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The American Law of Unjust Enrichment in the Restatement 2011
No full textThe present paper discusses the American law of unjust enrichment as found in the Restatement the Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE) published by the American Law Institute in 2011. The author begins with the short history of the Restatements of the Law movement (1). He attempts to describe both the formal structure of the treatise (2) and the meaning of its keywords such as “unjust enrichment” and “restitution” (3). In the following sections the premises of restitution claims are presented: the absence of basis (4), the defendant’s enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense (5). The paper covers such separate doctrines included in the Restatement’s provisions as the unrequested intervention (negotiorum gestio) either (6). The author researches also the remedies that could be applied in restitution cases (7), issues on the concurrence of claims (8) and the limitation (9). In the final section he attempts to draw conclusions on conflicting nature of the unjust enrichment law in America (10)
Mistake of law and mistake of fact in English law of restitution
No full textThe paper discusses the history of the English law doctrine according to which the mistake of law (error iuris) is a bar for restitution. The author seeks to analyze the premises of mistake that led to recovery of the payment. Since the adjudication of the leading case Bilbie v. Lumley (1802) it was settled by the courts that he who had paid while operating under mistake of fact could demand restitution. On the other hand the one who acted under mistake of law could not. Over the last two centuries, until the ground-breaking decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council (1999), the distinction into mistake of law and mistake of fact was very important in cases of undue payment. The author ventures whether there are any foundations for the promotion of the thesis that the aforementioned distinction might be an example of the reception of continental doctrines by the English legal system
Angielska doktryna promissory estoppel a polska klauzula nadużycia prawa
Full text linkThe English doctrine of promissory estoppel and the Polish clause of abuse of lawThe article discusses the problem of evolution and the premises used in applying the English concept known as promissory estoppel. The birth of this legal concept has been discussed on the example of the most important court cases, the so called leading cases, such as, among others, that of High Trees (1947) and Combe v. Combe (1951), in which it was lord Denning who adjudicated. In the article, the author also analyzes the general principles of invoking promissory estoppel. He indicates that in the course of a court trial it is necessary to prove the existence of a promise, on the basis of which the person who was promised something, while acting in accordance with the common sense, decided to withdraw and by undertaking certain definite steps ultimately suffered a loss, whereas withdrawal on the part of the person making a promise would be unjustified. The author of the paper made an effort to try to answer the question whether the abuse of right clause mentioned in Art. 5 of the Civil Code may be regarded as the Polish equivalent of promissory estoppel
The English doctrine of promissory estoppel and the Polish clause of abuse of law
Full text linkThe English Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and the Polish Concept of the Abuse-of-Right Clause
The article discusses the issues of evolution and premises of the applying of English concept known as promissory estoppel. In the present paper the development of the legal doctrine referring to the aforementioned problems is illustrated with the examples of several leading cases such as that of High Trees (1947) and Combe v. Combe (1951). In these cases it was lord Denning who was a decision maker. The author of the paper analyzes the general principles on which the promissory estoppel might be invoked. He draws our attention to the fact that in the course of litigation it is necessary to prove the existence of a promise on the basis of which a promisee (the person who was promised something), while reasonably relying on this promise decided to do something or to refrain from doing it, and simultaneously it would be inequitable if a promisor (the person making a promise) could call off what he had promised. The author of the paper made an effort to answer a question whether the abuse-of-right clause provided for in Art.5 of the Civil Code may be regarded as the Polish equivalent of promissory estoppel
The arguments of legal historical nature as found in the judicial decisions taken by the House of Lords on the turn of 21st century and illustrated by references to the case Moses v. MacFerlan (1760)
No full textAutor próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie o rolę historii prawa w dyskursie prowadzonym przed Izbą Lordów. Analizuje procesy w obszarze prawa bezpodstawnego wzbogacenia badając sposób, w jaki sędziowie odwołują się do precedensu Moses v. MacFerlan (1760). Po przedstawieniu przebiegu tego procesu (2) oraz obowiązującej w następnym stuleciu doktryny dorozumianych kontraktów (3) przedstawia pochodzące z przełomu XX i XXI w. wypowiedzi lordów związane z dyskusją na temat znaczenia zasady bezpodstawnego wzbogacenia (4a), wprowadzenia do prawa angielskiego zarzutu utraty wzbogacenia (4b), orzekania przez sąd w sprawie odsetek (4c). W końcu zaś bada zjawisko odwoływania się do historii prawa w celu uzasadnienia odstąpienia od precedensu (5).The author of the paper tries to discuss the role played by legal history in the disputes carried on in the House of Lords. He analyzes the cases of unjust enrichment (law of restitution). On that occasion he investigates the lines along which the judges used to invoke the landmark case of Moses v. MacFerlan (1760). Upon having depicted the details of the aforementioned case (2) he presents the doctrine of implied contract that prevailed in the 19th century (3) and discusses the opinions of the lords articulated on the turn of 21st century on occasion of their discussing the meaning of the principle of unjust enrichment (4a). Likewise he discusses the introduction into the English law of the change of position defence (4b) and he comments on the court decisions on interest (4c). Finally, the author investigates the referrals to the legal history as made in order to justify the overruling of precedent (5)
Unjust enrichment in English law
No full textPrzedmiotem artykułu jest bezpodstawne wzbogacenie w prawie angielskim. Autor przedstawia ewolucję law of restitution w XVIII-XX w., uzyskanie przez bezpodstawne wzbogacenie statusu osobnego działu prawa. Następnie omawia przesłanki bezpodstawne wzbogacenie prezentując obecny w nauce spór o to czy instytucja oparta jest na tzw. unjust factors czy na zasadzie bezpodstawności wzbogacenia. Spór przedstawiony jest m.in. na przykładzie procesów dotyczących restytucji świadczeń spełnionych w wykona-niu kontraktów terminowych oraz zwrotu należności podatkowych prowadzonych na przełomie XX i XXI w. Autor omawia zagadnienia przedawnienia świadczenia restytu-cyjnego w kontekście deklaratoryjnej teorii common law.The subject of the article is the unjust enrichment in English law. The author presents the evolution of the law of restitution in the 18th and 20th centuries. Then he discusses the required elements for a claim in unjust enrichment, presenting the current dispute whether the cause of action is based on the so-called unjust factors or on the basis of unjust enrichment. The dispute is presented, among others on the example of cases regarding the restitution of benefits rendered in the performance of swap contracts and the refund of tax receivables conducted at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. The author discusses the issues of limitation period for the restitution claims in the context of the declarative theory of common law
The jurisdictional drift : mistake of law and mistake of fact in the English law of restitution
No full textThe paper discusses the history of the English law doctrine according to which the mistake of law (error iuris) was a bar for restitution. The author seeks to analyze the premises of mistake that led to recovery of the payment. Since the adjudication of the leading case Bilbie v. Lumley (1802), it was settled by the courts that he who had paid while operating under mistake of fact could demand restitution. On the other hand, the one who acted under mistake of law could not. Over the last two centuries, until the ground-breaking decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council (1999), the distinction into mistake of law and mistake of fact was very important in cases of undue payment. The author ventures whether there are any foundations for the promotion of the thesis that the aforementioned distinction might be an example of the reception of continental doctrines by the English legal system. The English language version of the paper has been already published in Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (2014, vol. 82)
Estoppel in Anglo-American private law
Full text linkPrzedmiotem książki jest analiza angloamerykańskich instytucji prawnych określanych jako equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel. Swoim zakresem obejmuje ewolucję prawa angielskiego, amerykańskiego i australijskiego w okresie od XVIII w. do XXI w. Autor porównuje poszczególne odmiany estoppel z realizującymi podobne cele rozwiązaniami funkcjonującymi w kontynentalnej cywilistyce. Należą do nich znane europejskim projektom harmonizacyjnym (PECL, DCFR, CESL) jak i narodowym kodeksom cywilnym zasada dobrej wiary w znaczeniu obiektywnym oraz zakaz nadużywania prawa.
W krajach kultury prawnej common law obecny jest szereg odmiennych, różnych od siebie, instytucji estoppel. Ich celem jest zapobieżenie negatywnym skutkom niekonsekwentnego zachowania drugiej strony i przeciwdziałanie wystąpieniu uszczerbku (detriment) lub innych negatywnych następstw – określanych nieostrym terminem „unconscionability”, będących skutkiem podjęcia działań w zaufaniu (reliance) do zachowania drugiej strony.
Estoppel sprawuje obecnie funkcję „zaworu bezpieczeństwa”. Stosowany jest niemal we wszystkich obszarach angloamerykańskiego prawa prywatnego. Służy rozliczeniu nakładów dokonanych przez posiadacza na cudzej nieruchomości, ochronie zaufania adresatów formalnie wadliwych obietnic albo stron nieskutecznych negocjacji. Funkcjonuje również w relacjach prawnorodzinnych – pozwala przeprowadzić rozliczenia pomiędzy konkubentami lub modyfikować zasady podziału majątku spadkowego.
Mimo szerokiego spektrum stosowania instytucji, wciąż nie rozstrzygnięto licznych kontrowersji, a pomiędzy poszczególnymi jurysdykcjami występują istotne rozbieżności. W tej mierze dystans dzieli prawo angielskie z jednej, a amerykańskie i australijskie z drugiej strony. W prawie angielskim promissory estoppel jest wyłącznie zarzutem („tarczą”), podczas gdy w innych samodzielną podstawą powództwa („mieczem”). Brak ustawowej regulacji, a także stosunkowo krótki staż tej instytucji stanowią źródło wielu sporów toczonych w orzecznictwie i w nauce prawa. Prowadzą one do braku pewności prawa i nieprzewidywalności rozstrzygnięć. Próbie omówienia, a niekiedy i rozstrzygnięcia tych zagadnień poświęcona jest książka.The book attempts to analyze the status of several Anglo-American legal doctrines referred to as equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and proprietary estoppel. It examines the English, American and Australian law from the 18th century onwards. The book draws analogies to legal devices detectable in continental civil law and characterized by the goal similar to that performed by various types of estoppel. Among these devices there may be listed those found in the European harmonization projects (PECL, DCFR, CESL) as well as those found in the national civil codes, and specifically such as principle of good faith and fair dealing or the prohibition on the abuse of rights.
The common law jurisdictions recognize a number of specific estoppel doctrines. The latter prevent the negative effects of an inconsistent conduct of the other party and counteract the occurrence of detriment or other negative consequences (often referred to by a vague notion of "unconscionability") resulting from the party’s reliance on the other party's inconsistent conduct.
Estoppels are used today as a "safety valves" in almost all fields of Anglo-American private law. The courts apply them to settle accounts for the expenditures made on someone else's property and also to protect the addressees of formally defective promises (made in breach of the statute of frauds) as well as to protect the parties to the negotiations that did not lead to the contract's conclusion. Estoppels can also be found in family-law relations as a device to settle the accounts of former cohabitants or to modify the partition of the deceased’s estate.
Despite the broad scope of its application, the law on estoppels is far from being settled. SThere occur significant differences occur in its interpretation underas made by various jurisdictions. While in English law, the promissory estoppel might be used only as a defence (“a shield”), the American and Australian law recognize it as an independent cause of action (“a sword”). There are many controversies and disputes that are currently taking place both in the courts and in the scholarship. They lead to legal uncertainty and unpredictability of decisions. The book attempts to discuss these issues and sometimes point to potential solutions
On the borderland between common law and equity law : the emergence of the doctrine of estoppel in English law
No full textArtykuł przedstawia angielską doktrynę estoppel, która wykształciła się na pograniczu porządków prawnych common law i equity law. Po krótkiej prezentacji najważniejszych typów estoppel, autor przedstawia leading cases w tym obszarze prawa. Omawia Earl of Oxford case (1615) – sprawę będącą przykładem sporu pomiędzy sądami westminsterskimi a sądem kanclerskim. W tym procesie uznano, że w razie sprzeczności norm prawnych pochodzących z equity law i common law pierwszeństwo należy się tym pierwszym. Następnie artykuł omawia XIX-XX w. kazusy Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877) i Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1947), które stanowią początek historii instytucji promissory estoppel. Pomimo faktu, że w 1873 doszło do połączenia sądów orzekających według zasad common law i equity law, wciąż występując różnice pomiędzy uprawnieniami mającymi swe źródła w tych osobnych porządkach prawnych. W zakończeniu autor podejmuje próbę odniesienia się do tych różnic, które odgrywają istotną rolę w obszarze prawa estoppel.The article discusses the English doctrine of estoppel that emerged on the borderland between common law and equity law. After a short presentation of the most important categories of estoppel, the author presents leading cases in the law of estoppel. He starts with Earl of Oxford case (1615) that was an example of contest between the Westminster courts and Court of Chancery. This case resulted in finding that equity law prevails over the common law. Then the article discusses the 19th and 20th century cases of Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877) and Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1947) that lay the foundation of promissory estoppel. Despite the fact that in 1873 the common law and equity law courts have been merged there are still differences between the rights in law and the rights at equity. In the conclusion the author attempts to present those differences that play crucial role in the law of estoppel
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