1,721,489 research outputs found
Replication Data for: "Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments"
No full textClark, Damon, Gill, David, Prowse, Victoria, and Rush, Mark, (2020) “Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments.” Review of Economics and Statistics 102:4, 648-663
Replication Data for: "Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments"
No full textClark, Damon, Gill, David, Prowse, Victoria, and Rush, Mark, (2020) “Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments.” Review of Economics and Statistics 102:4, 648-663
Les applications de la photographie à l’astronomie, conférence
No full textGill David. Les applications de la photographie à l’astronomie, conférence. In: Bulletin astronomique, tome 4, 1887. pp. 361-380
Note préliminaire sur les observations de la planète Victoria, faites en 1889
No full textGill David. Note préliminaire sur les observations de la planète Victoria, faites en 1889. In: Bulletin astronomique, tome 10, 1893. pp. 248-250
Photographie astronomique. Lettre de M. D. Gill à M. l’amiral Mouchez. Observatoire royal du Cap de Bonne-Espérance, 1er mars 1886
No full textGill David. Photographie astronomique. Lettre de M. D. Gill à M. l’amiral Mouchez. Observatoire royal du Cap de Bonne-Espérance, 1er mars 1886. In: Bulletin astronomique, tome 3, 1886. pp. 161-164
Strategic disclosure of intermediate research results
No full textWe analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results during the course of a patent contest. Despite knowledge spillovers, the leading innovator sometimes discloses to signal commitment to the project, and so potentially inducing a rival's exit. Surprisingly, when development costs are low the leading innovator does not need to disclose to induce the same strategic deterrence effect as that which arises from disclosure. Taking into account wasteful duplication of R&D effort, a patent office can increase welfare by choosing the probability of granting a contested patent and so altering the proportion of rivals that the leading innovator deters
A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition
Full text linkWe develop a novel computerized real effort task, based on moving sliders across a screen, to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a real effort sequential-move tournament. Our theory predicts that a disappointment averse agent, who is loss averse around her endogenous expectations-based reference point, responds negatively to her rival's effort. We find significant evidence for this discouragement effect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population
Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers
Full text linkWith indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome
The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer: how best to transmit information using tests and conditional pricing
Full text linkA principal who knows her type can face public testing to help attract endorsements from agents. Tests are pass/fail and have an innate toughness (bias) corresponding to a trade-off between the higher probability of passing a softer test and the greater impact on agents’ beliefs from passing a tougher test. Conditional on the test result, the principal also selects the price of endorsement. The principal always wants to be tested, and chooses the toughest or softest test available depending upon the precision of the agents’ and tests’ information. Applications abound in industrial organization, political economy and labor economics
Fairness and desert in tournaments.
No full textWe model the behavior of agents who care about receiving what they feel they deserve in a two-player rank-order tournament. Perceived entitlements are sensitive to how hard an agent has worked relative to her rival, and agents are loss averse around their meritocratically determined endogenous reference points. In a fair tournament sufficiently large desert concerns drive identical agents to push their effort levels apart in order to end up closer to their reference points on average. In an unfair tournament, where one agent is advantaged, the equilibrium is symmetric in the absence of desert, but asymmetric in the presence of desert. We find that desert concerns can undermine the standard conclusion that competition for a fixed supply of status is socially wasteful and explain why, when the distribution of output noise is fat-tailed, an employer might use a rank-order incentive scheme
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