17 research outputs found
G-2 after action reports, June 44 to April 45: 30th Infantry Division.
No full textContains "after action/after battle reports" from the 30th Infantry Division during World War Two. The document provides information on the enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and enemy operations
After action reports, G-4 Section, Headquarters 30th Infantry Division.
No full textAfter action report dates include the following: 1 April 1945; 1 March 1945; 1 February 1945; 2 January 1945; 1 December 1944; 1 November 1944; 1 October 1944; 5 September 1944; 3 August 1944; and 19 July 1944
After action reports, June 1944 to May 1945, 30th Infantry Division Artillery.
No full textThis collection is not complete and may have gaps. Includes reports and dates: 1 May 1945, 1 April 1945, [1] March 1945, 1 February 1945, 1 January 1945, history Thirtieth Infantry Division Artillery 1-30th November 1944, 1-31st October 1944, 1st-30th September 1944, 5 September 1944, 1st-31st August 1944, statistics, 1-31 July 1944, 20 July 1944, and 1-30 June 1944
G-3 after action reports, June 1944 to April 1945: 30th Infantry.
No full textContains multiple overlays showing disposition of troops. The collection is not complete and may have gaps
After action reports, Office of the Quartermaster, 30th Infantry Division.
No full textContained within this document are after operation reports of action against the enemy with dates 20 July 1944, 4 August 1944, {5} September 1944, 5 November 1944, 5 January 1945, 5 February 1945, 4 March 1945, and 5 April 1945
ASF report no. 4 – forwarding a report on operations of the 105th Engineer Combat Battalion in the breaching of the Siegfried Line by the 30th Infantry Division.
No full textThe attached report covers the preparations and operations of the 105th Engineer Combat Battalion, supported by the 1104th Engineer Group, in the breaching of the Siegfried Line by the 30th Infantry Division in the period 2 October 1944 to 6 October 1944. "On September 19, 1944, the 30th Infantry Division reached a north-south line generally one-half mile west of the Wurm River between Kerkrade and Teveren and prepared to attack to the east thru the Siegfried Line upon XIX Corps' order." Table of contents: introduction; the Siegfried Line in the 30th Division area; division plan of assault; engineer plan of support to the assault; preparation for the assault; comments and operation and suggestions for improvement training for similar operations; and various annexes
Immediate report no. C-954. Report, Army Ground Forces Board ETO number C-954.
No full textReport, Army Ground Forces Board ETO number C-954. The following narrative of the functions of the division G-2 section was obtained in conversation with and from the files of Lieutenant Colonel Stewart L. Hall, GSC, G-2, 30th Division. While somewhat lengthy, this account emphasizes the value of widespread use of air photos in planning and operations. The issue of aerial photographs to lower echelons, even to squad leaders in some instances, was stated to have proved of the utmost value in the success of operations and in the reduction of losses. The difficulty of obtaining suitable photography, in time and in sufficient quantity, also is explained
Technical intelligence report – infantry troops in France and Belgium.
No full textReport no. 212, 4 January 1945. Source: Private David A. Van Zandt served as a scout with the 30th Division, 119th Infantry, in France and Belgium from 2 July 1944 until he was wounded on 2 September 1944. Summary of report: This is a technical intelligence report relative to the use of scouts and mortarmen/mortar squads during operations in France and Belgium
The development of the British army during the wars with France, 1793-1815
Get PDFThe British Army that fought the engagement at Waterloo in 1815, was outwardly little changed from that which was engaged in the initial campaigns of the Wars, twenty-two years previously. Line upon line of red-coated, musket-armed infantry, manoeuvred as chess pieces across open fields, deciding the issue by volley and bayonet, having spent a hungry night exposed to rain and cold. The cavalry were still beautifully and often impractically clad, and were always seeking the decisive charge, on their unfed and often sickly mounts. The Army's commander still viewed his troops as 'the scum of the earth', who were rarely paid, and predominantly enlisted for life. It would therefore appear that little had altered from 1793 to 1815, and that this will be a study of continuity rather than change. However, this thesis will show that despite outward appearances, the Army that took the field at Waterloo was intrinsically different from the one that entered the conflict in 1793, being modernised in line with other institutions of state, and other European armies. This thesis is first and foremost intended to be a contribution to the history of the British Army from the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793, to the reduction of the forces after the battle of Waterloo in 1815. It proceeds from an assumption that the understanding of not only that history, but the history of the developing British state, will be significantly advanced through a study of the operation of, and the changes which took place within, the Army during the Wars with France
'BROTHERS IN ARMS'?: The American and British Coalition on the Western Front, 1918
Get PDFThis dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of
the 27 th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the
announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed
on the two divisions after they were attached to the 11 American Corps. especiallý
their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training
received under the supervision of British officers.
The 11 American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in
the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these
were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen.
John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and
operated entirely independent of 11 American Corps. The týýo American divisions
that h, oth remained with the British, the 27t and -3 , relied heavily upon their coalition
partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly,
tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from
being th -, oth amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27 and -)
Divisions
became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Arrný during the final campaigns of
the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western
Front in 1918, the 11 American Corps suffered heavý casualties during its limited
operational experience and. in many ways. failed to take advantage of lessons
learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917.
This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American
divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the
27 th and 30'hDivisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the
British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the
tNNo ,a llies became Brothers-in-Arms
