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Questioning and knowing: the logic of questioning in Bernard Lonergan's theory of knowing
No full textFull text is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland only.The aim of this investigation is to explore and develop the logic of questioning as it relates to knowing. The central thesis of the investigation is that the practice of questioning is an expression of the desire to know that is dynamically oriented towards knowing everything. It recognizes that the domain of questioning is larger than the domain of knowledge, for we can always ask more questions than we are able to answer. It discusses the relationship between questioning and ignorance; it points out conceptual similarities and differences between questioning, doubt, wonder, interest and attention. It discusses Aristotle's logic of questions in relation to gaining knowledge, as answers to different types of questions. It examines Hintikka's approach to the logic of questioning and argues that his Game Theory model of questioning is restrictive. It distinguishes between the act of questioning and the content of questions. It argues that the practice of questioning grounds a critical realist theory of knowledge that is coherent and verifiable, and that any theory of knowing that restricts questioning is itself questionable. The major part of the investigation is an examination of the place of questioning in the arguments used by Bernard Lonergan to develop a theory of knowing and being in his major work, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. It shows how Lonergan employed an unrestricted logic of questioning that is oriented to knowing everything about everything. It argues that questioning not only initiates the movement towards knowing but also that it is the guiding methodology by which we discovery further knowledge. It examines Lonergan's theory of being as the objective of an unrestricted desire to know, and shows how his argument for the existence of transcendent being are related to the practice of raising further questions. The conclusion outlines key features of questioning that need to be included in a full account of the logic of questioning. In an Appendix it provides a brief sketch of Bernard Lonergan's intellectual life and discusses related aspects of his work
Shades of consciousness
No full textIt has been argued that consciousness might be what differentiates human from machine mentality. What then is consciousness? We discuss consciousness, particularly perception accounts of consciousness. It is argued that perception and consciousness are distinct. Armstrong's (1980) account of consciousness is rejected. It is proposed that perception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness, and that there is a distinction to be drawn between consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness is tightly linked to attention and to certain sorts of knowledge. Implications for machine consciousness and machine attention are discussed
Belief Sets and Commitment Stores
Get PDFConference Papers and Commentary.In this paper we compare central elements of Dialogue Logic and Belief Revision theory. Dialogue Logic of the Hamblin/Mackenzie style, or Formal Dialectic, contains three main features. First, there is a rule governed interaction between dialogue participants—the minimal case being two participants. Second, each participant has a commitment store which changes as the dialogue progresses. Third, the changes in the commitment store are governed by rules for additions and withdrawals of material. Withdrawal of material is one major source of difficulty in proposing rules for commitment store change. The classic Belief Revision theory is the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson) theory. AGM theory is a theory about ideal rational believers who change their sets of beliefs by either expansion or contraction. Contraction is a major source of difficulty in belief revision theory. We claim that the commitment stores of dialogue logic include, in a sense, the belief sets of belief revision theory. Further, withdrawal and contraction are essentially the same process. We consider various kinds of withdrawal and contraction, and show how approaches to these processes illuminate certain of the formal fallacies
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