1,812 research outputs found
SOUTHEAST MARINE RECREATIONAL FISHERY STATISTICAL SURVEY: DISTANCE AND CATCH BASED CHOICE SETS
No full textIn this paper we estimate the economic value associated with marine recreational fishing in the southeast United States using the random utility model. The data used is the Southeast (North Carolina to Louisiana) Marine Recreational Fishery Statistics Survey (SE MRFSS). The geographic extent of the market and potential catch are used to determine the effect of choice set definition on random utility model parameter and welfare estimates. We find that choice sets based on distance or catch do not lead to large differences in the compensating variation of a fishing trip. Defining choice sets based on catch does lead to insignificant estimates of the effect of one measure of site quality on site selection. We also find differences in the value of an additional fish when comparing alternative measures of site quality.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
The Economic Value of Marine Recreational Fishing: Analysis of the MRFSS 1998 Pacific Add-on
No full textMarine Recreational Fishing Statistics Survey (MRFSS) economic add-on data has been collected since 1994. The data are comprised of two geographically identical datasets for the Southeast region (1997, 2000), five identical datasets for the Northeast region (1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000), and one dataset for the Pacific region (1998). Measures of the economic value of fishing sites and harvest have been derived from demand models estimated with data from the Northeast and the Southeast regions. In this paper we present a demand model estimated for the Pacific region (i.e., west coast). For consistency, the model is based on the 1994 and 1997 studies. Measures of the economic value of fishing sites and harvest are developed. We demonstrate how the model can be used for fisheries management decisions.
Angler Heterogeneity and the Species-Specific Demand for Marine Recreational Fishing
No full textIn this study we assess the viability of single-species recreation demand models given commonly available data sets. Using the 2000 MRFSS southeast intercept data combined with the economic add-on, we determine that the MRFSS data will support only a few species-specific recreation demand models. Considering species of management interest in the southeast, we focus on dolphin, king mackerel, red snapper and red drum. We examine single-species recreational fishing behavior using random utility models of demand. We explore mixed logit (i.e., random parameter) logit and finite mixture (i.e., latent class logit) models for dealing with angler heterogeneity. We compare these to the commonly used conditional and nested logit models in terms of the value of catching (and keeping) one additional fish. Mixed logit models illustrate that the value of catch can be highly heterogeneous and, in some cases, can include both positive and negative values. The finite mixture model generates value estimates that were some times strikingly different than conditional, nested and mixed logit models. Preference heterogeneity is significant within the MRFSS data. We find evidence that single-species models outperform multiple species models and recreational values differ. Key Words: marine recreational fishing, single-species demand, preference heterogeneity models
Wind Turbines and Coastal Recreation Demand
No full textWe examine the impact of coastal wind turbines on coastal tourism and recreation for residents of the northern CAMA counties in North Carolina. A combination of telephone and web survey data are used to assess the impact of coastal wind farms on trip behavior and site choice. Most of the respondents to our telephone survey claim to support offshore wind energy development, and independent survey data suggest that the observed levels of support may be indicative of the broader population in this region. Overall, we find very little impact of coastal wind turbines on aggregate recreational visitation; loss in consumer surplus associated with wide spread wind development in the coastal zone is insignificant at 55 per household. On average, we find no evidence of aversion to wind farms 4 miles out in the ocean, or for wind farms located in coastal estuaries. For all wind farm scenarios, we find evidence of preference heterogeneity– some respondents find this appealing while others find it aversive. Key Words: Recreation demand, tourism, renewable energy
REVISITING BID DESIGN ISSUES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION
No full textA uniform bid design from a predetermined uniform distribution is proposed as a practical and robust alternative to existing optimal or naïve bid designs. Analytics and simulations show that the uniform design provides efficiency better than naïve designs under ideal conditions and outperforms optimal designs with poor initial information.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,
Temporal Insensitivity of Willingness to Pay: How do they evaluate in CVM?
No full textIn addition to scope and scale embedding effects, temporal insensitivity of willingness to pay, also known as temporal embedding effect, has been a well known anomaly in eliciting willingness to pay for environmental quality change, especially over time. Stevens et al. (1997) defines two types of temporal embedding effects: strong insensitivity and weak insensitivity to payment schedule. This paper proposes an alternative definition of the temporal insensitivity. Temporal insensitivity implies that a subject in the survey responds consistently to value elicitation questions regardless of payment schemes. The sequential test tests the temporal insensitivity using the oyster reef restoration programs in Chesapeake Bay. Test results show that willingness to pay for the program is insensitive to the payment scheme or to the length of benefit stream of the project. Discount rates imbedded in cost stream vary significantly among the combination of project lengths and payment schemes.Temporal insensitivity of willingness to pay, Temporal embedding effect, Implicit discount rate, Sequential test, Demand and Price Analysis,
CHOICE SET CONSIDERATIONS IN MODELS OF RECREATION DEMAND: HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF THE ART
No full textDemand and Price Analysis,
Common Pool Resources and Social Norms: Internal cost & Less than Full Compliance - Fishery example
No full textWe develop a theoretical model that is capable of explaining the existence of sustainable common pool resource equilibria in the absence of external regulation. We combine ideas from the literature on social norms in an iterative game theory framework to establish the existence of multiple sustainable common pool equilibria. Summary: Consider a highly stylized common pool resource (CPR) allocation problem where individual agents have the opportunity to comply or defect from some benchmark behavior. For example, a recreational boater can choose to dispose of trash overboard or haul the trash to shore, or perhaps a polluting firm can choose to meet or exceed a governmental standard for emissions. Traditional neo-classical models of common pool resource allocations predict that rational self-interested agents will tend to over-exploit the CPR in the absence of external regulation. A number of recent studies have documented the existence of common pool resource outcomes that contradict this commonly held belief. In recent years, social norms have been gained much attention from the economists as an important driving force of individual behavior. A number of studies on the management of common pool resources (CPR) through endogenous institutions have argued for the importance of social norms in maintaining efficient, sustainable allocations in the absence of external regulation (Ostrom (1992), Bromley (1992), Baland and Platteau (1996)). Despite the empirical documentation of potentially sustainable outcomes, theoretical explanations remain in their infancy. Since Hardin's(1968) seminal work on the 'tragedy of the commons', a number of models based on neo-classical economics have tried to explain the existence of common pool resource equilibria consisting of partial compliance or defection (Sethi and Somanathan (1996), Haab and McConnell (2002)). Of particular interest, evolutionary models of compliance, which incorporate the behavioral outcomes of others into individual decision making, have proven popular in explaining collective behavior problems associated with sustainable CPR outcomes. However, these evolutionary models fail to incorporate two commonly observed characteristics of common pool resource decision environments: partial compliance equilibria and costly sanctioning behavior. Haab and McConnell (2002) develop a rudimentary evolutionary model of compliance behavior and show that heterogeneous distributions of compliance costs across a population can result in a less than full compliance equilibrium. The model of Haab and McConnell ignores the possibility of endogenous sanctioning of deviant behavior. Other evolutionary models of common pool behavior assume altruistic motives for sanctioning or costless sanctioning. The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation for partial compliance equilibria in a common pool resource allocation problem with and without endogenous sanctioning behavior. First, the theoretical possibility of partial compliance equilibrium with exogenous sanctioning behavior and fully observable agent behavior, is presented. Next we introduce uncertainty into the model through the incomplete observation of agent behavior to examine why some agents willingly commit costly sanctioning behaviors. We show that even in the presence of costly, endogenous sanctioning, multiple CPR equilibria exist, including a stable partial compliance equilibrium. Finally, we compare the resulting CPR equilibria to determine the socially efficient outcome, and compare the costs of various policies of achieving such outcomes. An Overview of the Model and Outcomes: Reconsider the stylized CPR problem where individual decision agents can choose to undertake some behavior or not (a binary decision). Assume there are two types of agents: defectors and compliers. Further, compliers can be divided into sub-samples of sheer compliers and enforcers. Defectors do not follow the socially accepted norm and can be punished (sanctioned) by compliers when detected. Sheer compliers follow the social norm but pay a compliance cost (e.g. time value of waste disposal). Enforcers, a subset of compliers, willingly sanction defectors but pay a sanctioning cost (e.g. monitoring cost). The primary difference between the current model and other evolutionary models of behavior is found in the payoff function of the agents. We assume that agents can incur an internal cost of defection (e.g. humiliation) when an agent commits defecting behavior whether or not he is detected. Several studies (Coleman (1987), Kerr et al. (1994), Carwford and Ostrom (1995) and T.C Haab and K.E. McCornell (2001)) have already examined this internal cost. Further, the agent can earn a benefit through enhanced reputation by complying. (Hamilton (1964), Axelrod (1984), Nowak and Simund (1998) and Leimar and Mammerstein (2001)) Internal cost increases as the number of complier increases. Reputation only can be earned when compliance behavior is observed by others thus the size of community of CPR and the proportion of compliers are important. The benefits to defection increase as the number of compliers increases. For example, in a fishery, the more agents complying with the efficient fishing effort the more fish defectors can catch. However, the internal cost to defection increases as the number of compliers increases. The difference between this defecting benefit and defecting cost (internal cost + inflict from sanctioning) increases as the number of compliers increases. On the other hand, the marginal reputation benefit is increasing for low levels of compliance but after some level of compliers, reputation increases at the decreasing rate. A representative individual will compare the marginal net benefit of defection to the marginal reputation of compliance and will choose to defect if the marginal net benefit of defection is greater than the marginal payoff to compliance. A partial compliance equilibrium is sustainable because for compliance populations above the point where the marginal net benefits of defection exceed the marginal net benefits of compliance, the marginal net benefits of defection are greater than the marginal net benefits of compliance, leading to increasing defection. For compliance populations below the point where the marginal net benefits of defection equal the marginal net benefits of compliance, the marginal net benefits of defection are less than the marginal reputation of compliance leading to increasing compliance. With sufficient exogenous sanctioning behavior, by government or authorized party, the marginal net defecting benefit can be reduced thereby achieving a less than full compliance (or full defection) equilibrium. In practice, it's possible that the sanctioning behavior is enforced by endogenous members. The interesting features of this endogenous sanctioning behavior are that it is not only sufficient to maintain sustainable level of CPR but also enforced by rational individuals who would not sanction unless there were a reward. When individual behavior can be observed fully or partially, sanctioning behavior is rewarded in a form of reputation or prestige. Thus there may be sufficient incentive to overcome costly sanctioning behavior. In some environments where information of individual behavior is uncertain, people have incentive to monitor others' strategies in order not to be fooled in the next stage of game. Therefore it can be easily inferred that there is positive relationship between costly sanctioning behavior and earning reputation or getting information of others' behavior, which depends on the availability of information of others' behaviors. In conclusion, with the assumption of sufficient internal cost for defecting behavior and reputation for compliance behavior, a less than full compliance equilibrium with exogenous sanctioning can be explained. Even with endogenous sanctioning, a stable partial compliance equilibrium is possible if people have the incentive to either gather information on other's behavior (in the hidden action case) or to earn reputation in partially observable action case.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
Common Pool Resources and Social Norms: Internal cost & Less than Full Compliance - Fishery example
No full textWe develop a theoretical model that is capable of explaining the existence of sustainable common pool resource equilibria in the absence of external regulation. We combine ideas from the literature on social norms in an iterative game theory framework to establish the existence of multiple sustainable common pool equilibria. Summary: Consider a highly stylized common pool resource (CPR) allocation problem where individual agents have the opportunity to comply or defect from some benchmark behavior. For example, a recreational boater can choose to dispose of trash overboard or haul the trash to shore, or perhaps a polluting firm can choose to meet or exceed a governmental standard for emissions. Traditional neo-classical models of common pool resource allocations predict that rational self-interested agents will tend to over-exploit the CPR in the absence of external regulation. A number of recent studies have documented the existence of common pool resource outcomes that contradict this commonly held belief. In recent years, social norms have been gained much attention from the economists as an important driving force of individual behavior. A number of studies on the management of common pool resources (CPR) through endogenous institutions have argued for the importance of social norms in maintaining efficient, sustainable allocations in the absence of external regulation (Ostrom (1992), Bromley (1992), Baland and Platteau (1996)). Despite the empirical documentation of potentially sustainable outcomes, theoretical explanations remain in their infancy. Since Hardin's(1968) seminal work on the 'tragedy of the commons', a number of models based on neo-classical economics have tried to explain the existence of common pool resource equilibria consisting of partial compliance or defection (Sethi and Somanathan (1996), Haab and McConnell (2002)). Of particular interest, evolutionary models of compliance, which incorporate the behavioral outcomes of others into individual decision making, have proven popular in explaining collective behavior problems associated with sustainable CPR outcomes. However, these evolutionary models fail to incorporate two commonly observed characteristics of common pool resource decision environments: partial compliance equilibria and costly sanctioning behavior. Haab and McConnell (2002) develop a rudimentary evolutionary model of compliance behavior and show that heterogeneous distributions of compliance costs across a population can result in a less than full compliance equilibrium. The model of Haab and McConnell ignores the possibility of endogenous sanctioning of deviant behavior. Other evolutionary models of common pool behavior assume altruistic motives for sanctioning or costless sanctioning. The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation for partial compliance equilibria in a common pool resource allocation problem with and without endogenous sanctioning behavior. First, the theoretical possibility of partial compliance equilibrium with exogenous sanctioning behavior and fully observable agent behavior, is presented. Next we introduce uncertainty into the model through the incomplete observation of agent behavior to examine why some agents willingly commit costly sanctioning behaviors. We show that even in the presence of costly, endogenous sanctioning, multiple CPR equilibria exist, including a stable partial compliance equilibrium. Finally, we compare the resulting CPR equilibria to determine the socially efficient outcome, and compare the costs of various policies of achieving such outcomes. An Overview of the Model and Outcomes: Reconsider the stylized CPR problem where individual decision agents can choose to undertake some behavior or not (a binary decision). Assume there are two types of agents: defectors and compliers. Further, compliers can be divided into sub-samples of sheer compliers and enforcers. Defectors do not follow the socially accepted norm and can be punished (sanctioned) by compliers when detected. Sheer compliers follow the social norm but pay a compliance cost (e.g. time value of waste disposal). Enforcers, a subset of compliers, willingly sanction defectors but pay a sanctioning cost (e.g. monitoring cost). The primary difference between the current model and other evolutionary models of behavior is found in the payoff function of the agents. We assume that agents can incur an internal cost of defection (e.g. humiliation) when an agent commits defecting behavior whether or not he is detected. Several studies (Coleman (1987), Kerr et al. (1994), Carwford and Ostrom (1995) and T.C Haab and K.E. McCornell (2001)) have already examined this internal cost. Further, the agent can earn a benefit through enhanced reputation by complying. (Hamilton (1964), Axelrod (1984), Nowak and Simund (1998) and Leimar and Mammerstein (2001)) Internal cost increases as the number of complier increases. Reputation only can be earned when compliance behavior is observed by others thus the size of community of CPR and the proportion of compliers are important. The benefits to defection increase as the number of compliers increases. For example, in a fishery, the more agents complying with the efficient fishing effort the more fish defectors can catch. However, the internal cost to defection increases as the number of compliers increases. The difference between this defecting benefit and defecting cost (internal cost + inflict from sanctioning) increases as the number of compliers increases. On the other hand, the marginal reputation benefit is increasing for low levels of compliance but after some level of compliers, reputation increases at the decreasing rate. A representative individual will compare the marginal net benefit of defection to the marginal reputation of compliance and will choose to defect if the marginal net benefit of defection is greater than the marginal payoff to compliance. A partial compliance equilibrium is sustainable because for compliance populations above the point where the marginal net benefits of defection exceed the marginal net benefits of compliance, the marginal net benefits of defection are greater than the marginal net benefits of compliance, leading to increasing defection. For compliance populations below the point where the marginal net benefits of defection equal the marginal net benefits of compliance, the marginal net benefits of defection are less than the marginal reputation of compliance leading to increasing compliance. With sufficient exogenous sanctioning behavior, by government or authorized party, the marginal net defecting benefit can be reduced thereby achieving a less than full compliance (or full defection) equilibrium. In practice, it's possible that the sanctioning behavior is enforced by endogenous members. The interesting features of this endogenous sanctioning behavior are that it is not only sufficient to maintain sustainable level of CPR but also enforced by rational individuals who would not sanction unless there were a reward. When individual behavior can be observed fully or partially, sanctioning behavior is rewarded in a form of reputation or prestige. Thus there may be sufficient incentive to overcome costly sanctioning behavior. In some environments where information of individual behavior is uncertain, people have incentive to monitor others' strategies in order not to be fooled in the next stage of game. Therefore it can be easily inferred that there is positive relationship between costly sanctioning behavior and earning reputation or getting information of others' behavior, which depends on the availability of information of others' behaviors. In conclusion, with the assumption of sufficient internal cost for defecting behavior and reputation for compliance behavior, a less than full compliance equilibrium with exogenous sanctioning can be explained. Even with endogenous sanctioning, a stable partial compliance equilibrium is possible if people have the incentive to either gather information on other's behavior (in the hidden action case) or to earn reputation in partially observable action case
Increasing Distributed Generation Penetration using Soft Normally-Open Points
No full textThis paper considers the effects of various voltage control solutions on facilitating an increase in allowable levels of distributed generation installation before voltage violations occur. In particular, the voltage control solution that is focused on is the implementation of `soft' normally-open points (SNOPs), a term which refers to power electronic devices installed in place of a normally-open point in a medium-voltage distribution network which allows for control of real and reactive power flows between each end point of its installation sites. While other benefits of SNOP installation are discussed, the intent of this paper is to determine whether SNOPs are a viable alternative to other voltage control strategies for this particular application. As such, the SNOPs ability to affect the voltage profile along feeders within a distribution system is focused on with other voltage control options used for comparative purposes. Results from studies on multiple network models with varying topologies are presented and a case study which considers economic benefits of increasing feasible DG penetration is also given
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