1,721,075 research outputs found
Beliefs as mental states: steps toward a dispositional approach
No full textBelief is an epistemic state often contrasted with other epistemic states. The contrast varies depending on the kind of states one is interested in. If the relation with language is at stake, beliefs are compared with sub-doxastic states, implicit beliefs, dispositional beliefs or proto-thoughts. If the relation with certainty is at stake, we have credences, assents or opinions. After reviewing these concepts and the related theories, I argue that we need a multi-faceted and dispositional view of beliefs, one that incorporates four different parameters, as I call them. These are the degree of inferentially integration, consciousness of its content, the order of the belief and its degree of certainty. All of these parameters have been used by one author or the other, but none has used them all. However, they are compatible with each other and make a satisfactory explanatory and a metaphysically sound set
Second Order Properties: Why Kim’s Reduction Does Not Work
No full textIn this paper I argue that recent reductionist’s arguments marshaled by Jaegwon Kim on the causal status of mental properties do not get the point they are aimed at. In particular, in the first part, tackling epistemological issues, I show that Kim’s arguments concerning the heterogeneity of disjunctive properties if accepted would undermine most scientific practice; in the second part, devoted to metaphysical issues, I argue that Kim’s reductive functionalism, if taken as a metaphysical thesis, cannot be applied neither to qualitative states nor to intentional ones. In particular, qualitative states cannot be reduced by Kim’s admissions, while intentional states cannot be reduced given Kripke’s argument concerning the nature of theoretical identifications. Being mental states either qualitative or intentional, Kim’s strategy fails to make his point. Finally, I argue that the mental properties can be interpreted as micro-based properties, so showing that the so-called ‘generalization argument’ either holds or licenses us in crediting mental properties with causal powers
Tropes and mental causation
No full textIn the paper it is argued that Davidsonian solution to mental causation are not helped by recurring to tropes
Levels, Orders and the Causal Status of Mental Properties
Get PDFIn recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the context of his reply to this so-called ‘generalization argument’. In particular, the paper focuses on the level/order distinction, to which Kim appeals in his reply to the generalization argument, and on the relation between this distinction and two varieties of functionalism, ‘realizer’ vs. ‘role’ functionalism. The author argues that a proper analysis of the notions of levels and orders undermines Kim’s response to the generalization argument, and suggests that Kim’s reductionist strategy for vindicating the causal powers of mental properties is better served if mental properties are construed as first-order properties, as realizer-functionalism recommends
Reconsidering the logic of emotion
No full textIt is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitudes. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional or psychological role. Some authors have seek a convergence by individuating propositions by some Functional role semantics. In this paper I show that when it comes to emotional attitudes with propositional content, either the independence of proposition and attitude collapses or functional role semantics brings to unstable individuation conditions for propositions. Some consequences of these two outcomes are considered
Animali intenzionali
No full textIn questo saggio difendo e sviluppo la tesi per cui l'intenzionalità può essere pienamente attribuita anche ad animali privi del linguaggi
Per una filosofia della mente
No full textSi sottolinea la necessità di accettare l'idea che la filosofia della mente è un campo autonomo e solido di ricerca, che anche in Italia deve avere un suo spazio
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