714 research outputs found
A science-based critique of epistemological naturalism in Quine’s tradition
No full textAt the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine’s tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey.
By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalis
Pragmatic norms are all you need – why the symbol grounding problem does not apply to LLMs
No full textDo LLMs fall prey to Harnad’s symbol grounding problem (SGP), as it has recently been claimed? We argue that this is not the case. Starting out with countering the arguments of Bender and Koller (2020), we trace the origins of the SGP to the computational theory of mind (CTM), and we show that it only arises with natural language when questionable theories of meaning are presupposed. We conclude by showing that it would apply to LLMs only if they were interpreted in the manner of how the CTM conceives the mind, i.e., by postulating that LLMs rely on a version of a language of thought, or by adopting said questionable theories of meaning; since neither option is rational, we conclude that the SGP does not apply to LLMs
Maddy vs. Quine on innate concepts. Revisiting a perennial debate in light of recent empirical results
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