43,859 research outputs found
Letter re: Texas Centennial Committee
Letter from Wilbur C. Hawk to Cullen F. Thomas denying any interest in appointment as the Director-General of the Centennia
Chicken Hawk
chicken hawkPigeon Hawk: Chicken HawkPRINTED ITEM G. M. Story JAN 1970 JH 1/70Not usedNot usedWithdrawnChecked by Jordyn Hughes on Fri 15 Jul 201
Evolution of the G+C content frontier in the rat cytomegalovirus genome
Within the 230138 bp of the rat cytomegalovirus (RCMV) genome, the G+C content changes abruptly at position 142644, constituting a G+C content frontier. To the left of this point, overall G+C content is 69.2%, and to the right it is only 47.6%. A region of extremely low G+C content (33.8%) is found in the 5 kb immediately to the right of the frontier, in which there are no predicted coding sequences. To the right of position 147501, the G+C content rises and predicted coding sequences reappear. However, these genes are much shorter (average 848bp, 50% G+C) than those in the left two-thirds of the genome (average 1462bp, 70% G+C). Whole genome alignment of several viruses indicates that the initial ultra-low G+C region appeared in the common ancestor of the genera Cytomegalovirus and Muromegalovirus, and that the lowering of G+C in the right third has been a subsequent process in the lineage leading to RCMV. The left two-thirds of RCMV has stop codon occurrences at 67.5% of their expected level, based on a modified Markov chain model of stop codon distribution, and the corresponding figure for the right third is 78%. Therefore, despite heavy mutation pressure, selective constraint has operated in the right third of the RCMV genome to maintain a degree of gene length unusual for such low G+C sequences
Never retreat, never surrender: The bargaining power of commitment in the Hawk-Dove game
This paper studies experimentally the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats in a negotiation process. Following Schelling’s (1960) ideas we choose the hawk-dove game because is the simplest negotiation environment with inequity distribution in equilibrium. The analysis is focused on three essential elements of commitment: the possibility of a player to announce his own actions, the credibility of these messages and the experience acquired in the negotiation process. The empirical evidence shows that, in the first period, subjects do not realize the bargaining power of commitment. When the game is repeated and experience increases, subjects gradually understand the advantages of a threat, turning the payoffs into their favor. Credibility is also relevant for the relation, if subjects can choose their message, it is common to find strategic liars, and their rivals punish this behavior.Credible threats, negotiation, experiments
Myopically Forward-Looking Agents in a Network Formation Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence
A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Hawk-Dove game with each of them. We design our experiment in continuous time where participants may change their Hawk-Dove action and/or their neighborhood at any point in time. We are interested in the resulting formation of networks and the action distributions. Compared with static Nash equilibrium (e.g., Berninghaus and Vogt, 2004, 2006; Bramoulle, Lopez-Pintado, Goyal, and Vega-Redondo, 2004) and social optimum as theoretical benchmark solutions, subjects seem to employ a more complex, forward-looking thinking. We develop an other benchmark solution, called one-step-ahead stability, that combines forward-looking belief formation with rational response and that fits the data much better.
Erratum to: Effect of moderate red wine intake on cardiac prognosis after recent acute myocardial infarction of subjects with Type 2 diabetes mellitus (Diabetic Medicine, (2006), 23, 9, (974-981), 10.1111/j.1464-5491.2006.01886.x)
In an article by Marfella et al, the author name C. Saron is incorrect and should be listed as C. Sardu. Therefore the correct author list is: R. Marfella, F. Cacciapuoti, M. Siniscalchi, F. C. Sasso, F. Marchese, F. Cinone, E. Musacchio, M. A. Marfella, L. Ruggiero, G. Chiorazzo, D. Liberti, G. Chiorazzo, G. F. Nicoletti, C. Sardu, F. D'Andrea, C. Ammendola, M. Verza and L. Coppola.In an article by Marfella et al, the author name C. Saron is incorrect and should be listed as C. Sardu. Therefore the correct author list is: R. Marfella, F. Cacciapuoti, M. Siniscalchi, F. C. Sasso, F. Marchese, F. Cinone, E. Musacchio, M. A. Marfella, L. Ruggiero, G. Chiorazzo, D. Liberti, G. Chiorazzo, G. F. Nicoletti, C. Sardu, F. D'Andrea, C. Ammendola, M. Verza and L. Coppola
George C. Quick
50-1PensionsReport : Petition of G. Quick. [2607] Black Hawk war; 1832.1888-33
George C. Quick
47-1PensionsReport : Petition of G. Quick. [2069] Service in Black Hawk war of 1832.1882-24
George C. Quick.
2709 S.rp.103651-1Invalid PensionsReport : Petition of G. Quick. [2810]
Black Hawk war; 1832; Illinois.1890-21
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