1,721,574 research outputs found
Replication data for: "Evaluating Measures of Hospital Quality: Evidence from Ambulance Referral Patterns"
No full textDoyle, Joseph, Graves, John, and Gruber, Jonathan, (2019) "Evaluating Measures of Hospital Quality: Evidence from Ambulance Referral Patterns." Review of Economics and Statistics 101:5, 841-852
Méditer Médée, in Pascal Quignard, translations et métamorphoses, sous la direction de Mireille Calle-Gruber, Jonathan Degenève et Irène Fenoglio, Paris Hermann, 2015, pp. 435-447
No full textAnalisi comparativa ed evolutiva dei testi dedicati da Pascal Quignard al mito di Medea, da "Le sexe et l'effroi" al libretto per il buto "Medea (performance con la coreografa e danzatrice Carlotta Ikeda), ripreso in "L'origine de la danse" e ai numerosi testi sparsi che lo circondano: studio delle fonti in chiave intertestuale e interartisica (Euripide, Seneca, l'affresco pompeiano e i contro-modelli moderni), poetica dell'"augmentum" e realizzazione scenica
Replication data for: "Evaluating Measures of Hospital Quality: Evidence from Ambulance Referral Patterns"
No full textDoyle, Joseph, Graves, John, and Gruber, Jonathan, (2019) "Evaluating Measures of Hospital Quality: Evidence from Ambulance Referral Patterns." Review of Economics and Statistics 101:5, 841-852
Replication data for: Saving Lives by Tying Hands: The Unexpected Effects of Constraining Health Care Providers
No full textGruber, Jonathan, Hoe, Thomas P., and Stoye, George, (2023) “Saving Lives by Tying Hands: The Unexpected Effects of Constraining Health Care Providers.” Review of Economics and Statistics 105:1, 1–19
The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
No full textThis paper reviews the issues raised by and the impacts of the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance. After reviewing the arguments for and against this policy, I present evidence from a micro-simulation model on the impacts on federal revenue, insurance coverage, and income distribution of various reforms to the exclusion
Replication Data for: "It's Good to be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers"
No full textFeenberg, Daniel, Ganguli, Ina, Gaule, Patrick, and Gruber, Jonathan, (2017) "It's Good to be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers." Review of Economics and Statistics 99:1, 32-39
Replication Data for: "It's Good to be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers"
No full textFeenberg, Daniel, Ganguli, Ina, Gaule, Patrick, and Gruber, Jonathan, (2017) "It's Good to be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers." Review of Economics and Statistics 99:1, 32-39
Delivering Public Health Insurance Through Private Plan Choice in the United States
No full textThe United States has seen a sea change in the way that publicly financed health insurance coverage is provided to low-income, elderly, and disabled enrollees. When programs such as Medicare and Medicaid were introduced in the 1960s, the government directly reimbursed medical providers for the care that they provided, through a classic "single payer system." Since the mid-1980s, however, there has been an evolution towards a model where the government subsidizes enrollees who choose among privately provided insurance options. In the United States, privatized delivery of public health insurance appears to be here to stay, with debates now focused on how much to expand its reach. Yet such privatized delivery raises a variety of thorny issues. Will choice among private insurance options lead to adverse selection and market failures in privatized insurance markets? Can individuals choose appropriately over a wide range of expensive and confusing plan options? Will a privatized approach deliver the promised increases in delivery efficiency claimed by advocates? What policy mechanisms have been used, or might be used, to address these issues? A growing literature in health economics has begun to make headway on these questions. In this essay, I discuss that literature and the lessons for both economics more generally and health care policymakers more specifically
Controlling Health Care Costs through Limited Network Insurance Plans: Evidence from Massachusetts State Employees
Full text linkWe investigate the impact of limited network insurance plans in the context of the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC), the insurance plan for state employees. Our quasi-experimental analysis examines the introduction of a major financial incentive to choose limited network plans that affected a subset of GIC enrollees. We find that enrollees are very price sensitive in their decision to enroll in limited network plans. Those who switched spent almost 40 percent less on medical care. This reflects reductions in the quantity of services and prices paid per service. The spending reductions came from specialist and hospital care, while spending on primary care rose. (JEL G22, H75, I11, I13, J45)National Institute on Aging (Grant #P30AG012810 to the National Bureau of Economic Research
Claims-shifting: The problem of parallel reimbursement regimes
Full text linkParallel reimbursement regimes, under which providers have some discretion over which payer gets billed for patient treatment, are a common feature of health care markets. In the U.S., the largest such system is under Workers’ Compensation (WC), where the treatment workers with injuries that are not definitively tied to a work accident may be billed either under group health insurance plans or under WC. We document that there is significant reclassification of injuries from group health plans into WC, or “claims shifting”, when the financial incentives to do so are strongest. In particular, we find that injuries to workers enrolled in capitated group health plans (such as HMOs) see a higher incidence of their claims for soft-tissue injuries (which are hard to classify specifically as work related) under WC than under group health, relative to those in non-capitated plans. Such a pattern is not evident for workers with traumatic injuries. Moreover, we find that such reclassification is more common in states with higher WC fees, once again for soft tissue but not traumatic injuries. Our results imply that a significant shift towards capitated reimbursement, or reimbursement reductions, under GH could lead to a large rise in the cost of WC plans
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