1,402 research outputs found
The death of the cortical column? Patchwork structure and conceptual retirement in neuroscientific practice
No full textHaueis P. The death of the cortical column? Patchwork structure and conceptual retirement in neuroscientific practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 2021;(85):101–113
Evolving Concepts of “Hierarchy” in Systems Neuroscience
No full textBurnston D, Haueis P. Evolving Concepts of “Hierarchy” in Systems Neuroscience. In: Calzavarini F, Viola M, eds. Neural Mechanisms. Studies in Brain and Mind. Cham: Springer; 2020: 113-141
Multiscale modeling of cortical gradients: the role of mesoscale circuits for linking macro- and microscale gradients of cortical organization and hierarchical information processing
No full textHaueis P. Multiscale modeling of cortical gradients: the role of mesoscale circuits for linking macro- and microscale gradients of cortical organization and hierarchical information processing. NeuroImage. 2021;232: 117846.The gradient concept in neuroscience describes systematic and continuous progressions of features of cortical organization across the entire cortex. Recent multimodal studies revealed a macroscale gradient from primary sensory to transmodal association areas which is linked to increasing representational abstraction along the cortical hierarchy, and which is paralleled by microscale gradients of cytoarchitecture and gene expression profiles. Convergent or divergent evidence from these multimodal studies is then used to support inferences about the existence of one common or multiple scale-specific gradients of hierarchical information processing. This paper evaluates the validity of such inferences within the framework of multiscale modeling. In branches of physics and biology where multiscale modeling techniques are used, the simple averaging of microscale details can introduce errors in macroscale modeling if it ignores structures at the intermediate mesoscales of organization which affect system behavior. Conversely, information about mesoscale structures can be used to determine which microscale details are actually relevant to macroscale behavior. In this paper, I similarly argue that multiscale modeling of cortical gradients needs to take organization of mesoscale circuits into account if it affects structure-function relation these models describe. Information about these circuits provides crucial evidence for evaluating inferences from micro- and macroscale data to the role of cortical gradients in hierarchical information processing. My application of the multiscale modeling framework reveals that the gradient concept tracks multiple overlapping progressions of cortical properties, rather than one overall gradient of hierarchical information processing. I support this argument by proposing a mesoscale gradient of connectivity which describes architectural differences between granular and agranular circuits, and which helps us better understand the relation between neural connectivity and hierarchical information processing. Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Patchworks and operations
No full textNovick R, Haueis P. Patchworks and operations. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2023;13(1): 15.**Abstract**
Recent work in the philosophy of scientific concepts has seen the simultaneous revival of operationalism and development of patchwork approaches to scientific concepts. We argue that these two approaches are natural allies. Both recognize an important role for measurement techniques in giving meaning to scientific terms. The association of multiple techniques with a single term, however, raises the threat of proliferating concepts (Hempel, 1966). While contemporary operationalists have developed some resources to address this challenge, these resources are inadequate to account for the full range of complex behaviors of scientific concepts. We adopt show how the patchwork approach’s repertoire of inter-patch relations can expand the resources available to the operationalist. We focus on one especially important type of inter-patch relation: sharing a general reasoning strategy. General reasoning strategies serve two important functions: (1) they bind together distinct patches of scientific concepts, and (2) they provide normative guidance for extending concepts to new domains
Mechanistic inquiry and scientific pursuit: The case of visual processing
No full textHaueis P, Kastner L. Mechanistic inquiry and scientific pursuit: The case of visual processing. Studies in history and philosophy of science. 2022;93:123-135.Why is it rational for scientists to pursue multiple models of a phenomenon at the same time? The literatures on mechanistic inquiry and scientific pursuit each develop answers to a version of this question which is rarely discussed by the other. The mechanistic literature suggests that scientists pursue different complementary models because each model provides detailed insights into different aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. The pursuit literature suggests that scientists pursue competing models because alternative models promise to solve outstanding empirical and conceptual problems. Looking into research on visual processing as a case study, we suggest an integrated account of why it is rational for scientists to pursue both complementary and competing models of the same mechanism in scientific practice. Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
Climate concepts for supporting political goals of mitigation and adaptation: The case for "climate crisis"
No full textHaueis P. Climate concepts for supporting political goals of mitigation and adaptation: The case for "climate crisis". Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: WIREs. Climate Change . 2024;15(5): e893.Climate concepts are crucial to understand the effects of human activity on the climate system scientifically, and to formulate and pursue policies to mitigate and adapt to these effects. Yet, scientists, policymakers, and activists often use different terms such as "global warming," "climate change," "climate crisis," or "climate emergency." This advanced review investigates which climate concept is most suitable when we pursue mitigation and adaptation goals in a scientifically informed manner. It first discusses how survey experiments and social science reviews on climate frames draw normative recommendations about which terms to use for public climate communication. It is suggested that such normative claims can be refined by including the scientific alongside lay uses of a climate concept, and by using explicit assessment conditions to evaluate how suitable a concept is for formulating mitigation and adaptation goals. Drawing on philosophical theories of conceptual change in science and conceptual engineering, a novel framework with two assessment conditions is introduced and then applied to "global warming," "climate change," "climate emergency," and "climate crisis." The assessment suggests that currently, "climate crisis" is most suitable to formulate and pursue climate mitigation and adaptation goals. Using this concept promotes the epistemic goals of climate science to a high degree, bridges scientific, political, and activist discourse, and fosters for democratic participation when articulating climate policies. This article is categorized under: The Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Climate Science and Decision Making The Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Knowledge and Practice Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Communicatio
The humanities as conceptual practices: The formation and development of high-impact concepts in philosophy and beyond
No full textHaueis P, Slaby J. The humanities as conceptual practices: The formation and development of high-impact concepts in philosophy and beyond. Metaphilosophy. 2022.This paper proposes an analysis of the discursive dynamics of high-impact concepts in the humanities. These are concepts whose formation and development have a lasting and wide-ranging effect on research and our understanding of discursive reality in general. The notion of a conceptual practice, based on a normative conception of practice, is introduced, and practices are identified, on this perspective, according to the way their respective performances are held mutually accountable. This normative conception of practices is then combined with recent work from philosophy of science that characterizes concepts in terms of conceptual capacities that are productive, open-ended, and applicable beyond the original context they were developed in. It is shown that the formation of concepts can be identified by changes in how practitioners hold exercise of their conceptual capacities accountable when producing knowledge about a phenomenon. In a manner similar to the use of operational definitions in scientific practices, such concepts can also be used to intervene in various discourses within or outside the conceptual practice. Using the formation of the concepts "mechanism" and "performative" as examples, the paper shows how high-impact concepts reconfigure what is at issue and at stake in conceptual practices. As philosophy and other humanities disciplines are its domain of interest, it is a contribution to the methodology of the humanities
Stuck in between. Phenomenology's Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice
No full textCasper M-O, Haueis P. Stuck in between. Phenomenology's Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences . 2022.Questions about phenomenology's role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline
The life of the cortical column: Opening the domain of functional architecture of the cortex (1955–1981)
Get PDFThe concept of the cortical column refers to vertical cell bands with similar response properties, which were initially observed by Vernon Mountcastle’s mapping of single cell recordings in the cat somatic cortex. It has subsequently guided over 50 years of neuroscientific research, in which fundamental questions about the modularity of the cortex and basic principles of sensory information processing were empirically investigated. Nevertheless, the status of the column remains controversial today, as skeptical commentators proclaim that the vertical cell bands are a functionally insignificant by-product of ontogenetic development. This paper inquires how the column came to be viewed as an elementary unit of the cortex from Mountcastle’s discovery in 1955 until David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel’s reception of the Nobel Prize in 1981. I first argue that Mountcastle’s vertical electrode recordings served as criteria for applying the column concept to electrophysiological data. In contrast to previous authors, I claim that this move from electrophysiological data to the phenomenon of columnar responses was concept-laden, but not theory-laden. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Mountcastle’s criteria provided Hubel Wiesel with a conceptual outlook, i.e. it allowed them to anticipate columnar patterns in the cat and macaque visual cortex. I argue that in the late 1970s, this outlook only briefly took a form that one could call a ‘theory’ of the cerebral cortex, before new experimental techniques started to diversify column research. I end by showing how this account of early column research fits into a larger project that follows the conceptual development of the column into the present
Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry
No full textKästner L, Haueis P. Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry. Erkenntnis. 2019.What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literature, the norms for good explanations are directly derived from answers to the metaphysical question of what explanations are. Prominent mechanistic accounts thus emphasize either ontic (Craver, in: Kaiser, Scholz, Plenge, Huttemann (eds) Explanation in the special sciences: the case of biology and history, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 27-52, 2014) or epistemic norms (Bechtel in Mental mechanisms: philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience, Routledge, London, 2008). Still, mechanistic philosophers on both sides agree that there is no sharp distinction between the processes of discovery and explanation (Bechtel and Richardson in Discovering complexity. Decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Craver and Darden in In search of mechanisms: discoveries across the life sciences, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013). Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation will be accompanied by ontic and epistemic accounts of discovery, respectively. As we will show here, however, recent discovery accounts implicitly rely on both ontic and epistemic norms to characterize the discovery process. In this paper, we develop an account that makes explicit that, and how, ontic and epistemic norms work together throughout the discovery process. By describing mechanism discovery as a process of pattern recognition (Haugeland, in: Having thought. Essays in the metaphysics of mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 267-290, 1998) we demonstrate that scientists have to develop epistemic activities to distinguish a pattern from its background. Furthermore, they have to determine which epistemic activities successfully describe how the pattern is implemented by identifying the pattern's components. Our approach reveals that ontic and epistemic norms are equally important in mechanism discovery
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