34 research outputs found
Incentive Mechanism Design in Retailer Private-label Business under Random Yield: A Principal-agent Model with Hidden Actions
No full textInterchange fee rate, merchant discount rate, and retail prices in a credit card network : a game-theoretic analysis
Full text linkWe consider two game-theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer\u27s interchange fee rate, an acquirer\u27s merchant discount rate, and a merchant\u27s retail prices for multiple products in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two-stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail prices, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695, we develop a three-player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decisions. We derive both the Shapley value- and the nucleolus-characterized unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we show that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also find that the large, highly-specialized merchants and banks are more likely to join the cooperative negotiation whereas the small firms may prefer the two-stage game setting. Our numerical experiments demonstrate that the acquirer\u27s and the issuer\u27s unit operation costs more significantly impact both rates in the cooperative game setting than in the two-stage game setting
Optimal Ordering Decision and Incentives for Yield Improvement under Random Demand
Full text linkIn this thesis, we focus on the applications of incentive mechanism design in operations and supply chain management (OSCM). Most significant--and interesting--topics arising in OSCM are concerned with the management of relationships among supply chain members under asymmetric information. Since the incentive mechanism design based on the principal-agent model deals with asymmetric information in a satisfactory way, it has become an important tool in investigating OSCM-related asymmetric information problems.
We start with an introduction in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we briefly describe the theory of incentive mechanism design and its applications to OSCM, and the organization structure of this thesis. In Chapter 2, we study the optimal wage scheme and effort level in a contracting problem where both the principal and the agent are risk-averse. This chapter is a starting point for analyzing the buyer's optimal ordering decision and incentives for yield improvement in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 investigates the buyer's optimal ordering decision and incentives for yield improvement in the setting of random yield for the critical component and uncertain demand for the finished product. In Chapter 4, we assume the supplier's effort and yield become continuous and study a continuous optimization problem where the buyer decides the optimal order quantities and incentives for yield improvement under random demand. Our thesis ends with a conclusion and addresses the future research in Chapter 5.ThesisDoctor of Philosophy (PhD
Road Functional Characters of Shanghai Based on Intersection Turning Movement Proportion
No full textImpacts of intellectual capital on process innovation and mass customisation capability: Direct and mediating effects
Full text linkThis paper presents an empirical survey study. We propose a model to examine the individual and joint effects of the three components of intellectual capital (i.e., human, social, and structural capital) on process innovation and mass customisation (MC) capability. The hypotheses are empirically tested using structural equation modelling and data collected from 645 manufacturing plants in 10 countries/regions. The results show that human and social capital are positively associated with structural capital. Human capital directly improves both process innovation and MC capability. The direct effect of social capital on MC capability and that of structural capital on process innovation are positive and significant. Moreover, process innovation is positively associated with MC capability. In addition, we find that structural capital mediates human and social capital’s effects on process innovation, and process innovation mediates human and structural capital’s effects on MC capability. This study contributes to the literature by providing insights into how human, social, and structural capital jointly improve process innovation and MC capability, as well as how the different types of knowledge residing in a manufacturer affect MC capability development
Effects of social capital on operational performance: impacts of servitisation
Full text linkStudies on servitisation have largely overlooked the roles of social capital with suppliers and knowledge management. We propose a moderated mediation model to investigate the impacts of servitisation on the mechanisms through which social capital with suppliers improves operational performance. The hypotheses are empirically tested using structural equation modelling and data collected from 276 manufacturing firms in China. The results show that social capital improves operational performance both directly and indirectly through knowledge management, and the relationships are influenced by servitisation. In particular, social capital improves operational performance directly and indirectly through knowledge combination in servitised firms, whereas social capital only improves operational performance indirectly through knowledge acquisition in traditional manufacturers. The findings contribute to the literature by revealing that the effects of social capital with suppliers on operational performance are partially mediated by knowledge acquisition and knowledge combination and the mediation effects are moderated by servitisation, and by providing insights into how to design purchasing and production systems to profit from servitisation
Interchange Fee Decision for a Credit Card Network: Non-Cooperative vs. Cooperative Game Analysis
No full textLinking supply chain quality integration with mass customization and product modularity
Full text linkSupply chain quality management has received increasing attention from researchers and practitioners in recent years. However, the knowledge about the effects of a manufacturer's design and production capabilities on supply chain quality management is limited. In this study, we propose a model to investigate the effects of mass customization and product modularity on supply chain quality integration (i.e. internal, supplier, and customer quality integration) and the impact of supply chain quality integration on competitive performance. We use data collected from 317 global manufacturers to empirically test the conceptual model. The results show that mass customization and product modularity directly improve internal quality integration, and product modularity also improves internal quality integration indirectly through mass customization. Product modularity improves supplier quality integration directly, and both mass customization and product modularity improve supplier quality integration indirectly through internal quality integration. Mass customization improves customer quality integration both directly and indirectly through internal quality integration, and product modularity improves customer quality integration indirectly through mass customization and internal quality integration. We also find that supplier quality integration directly enhances competitive performance, and internal quality integration enhances competitive performance both directly and indirectly through supplier quality integration. Our findings contribute to production and quality management literature and practices
Single rollover or dual rollover: how a monopoly NEV manufacturer responds to NEV credit policy
No full textThe NEV credit policy plays a crucial role in advancing the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry and environmental conservation. This study investigates the monopoly NEV manufacturer’s optimal rollover strategy (Single Rollover (SR) vs. Dual Rollover (DR)) and pricing scheme (skimming vs. penetration) under the government’s stricter calculation criteria for NEV credit policy, considering a two-period market with strategic consumers. We find that the NEV manufacturer typically adopts a skimming pricing scheme in DR strategy, while a penetration pricing scheme in SR strategy. The choice between SR and DR strategy hinges on the government’s calculation criteria for NEV credits, product upgrade speed, and vehicle environmental performance improvement. When the calculation criterion for NEV credits is moderate, or when it is low, coupled with fast product upgrade speed and marginal improved environmental performance of the new vehicle, SR strategy is beneficial to the NEV manufacturer to avoid the cannibalization between new and old vehicles. In contrast, the NEV manufacturer can benefit from DR strategy through price discrimination between new and old vehicles to attract consumers from different market segments. However, stricter calculation criteria for NEV credits do not always result in higher social welfare.<br/
