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Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
No full textHaake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review. 2009;11(1):15-32.We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
Full text linkHaake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 359. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2004.We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
No full textHaake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES. 2009;57(2):177-187.We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Strategic interaction determines an allocation of objects, so that evaluation with individual utilities constitute the pay-offs in the derived games. These allocations of objects are obtained through individual demand in a specific market for objects. For the first support result, games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium payoffs equal the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of the underlying bargaining problem. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game in extensive form. Again, payoffs in any subgame perfect equilibrium coincide with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
No full textWe discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Strategic interaction determines an allocation of objects, so that evaluation with individual utilities constitute the payoffs in the derived games. These allocations of objects are obtained through individual demand in a specific market for objects. For the first support result, games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium payoffs equal the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of the underlying bargaining problem. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game in extensive form. Again, payoffs in any subgame perfect equilibrium coincide with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.Support result Object division market Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies
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Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
Full text linkHaake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 366. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2005.We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed
Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
Full text linkWe consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty
Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
Full text linkDimitrov D, Haake C-J. Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 367. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2005.In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of such rules can be analysed, and show the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality and regrouping-proofness even if agents' preferences are additive separable
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