1,720,980 research outputs found
Regulating accuracy on university tests with the plurality option
No full textA single experiment is reported in which introductory psychology students were administered a multiple-choice test on psychology with either 4 (n = 78) or 5 alternatives (n = 92) prior to any lectures being delivered. Two answers were generated for each question: a small answer consisting of their favorite alternative, and a large answer consisting of all alternatives except for their least favorite one. They also rated confidence of the accuracy of both answers and selected one for grading (plurality option). Replicating previous research, there was evidence of a confidence-accuracy (C-A) dissociation for selected answers. Specifically, accuracy was higher, but confidence was lower, for selected large answers compared to selected small answers. However, unlike previous research, the C-A dissociation was coupled with marked underconfidence for both types of selected answers. The results are discussed in terms of option fixation, the base-rate fallacy, response criteria, and alternative plausibility
Not all errors are created equal: metacognition and changing answers on multiple-choice tests
No full textTwo experiments investigated the role of metacognition in changing answers to multiple-choice, general-knowledge questions. Both experiments revealed qualitatively different errors produced by speeded responding versus confusability amongst the alternatives; revision completely corrected the former, but had no effect on the latter. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that a pretest, designed to make participants' actual experience with answer changing either positive or negative, affected the tendency to correct errors. However, this effect was not apparent in the proportion of correct responses; it was only discovered when the metacognitive component to answer changing was isolated with a Type 2 signal-detection measure of discrimination. Overall, the results suggest that future research on answer changing should more closely consider the metacognitive factors underlying answer changing, using Type 2 signal-detection theory to isolate these aspects of performance
Dissociating early- and late-selection processes in recall: the mixed blessing of categorized study lists
No full textTwo experiments are reported in which we used type-2 signal detection theory to separate the effects of semantic categorization on early- and late-selection processes in free and cued recall. In Experiment 1, participants studied cue–target pairs for which the targets belonged to two, six, or 24 semantic categories, and later the participants were required to recall the targets either with (cued recall) or without (free recall) the studied cues. A confidence rating and a report decision were also required, so that we could compute both forced-report quantity and metacognitive resolution (type-2 discrimination), which served as our estimates of early- and late-selection processes, respectively. Consistent with prior research, having fewer categories enhanced the early-selection process (in performance, two > six > 24 categories). However, in contrast, the late-selection process was impaired (24 > six = two categories). In Experiment 2, encoding of paired associates, for which the targets belonged to either two or 20 semantic categories, was manipulated by having participants either form interactive images or engage in rote repetition. Having fewer categories again was associated with enhanced early selection (two > 20 categories); this effect was greater for rote repetition than for interactive imagery, and greater for free recall than for cued recall. However, late selection again showed the opposite pattern (20 > two categories), even with interactive-imagery encoding, which formed distinctive, individuated memory traces. The results are discussed in terms of early- and late-selection processes in retrieval, as well as overt versus covert recognition
Strong cues are not necessarily weak: Thomson and Tulving (1970) and the encoding specificity principle revisited
No full textPerformance on tests in which there is control over reporting (e.g., cued recall with the option to withhold responses) can be characterized by four parameters: free- and forced-report retrieval (correct responses retrieved from memory when the option to withhold responses is exercised and when it is not, respectively), monitoring (discrimination between correct and incorrect potential responses), and report bias (willingness to report responses). Typically, researchers do not examine all these components in cued-test performance; blanks are sometimes counted the same as errors, meaning that the (free-report) performance index is contaminated with report bias and monitoring ability. In this research, a two-stage testing procedure is described that allows measures of free- and forced-report retrieval, monitoring, and bias to be derived from the original encoding specificity experiments (Thomson & Tulving, 1970). The results show that their cue-reinstatement manipulation affected free-report retrieval, but once report bias and monitoring effects were removed by forcing output, retrieval was unaffected
Beyond reliability and validity: The role of metacognition in psychological testing
No full textMuch research on psychological testing in educational contexts has focused on issues to do with reliability and validity. An excellent example is the debate over whether or not to penalize errors on multiple-choice tests, so called formula scoring. The case in support of formula scoring has typically focused on the idea that it may improve the reliability and validity of the test by removing error variance from the observed score. However, because students writing formula-scored tests are given the opportunity to "pass" on questions for which the answer is not known, opponents of formula scoring have argued that it contaminates the test score by introducing strategic factors. For example, conservative or risk-averse students may penalize themselves by answering too few questions on the test. A key factor that has been missing from this debate is the role of metacognitive monitoring, that is, the extent to which students can assess the accuracy of their own answers. Students with good metacognitive monitoring are at an advantage relative to students with poor monitoring because they know better which answers to offer (correct ones) and which to omit (incorrect ones). This parameter contaminates the corrected test score and varies between individuals just as aptitude or knowledge does, yet commonly used methods of scoring have no way of estimating its influence. In this chapter, we outline a signal-detection model that allows this metacognitive parameter to be estimated separately from other test parameters, review research on its influence, and make recommendations to test designers as to how they can obtain purer measures of the different aspects of test performanc
Accuracy discrimination and type-2 signal detection theory: clarifications, extensions, and an analysis of bias
No full textBeyond dissociation logic: evidence for controlled and automatic influences in artificial grammar learning
No full textEvidence for unconscious learning has typically been based on dissociations between direct and indirect tests of learning. Because of some inherent problems with dissociation logic, we applied the logic of opposition to 2 artificial grammar learning experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were exposed to 2 different sets of letter strings, generated from 2 different grammars, and later rated test strings for grammaticality with either in-concert (rate grammatical strings consistent with either structure) or opposition (rate grammatical only strings from 1 of the structures) instructions. Manipulating response deadline affected controlled, but not automatic influences. In Experiment 2, after similar training, a source-monitoring test was administered from which the in-concert and opposition conditions were derived. The test indicated that varying the retention interval affected controlled, but not automatic, influences. The results are discussed in terms of awareness, knowledge representation, and metacognitive processing
Memory and metacognition in dangerous situations: investigating cognitive impairment from gas narcosis in undersea divers
No full textObjective: The current study tested whether undersea divers are able to accurately judge their level of memory impairment from inert gas narcosis.Background: Inert gas narcosis causes a number of cognitive impairments, including a decrement in memory ability. Undersea divers may be unable to accurately judge their level of impairment, affecting safety and work performance.Method: In two underwater field experiments, performance decrements on tests of memory at 33 to 42 m were compared with self-ratings of impairment and resolution. The effect of depth (shallow [1-11 m] vs. deep [33-42 m]) was measured on free-recall (Experiment 1; n = 41) and cued-recall (Experiment 2; n = 39) performance, a visual-analogue self-assessment rating of narcotic impairment, and the accuracy of judgements-of-learning (JOLs).Results: Both free- and cued-recall were significantly reduced in deep, compared to shallow, conditions. This decrement was accompanied by an increase in self-assessed impairment. In contrast, resolution (based on JOLs) remained unaffected by depth. The dissociation of memory accuracy and resolution, coupled with a shift in a self-assessment of impairment, indicated that divers were able to accurately judge their decrease in memory performance at depth.Conclusion: These findings suggest that impaired self-assessment and resolution may not actually be a symptom of narcosis in the depth range of 33 to 42 m underwater and that the divers in this study were better equipped to manage narcosis than prior literature suggested. The results are discussed in relation to implications for diver safety and work performance
Wordless wisdom: the dominant role of tacit knowledge in true and fake news discrimination
No full textIn this preregistered study, we investigated the type of knowledge people use to discriminate between true and fake news by asking participants (N = 327 Prolific users residing in the United States) to rate the veracity of different news headlines and indicate what decision strategy they used to make each rating (guess, intuition, familiarity, prior knowledge, rule, or other). We found that participants discriminated well between true and fake news headlines, and predominantly chose decision strategies that suggested they were using tacit knowledge (knowledge that is not easily articulated) rather than explicit knowledge (knowledge that is easily articulated). For example, guess and intuition were chosen 63% of the time, and participants’ discrimination was good even when they claimed to be guessing. The fact that tacit knowledge formed the dominant basis of participants’ discriminative ability speaks to the types of interventions that may be successful in improving this skill
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