86 research outputs found
Headquarters, Eastern Air Command operational directive numbers 15, Operation "L" (5 October 1944), and 16, offensive air action by Eastern Air Command, SEA (18 October 1944).
No full textHeadings: information; Allied operations in area defined by Eastern Air Command; area assignments; Strategic Air Force; Third Tactical Air Force; Tenth Air Force; combat cargo task force; photographic reconnaissance force; coordination of operations; and general policy
Eastern Air Command weekly intelligence summary: Headquarters Eastern Air Command, South East Asia.
No full textThe six sections of the weekly intelligence summary give information on and about tactical intelligence, objective folder and target chart data, war news from other fighting fronts, Japanese antiaircraft defenses, and special reports from EAC tactical units
Souvenir pamphlet for Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama.
No full textThe publication documents and illustrates military activities at the field, which was the headquarters of the Army Air Forces Eastern Flying Training Command, the Army Air Forces Pre-Flight School, and the Liberator Pilot Transition School
The Ambon Forward Observation Line Strategy 1941-1942 A Lesson in Military Incompetence
Get PDFIn October 1940 and in February 1941, the Australian Chiefs of Staff agreed to supply a task force (Gull Force) and an air strike group to garrison the small Dutch Island of Ambon. The decision to send troops to support the Dutch was made at Singapore where Australia ostensibly agreed to send three squadrons of aircraft to support Ambon in exchange for the Dutch sending four of their squadrons to support Malaya and Singapore should they be attacked. Under closer examination, however, the reasons for sending Australian troops and aircraft to Ambon become more obscure.
Historians and writers in the past have provided various explanations for Australia’s commitment to Dutch Ambon as being; because the Island was a steppingstone for the Japanese to use in approaching Australia; because it was necessary to delay the Japanese for a couple of days; because Australia required a forward operating base; because Timor and Ambon were necessary for maintaining an open air route between Java and Australia; and, because Australia needed to demonstrate to its allies that it was prepared to fight the Japanese regardless of the disproportionate cost in doing so. Considering the paucity of facts regarding the Ambon case, the aim of this dissertation is to examine the question of why the Australian Government knowingly made the decision to send an under equipped, under-strength and unprotected task force to an isolated island in the Malukus to face overwhelming Japanese forces without any hope of reinforcement, rescue or withdrawal.
The conclusions show that the Australian Government and its military advisors were unequal to the task of successfully formulating grand war policy and military strategy in the Ambon Island case during 1941-1942. The minimum aim of war strategy is to formulate a decisive war plan in balance with the attainable political objective and the military’s ability to achieve those ends. The Ambon strategy failed these criterion where Gull Force was sent to garrison the Island without any stated aims other than fighting to hold the Japanese advance for no longer than a few days to demonstrate Australia’s willingness to fight. Gull Force was given an impossible task to fulfil at a price that could not be justified under any conventional strategic principles of the time
Low Intensity Conflict: Contemporary Approaches and Strategic Thinking
No full textLow Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such conflict, or are likely to become so. This thesis is not concerned with how such difficult conflict situations arise. Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory resolution. The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC.
The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC and six in depth case studies. These distilled principles are analysed in two central chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there practicality and resilience. Numerous defence academics and military practitioners have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research.
The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC. The function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services. The effectiveness of the military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression of LIC. Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or resolving LIC
Leadership and command on the Eastern Front (1941-1945) : the military style of Marchal Konstantin Rokossovskiy
No full textMarshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union, Order of
Victory, Knight of the Bath, OBE, victor of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the destruction
of German Army Group Centre and East Prussia, participated in some of the most
significant operations in the history of war, let alone the twentieth century. Yet, in the
English speaking world Rokossovskiy is unknown, a name, vaguely associated with
famous events. There is no sustained historical analysis of Rokossovskiy’s style of
leadership and operational command in the English language.
Rokossovskiy rejected the authoritarian leadership culture of Stalin’s Soviet Union and
Zhukov’s Red Army. Rokossovskiy was highly demanding and occasionally harsh but
his leadership encouraged initiative, consultation, trust, delegation and tolerated
mistakes in a way that made him unusual, indeed exceptional, in the Red Army. It was
primarily an authoritative style of leadership but Rokossovskiy practised different forms
and styles of leadership guided by his own instinctive judgement according to the
demands of the situation and the nature of his subordinates. This was a considered
philosophy of leadership and command that set him apart from his contemporaries.
Rokossovskiy’s style of leadership was intimately connected to his conduct of
operations. As one of the Red Army’s finest commanders, respected by the Wehrmacht
and the Red Army, Rokossovskiy’s operational art was dominated by the idea of depth.
Rokossovskiy, the Pole, was the heir to a long Russian tradition, centuries old, of deep
operations, whereas Zhukov, the Russian, was committed to operational encirclement
and annihilation, a Germanic concept.
Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy had a distinct military style of his
own: his style of leadership challenged the Red Army’s authoritarian culture whilst his
style of operations endorsed the historical traditions of the Russian army. It makes him
one of the most significant military commanders of the twentieth century
Environmental regulation and development : a cross-country empirical analysis
Get PDFThe authors develop comparative indices of environmental policy and performance for 31 countries using a quantified analysis of reports prepared for the United Nations Conference on Environmental and Development. In cross-country regressions, they find a very strong, continuous association between their indicators and national income per capita, particularly when adjusted for purchasing power parity. Their results suggest a characteristic progression in development. Poor agrarian economies focus first on natural resource protection. With increased urbanization and industrialization, countries move from initial regulation of water pollution to air pollution control. The authors highlight the importance of institutional development. Environmental regulation is more advanced in developing countries with relatively secure property rights, effective legal and judicial systems, and efficient public administration.Public Health Promotion,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Agricultural Research,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Agricultural Research,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Governance
Brigadier General Wayne Monteith
No full textBrig. Gen. Wayne R. Monteith is the Commander, 45th Space Wing; and Director, Eastern Range, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. He leads over 13,000 military, DoD civilian and contractor personnel responsible for the processing and launching of U.S. government and commercial satellites from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. General Monteith is also the final approval authority for all launches on the Eastern Range, a 15-million-square-mile area which supports an average of 15 launches per year aboard Delta, Atlas, Falcon, Navy and emerging launch vehicles. In addition, he manages wing launch and range infrastructure supporting NASA, commercial and missile test missions.Prior to assuming his current position, General Monteith served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. General Monteith has served as a Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) combat crew member, senior ICBM standardization and evaluation crew commander, ICBM instructor, chief ICBM flight testing, and command lead for a major space acquisition program. He commanded the Air Force’s only ICBM combat crew training squadron and the 50th Space Wing where he led more than 5,300 military, DoD civilians and contractor personnel serving at 14 operating locations worldwide in support of more than 170 communications, navigation, weather and surveillance satellites with their associated systems valued at more than $66 billion. General Monteith has also served in various special duty capacities including major command, combatant command, Headquarters U.S. Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense staff positions. He earned the Master Missile Operations designation and is a Command Space Professional.
General Monteith earned his commission as a distinguished graduate from the University of New Mexico’s Air Force ROTC program.EDUCATION 1989 Bachelor of Arts in Geography, University of New Mexico 1994 Master of Science in Business Administration, Lesley College, Cambridge, Mass1995 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 2000 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 2005 Air War College, by correspondence 2007 Master of Science in National Resource Strategy, Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (formerly Industrial College of the Armed Forces), Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.2010 Leadership Development Program, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.2012 Air Force Enterprise Leadership Seminar, Darden School of Business, University of VirginiaASSIGNMENTS1. November 1989 – March 1990, Student, Distinguished Graduate, Undergraduate Missile Training, 4315th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.2. March 1990 – April 1994, Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Combat Crew, Stan/Eval, Instructor, and Senior Combat Crew Evaluator, 400th Strategic Missile Squadron and 90th Operations Group, F. E. Warren AFB, Wyo.3. April 1994 – September 1994, ICBM Officer Code Controller, 90th Operations Support Squadron, F. E. Warren AFB, Wyo. 4. September 1994 – September 1997, ICBM Test Operations Director and Chief, ICBM Flight Testing (Top Hand), 576th Flight Test Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.5. September 1997 – November 2000, Command Lead, Range Standardization and Automation, Phase I, and Chief, Space Launch Programs, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.6. November 2000 – April 2001, Executive Officer to the Director of Staff, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.7. April 2001 – July 2003, Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command; Commander, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Northern Command and Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.8. July 2003 – July 2004, Deputy Division Chief, Space Superiority Division, Plans and Programs Directorate, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 9. July 2004 – July 2006, Commander, 392nd Training Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.10. August 2006 – June 2007, Student, Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (formerly Industrial College of the Armed Forces), Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.11. June 2007 – July 2008, Director, Navigation Warfare, Space Programs and Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration, Washington, D.C. 12. July 2008 – August 2009, Vice Commander, 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colo.13. August 2009 – August 2011, Commander, 50th Space Wing, Schriever AFB Colo.14. September 2011 – May 2013, Deputy Director, DoD Executive Agent for Space Staff and Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (Space), Washington, D.C.15. May 2013 – June 2014, Senior Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. 16. June 2014 – July 2015, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.17. August 2015 – present, Commander, 45th Space Wing; and Director, Eastern Range, Patrick AFB, Fla.
SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS1. April 2001 – July 2003, Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command; Commander, U.S. Space Command and U.S. Northern Command, Peterson AFB, Colo., as a major2. June 2007 – July 2008, Director, Navigation Warfare, Space Programs and Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel and colonel 3. September 2011 – May 2013, Deputy Director, DoD Executive Agent for Space Staff, Washington D.C., as a colonelOPERATIONAL INFORMATIONWeapon systems: Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, PAVE PAWS Upgraded Early Warning Radar and Wideband Global Satellite CommunicationsMAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS Defense Superior Service MedalLegion of Merit with clusterDefense Meritorious Service Medal with clusterMeritorious Service Medal with two clustersAir Force Commendation Medal with clusterCombat Readiness MedalHumanitarian Service MedalMilitary Outstanding Volunteer Service MedalNuclear Deterrence Operations Service Medal with deviceUnited States Air Force Chief of Staff\u27s Team Excellence Award, 2005Air Force Space Command ICBM Instructor/Evaluator of the Year, 1993EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTIONSecond Lieutenant Nov. 3, 1989First Lieutenant Aug. 10, 1991Captain Aug. 10, 1993Major Dec. 1, 2000Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 2004Colonel Sept. 1, 2007Brigadier General March 1, 2015 (Current as of August 2015)https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-bios-2018/1020/thumbnail.jp
Respiratory health in the past: a bioarchaeological study of chronic maxillary sinusitis and rib periostitis from the Iron Age to the Post Medieval Period in Southern England
Get PDFRespiratory disease has affected human populations throughout our history and remains a significant cause of morbidity and mortality today. In spite of this, there is a dearth of bioarchaeological research on this important subject. Previous research has suggested a relationship between poor air quality and the prevalence of chronic maxillary sinusitis and rib periostitis. These conditions have many causes (e.g. congenital disorders, allergies, poor air quality, climate, infectious disease). Chronic maxillary sinusitis and rib periostitis are recognised as bone formation and/or destruction, indicating long-term inflammation of the soft tissues of the sinuses and ribs in some upper and lower respiratory tract conditions.
If air quality is a significant contributor to respiratory disease, the highest prevalence rates would be expected in populations exposed to high concentrations of indoor and outdoor pollutants. This study examines 12 skeletal samples from cemeteries located in southern England, ranging in date from the Iron Age to the Post Medieval Period. The samples were chosen to examine both synchronic and diachronic trends in respiratory disease, contrasting contemporaneous populations living in rural and urban contexts, as well as populations from high and low social status groups. A total of 1203 individuals were examined for this study. Of these, 1101 had at least one sinus preserved, and of these individuals, 546 (49.6%) had sinusitis in one or both sinuses. A total of 2091 sinuses were recorded. Of these, 854 (40.8%) had chronic maxillary sinusitis. 50.42% of 720 males and analysed had sinusitis and 47.85% of 372 females (not significant). Prevalence rates ranged from 30.6% (Post Medieval) to 75.44% (Iron Age) for chronic maxillary sinusitis and 1.59% (Iron Age) to 29.7% (Post Medieval) for rib periostitis, but, when combining the skeletal and archaeological/historical data, the hypothesis posed is not consistently supported. Based on archaeological evidence for lifestyle and housing, these results suggest that the causes of respiratory disease are more complex than this current hypothesis presumes
'BROTHERS IN ARMS'?: The American and British Coalition on the Western Front, 1918
Get PDFThis dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of
the 27 th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the
announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed
on the two divisions after they were attached to the 11 American Corps. especiallý
their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training
received under the supervision of British officers.
The 11 American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in
the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these
were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen.
John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and
operated entirely independent of 11 American Corps. The týýo American divisions
that h, oth remained with the British, the 27t and -3 , relied heavily upon their coalition
partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly,
tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from
being th -, oth amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27 and -)
Divisions
became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Arrný during the final campaigns of
the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western
Front in 1918, the 11 American Corps suffered heavý casualties during its limited
operational experience and. in many ways. failed to take advantage of lessons
learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917.
This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American
divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the
27 th and 30'hDivisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the
British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the
tNNo ,a llies became Brothers-in-Arms
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