24 research outputs found
Der kampf um Sizilien.
No full textGerman copy of Division "Hermann Goering" in Sicily 1943, 10-14 July 1943, commentary
Partisan warfare in Croatia, project # 41.
No full textThe first section of the manuscript deals with the situation in Croatia as well as the military and political organization of the partisans and of the German occupation forces from 1942 on. The second section contains tactical examples of partisan warfare presented in the form of separate narrations, in each of which the German and enemy measures and, where suitable, the practical knowledge gained thereby are set forth. Contents include: the situation in Croatia after 1942; partisan organization in Croatia; German organization and battle command; tactical examples from the partisan war; how the 54th Rifle Regiment performed its mission; the tactics of the partisans; the capture of the Signal Communication Platoon of the 54th Rifle Regiment at Pivnica on 13 July 1943; the mopping up of the Fruska gora by the 9th SS and police regiment between 24 July and 3 August 1943; attack on the garrison of Casinci; attack on Ludbreg; the destruction of the garrison of Casma; four short stories; defense areas; battles for Nasice; even Banja Luka proves impossible to hold; and the Bilo gora Operation as a test case
The Development of British civil affairs and its employment in the British sector of allied military operations during the Battle of Normandy, June to August 1944
Full text linkCivil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military
organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were
maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during
the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to
focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian
problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses
the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This
contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and
diplomatic history.
If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to
the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that
in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it
was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained.
Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs
approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign
was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was
arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had
to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military
circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of
the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility.
Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was
militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider
diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The
research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the
various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the
lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the
significantly larger problems encountered later in the war
The collectors : Naval, Army and Air Intelligence in the New Zealand Armed Forces during the Second World War
No full textThis thesis examines the performance of the intelligence collection organisations of the armed services of New Zealand during the Second World War. It considers the intelligence bodies of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force and looks at their growth, development and demise, and assesses their effectiveness as intelligence organisations. The question of how much New Zealand could be expected to achieve in the field of intelligence arises, not least because New Zealand was demographically small, had a long coastline and was geographically relatively remote. How much could New Zealand contribute to the Allied cause in intelligence terms is another issue, and what forms did any participation take? Were there lessons to be learned from the wartime experience (there were, but they went for the most part largely unheeded)?
New Zealand, like other countries, had a fragmented approach to intelligence collection, making for a degree of complexity over a range of activity, despite the intelligence organisations being of modest size. The examination of the organisations in this thesis includes multi-service and multi-departmental dimensions along with the production of useful intelligence. Whether good use was made of intelligence collected is another matter. There was a substantial amount of liaison, contact and practice between departments of state as to various aspects of intelligence, the Organization for National Security and coastwatching being two notable areas. The overarching role and limitations of the Organization for National Security with regard to intelligence is explored, and the development of a combined intelligence centre examined. The participation of New Zealand signals intelligence organisations in the great Allied interception offensive is detailed, along with the mundane but fundamental task of coastal surveillance. The establishment and spectacular decline of the first local independent security service is traced. Both the intelligence and security aspects of the Army's operationally deployed units are covered, along with the growth of RNZAF air intelligence.
The effectiveness of all of these organisations could hardly be expected to be uniform, and indeed it was not. Some bodies succeeded in their collection roles beyond expectations, others were reasonably effective, and two organisations failed dismally in different ways, for a number of reasons. If a pattern emerges at all, it is that small single service component-type intelligence sections collecting operational intelligence were the most effective New Zealand intelligence organisations. Operational focus and. operational requirements underlay the drive for successful collection. Most significant within the Allied context were the signals intelligence bodies. At the other end of the scale, larger co-operative interdepartmental New Zealand intelligence ventures failed to deliver projected results.
New Zealand's armed forces had an interesting variety of intelligence contributions during the Second World War. Of these, the most effective organisations collected intelligence to meet directed operational requirements
The general as statesman : exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach
Full text linkThe problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy in practice. This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to facilitate and sustain the local political process. This requires military co-operation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes.
This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building role of the military component. Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, commanders have quietly assumed a political function. Doctrine now needs to be refreshed to reflect practice. It should explain the military role in supporting the political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military relationships
The development of the British army during the wars with France, 1793-1815
Full text linkThe British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was outwardly little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the Wars, twenty-two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed infantry, manoeuvred as chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley and bayonet, having spent a hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were still beautifully and often impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive charge, on their unfed and often sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his troops as 'the scum of the earth', who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for life. It would therefore appear that little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will be a study of continuity rather than change. However, this thesis will show that despite outward appearances, the Army that took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically different from the one that entered the conflict in 1793, being modernised in line with other institutions of state, and other European armies. This thesis is first and foremost intended to be a contribution to the history of the British Army from the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the reduction of the forces after the battle of Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption that the understanding of not only that history, but the history of the developing British state, will be significantly advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes which took place within, the Army during the Wars with France
Union Jacks and Red Stars on Them : UK Intelligence, the Soviet Nuclear Threat and British Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1970.
No full textPhDThis thesis is a study of the British intelligence assessments produced by the UK's Joint
Intelligence Committee regarding the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities and intentions.
It examines the origins of such intelligence, the various organisations that collected,
collated and analysed it and how it fed into the Joint Intelligence structure. The thesis
seeks both to synthesise existing historical analysis and add new evidence on
intelligence organisation, collection, analysis and dissemination by examining the
development of such assessments over a twenty-five year period and considering how
well they reflected and informed British governments about the status and progress of
the Soviet nuclear threat. Lastly, it analyses how this intelligence fed into and may have
affected wider British military and ministerial decision-making regarding the course of
the UK's nuclear weapons policy between 1945 and 1970
The role of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in the national liberation struggle in South Africa with reference to the rural far northern Transvaal, 1976-1990
No full textIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 250-275)
Open source intelligence (OSINT): a contemporary intelligence lifeline
Full text linkTraditionally, intelligence has been distinguished from all other forms of information working by its secrecy.Secret intelligence is about the acquisition of information from entities that do not wish that information to be acquired and,ideally,never know that it has. However, the transformation in information and communication technology(ICT)over the last two decades challenges this conventionally held perception of intelligence in one critical aspect: that information can increasingly be acquired legally in the public domain-‘open source intelligence’(OSINT).
The intelligence community has recognised this phenomenon by formally creating discrete open source exploitation systems within extant intelligence institutions. Indeed,the exploitation of open source of information is reckoned by many intelligence practitioners to constitute 80 percent or more of final intelligence product. Yet,the resource committed to, and status of, open source exploitation belies that figure.
This research derives a model of the high order factors describing the operational contribution of open source exploitation to the broader intelligence function: context; utility; cross-check; communication; focus; surge; and analysis. Such a model is useful in three related ways: first, in determining appropriate tasking for the intelligence function as a whole; second, as a basis for optimum intelligence resource allocation; and third, as defining objectives for specifically open source policy and doctrine. Additionally, the research details core capabilities, resources, and political arguments necessary for successful open source exploitation.
Significant drivers shape the contemporary context in which nation-state intelligence functions operate: globalisation; risk society; and changing societal expectation. The contemporary transformation in ICT percolates each of them. Understanding this context is crucial to the intelligence community. Implicitly, these drivers shape intelligence, and the relationship intelligence manages between knowledge and power within politics,in order to optimise decision-making. Because open source exploitation obtains from this context, it is better placed than closed to understand it.Thus, at a contextual level,this thesis further argues that the potential knowledge derived from open source exploitation not only has a unique contribution by comparison to closed, but that it can also usefully direct power towards determination of the appropriate objectives upon which any decisions should be made at all
The factors which influence the selection of physical targets by terrorist groups
No full textThe aim of terrorism is to influence a group of people
or institutions - the psychological target or targets - by
attacking the appropriate physical targets in order to prompt
the desired response. Several factors influence the selection
of physical targets by non-state terrorist groups. These
include the ideology of the terrorist group concerned, the
strategy adopted by the group and its capabilities, its need
to take account of external opinion - including that of
supporters, the measures adopted to protect likely targets,
and the security environment within which the terrorist group
operates. In addition, decision-making is affected by the
dynamics within the group which are in turn affected by the
psychological pressures of clandestinity and the frequent
risk of death or capture which many terrorists run.
The relationship between these factors varies from
group to group, which is inevitable given the idiosyncratic
nature of most terrorist groups, and the different
circumstances in which they find themselves. However, it can
generally be said that ideology sets out the moral framework
within which terrorists operate - and which determines
whether terrorists judge it to be legitimate to attack a
range of target. After this, the determination of which
targets it will actually be beneficial to attack depends upon
the strategy which the group has adopted as a means of
achieving its political objectives. The determination of
their strategic objectives depends upon the effects which the
terrorists hope their attacks will achieve. Thus, strategy
further refines the range of targets initially delimited by
the group's ideology.
The other factors mentioned tend to act as constraints
upon the group, partly - as with security measures - in
restricting them from carrying out the types of attacks which
they would desire but also in encouraging them to carry out
attacks on certain targets in the hope of gaining benefits
such as the approval of their supporters, or of gaining
publicity for their cause. Underlying all of this is the
human factor, whereby relations within the group, the impact
of psychological pressure, and individual differences in
moral judgements may influence the targets chosen by
terrorists
