126,442 research outputs found
Extraits du journal de M. Groves, missionnaire à Bagdad
No full texttraduit de l'anglais par le traducteur de la Vie de Mme Judson et de la Vie de S. MillsOriginaltitel: Journal of a residence at Bagdad, during the years 1830 and 183
Groves, A N, Rnr
No full textThis record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/389329Surname: GROVES. Given Name(s) or Initials: A N. Military Service Number or Last Known Location: RNR. Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 56450.213098
Item: [2016.0049.21622] "Groves, A N, Rnr
Box 5, Neg. No. 1338: Mrs. N. A. Groves and Elsie Groves
No full textThis black and white photograph features a portrait of Mrs. N. A. Groves (left) and Elsie Groves (right) are sitting next to each other with their heads touching; both are wearing dark colored dresses. Mrs. N. A. Groves and Elsie Groves ordered the photograph.https://scholars.fhsu.edu/stafford_county/1421/thumbnail.jp
Factors underlying migratory bat aggregations in chestnut groves
No full textDeciduous woodlands have undergone major structural changes in Europe in the course of the last century. Dense woodlands have, for instance, replaced traditionally managed, open sweet chestnut groves, and have led to biodiversity losses. Surveys carried out in the southern Alps have shown that the frequency of occurrence of the rare migratory Leisler’s bat Nyctalus leisleri in bat boxes is much higher in managed than in unmanaged chestnut groves, pointing to the importance of traditional groves as stopover sites. To identify the reasons for this habitat preference we investigated whether managed chestnut groves constitute a more appropriate foraging ground than closed stands, and whether bat boxes in managed chestnut groves offer more suitable temperature conditions for roosting. Foraging habitat selection and roost usage were investigated by means of radiotracking and temperature loggers, respectively. Foraging Leisler’s bats predominantly selected deciduous woodlands over other habitat types, but showed no distinct preference for either type of chestnut grove over other forest types. In managed chestnut groves, bats used cooler boxes than others available in the same habitat, but there was no difference in temperature between the boxes used in managed versus unmanaged groves. Our results provide no evidence that foraging opportunities or roost temperature dictate the forest-specific pattern of bat box occupancy. As an alternative explanation, we suggest that managed chestnut groves may represent optimal lekking arenas due to their open structure and high roost density. Whatever the reason for this habitat preference, partially maintaining traditional management, resulting in a semi-open, mosaic landscape, is likely key to maintaining chestnut groves attractive for this migratory bat
Groves' Melody of hope [music] /
No full textCover title.; For piano.; With: Don't take the bread from the worker / words and music composed by Leon H. Groves ; arranged by A.B. Saunders.; Also available online http://nla.gov.au/nla.mus-an8364955; MUS: N, MUS/264.Melody of hop
Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?
No full textStrategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.Experiment, Laboratory, Secure Implementation, Groves-Clarke, Pivotal, Learning
Fair groves mechanisms
No full textThe original publication can be found at www.springerlink.comWe study allocation problems in which a costly task is to be assigned and money transfers are used to achieve fairness among agents. We consider a series of fairness notions (k-fairness for k epsilon {1, ... , n} where n is the number of agents) of decreasing restrictiveness that are based on Rawls' maximin equity criterion and impose welfare lower bounds. These fairness notions were introduced by Porter et al. (J Econ Theory 118:209-228, 2004) who also introduced two classes of Groves mechanisms that are 1-fair and 3-fair, respectively, and generate deficits that are bounded above. We show that these classes are the largest such classes of Groves mechanisms. We generalize these mechanisms for each k epsilon {2, ... , n} and show that the corresponding mechanisms generate the smallest deficit for each economy among all k-fair Groves mechanisms.Murat Atlamaz and Duygu Yengi
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
No full textIn coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignment game. The incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection. Furthermore the relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.coalition formation ; assignment ; manipulability ; substitutes ; incremental value ; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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