and ensured its existence throughout the twentieth and twenty first centuries as a masculine affliction. Of the many shell shock studies that have been produced over the last few decades all have focused purely on the experience of the male combatant, predominantly because of this long held preoccupation with ‘front-line’ warfare and its consequences apparently being the preserve of men. Despite the prolonged interest and analysis of shell shock by medical and social historians along with a significant amount of work by feminist and, more recently, revisionist historians, detailing the involvement of women in the First World War, there is stHl no comprehensive study of the psychological problems encountered and suffered by the women who served alongside the British Expeditionary Forces (BEE). However, this study of the roles and duties of a specific group of women, namely nurses, voluntary aid detachments, and ambulance drivers, reveals they frequently endured a variety of traumatic experiences, involving injuries and fatalities, through the vicarious witnessing and dealing with horrific sights and sounds, all compounded by extremes of conditions and privations. Many, if not all, of these factors were given as antecedents for war neurosis in soldiers. Yet, while the nurse has been idolised for her role in the Great War, her experience of psychological ‘breakdown’ has not been examined. This thesis, through the analysis of professional medical literature, of medical case notes, personal testimonies, diaries and autobiographies, is a contribution to the areas of women’s history, medical history and, more specifically, to the history of psychological war trauma. Following a review of the literature in chapter one, chapter two is a re-examination of the proximity of nurses to the fighting zones and therefore of their exposure to danger. Chapter three analyses the nurses’ experience and subsequent symptoms of war trauma, including, importantly, how contemporary medical authorities understood the disorder, and then cared for and managed their female sufferers. These two chapters fundamentally argue that the notion of war-induced traumatic neurosis being the preserve of men is essentially pretence, and that this ‘focus’ on male sufferers means the history of the condition is incomplete. Chapter four essentially examines the issues of repatriation faced by these nurses, specifically examining the evolution of war disability pensions process of which they were excluded until 1920. It also looks at how the nurse, as female war veteran, coped with the consequences of her war experience. In conclusion, this thesis asserts that these nurses did indeed suffer psychologically for their involvement in this war and not because their symptoms and disorders ‘resembled’ those experienced by men, but were in fact, indistinguishable to the extent that some nurses were classed as ‘shellshocked
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