16 research outputs found
Winning the Third World
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Winning the Third World examines afresh the intense and enduring rivalry between the United States and China during the Cold War. Gregg A. Brazinsky shows how both nations fought vigorously to establish their influence in newly independent African and Asian countries. By playing a leadership role in Asia and Africa, China hoped to regain its status in world affairs, but Americans feared that China's history as a nonwhite, anticolonial nation would make it an even more dangerous threat in the postcolonial world than the Soviet Union. Drawing on a broad array of new archival materials from China and the United States, Brazinsky demonstrates that disrupting China's efforts to elevate its stature became an important motive behind Washington's use of both hard and soft power in the "Global South."</p
The Emergence of a Rivalry, 1919–1950
No full textThe first chapter explores the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) views of China’s role in what would later come to be known as the Third World. I argue that during these years, despite China’s weak position in international politics, CCP leaders nevertheless believed that their country would ultimately regain its status as a major power by leading a wider revolution of peoples oppressed by colonialism. It also looks at evolving American views of the CCP. It shows how American policies through most of the period served to alienate the CCP leaders from the United States.</p
Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. By D. Cha Victor, C. Kang David. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. x, 265 pp. pp. $24.50 (cloth).
No full textInsurgency and Counterinsurgency, 1961–1968
No full textEven as the PRC sought to win over radical and neutralist Afro-Asian states through diplomacy, it also sought to gain prestige in the Third World by becoming a leader of revolutionary forces. The PRC befriended a diverse group of Afro-Asian and insurgents guerilla that espoused Maoist doctrines during the 1960s. They believed that doing so would help to spread Mao Zedong thought throughout the world, raising the status of both the PRC and its leader. America’s fear that insurgent victories in countries such as Vietnam, Thailand and the Congo would enhance Chinese prestige and legitimate Maoism played a key role in precipitating some of the most dramatic and costly instances of U.S. intervention of the Cold War.</p
The Burdens of Status, 1950–1954
No full textThis chapter shows how the PRC’s search for greater status brought with it new obligations. China’s desire to stand at the helm of an Eastern revolution compelled the CCP to offer assistance to other Asian revolutionaries. The chapter argues that this mindset was a key factor in Beijing’s decisions to enter the Korean War and provide training and assistance to the Viet Minh. The United States, on the other hand, sought to prevent the PRC from gaining stature through its role in these conflicts. It often cited deflating China’s prestige in Asia as a motive for both fighting on in Korea and aiding the French in Indochina.</p
From Geneva to Bandung
No full textDuring the aftermath of the Korean War, the PRC continued seeking to strengthen its status in Asia, especially among other post-colonial states, but it hoped to do so in a more peaceful atmosphere that would allow economic recovery and domestic reconstruction. This chapter demonstrates how Beijing used two particularly important conferences—the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference—to demonstrate that it was a peaceful, responsible power. Guided by the skilled statesmanship of Zhou Enlai, the PRC aimed to play a significant role in both conferences while working to assure that the conferences themselves would be important and produce significant results.</p
The Cultural Competition, 1955–1964
No full textAlongside Beijing’s diplomatic campaign to win over Afro-Asian countries went an equally vigorous cultural initiative. During the 1950s and early 1960s the PRC carried out a multi-faceted propaganda offensive that highlighted China’s economic and military achievements while criticizing American imperialism. The overarching goal was to reassure the world about China’s intentions while inspiring admiration for the CCP’s revolutionary struggle. This chapter also covers Washington’s efforts to counter the effects of the PRC’s cultural diplomacy.</p
Introduction
No full textThe purpose of the introduction is to explain my general argument and review the historiography on my topic. The first part of the introduction describes briefly how the book fits into the evolving paradigm of Cold War studies and how looking at Sino-American competition in the Third World broadens our understanding of the field. The second part explores the concept of status, especially as it applies to Chinese and American foreign relations during the Cold War.</p
Advancing the Peace Offensive, 1955–1958
No full textThis chapter traces China’s efforts to capitalize on its success in Geneva and Bandung through diplomacy, especially in Southeast Asia. During this period, hosting official state visits by neighboring leaders such as Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Indonesian President Sukarno was especially important to Beijing. These helped to give the Chinese government the imprimatur of legitimacy and to raise its profile in Asia. Washington therefore sought to discourage or minimize the importance of these visits. Despite American meddling, China enjoyed great success with its diplomacy in the mid 1950s.</p
