198,466 research outputs found
GATT-Think
No full textWe describe recent work on the theory of trade agreements that speaks to the purpose and design of GATT. Our discussion proceeds in three steps. First, we examine the purpose of a trade agreement. In both the traditional economic and the political-economy approaches to the study of trade agreements, the problem for a trade agreement to solve is the excessive protection that arises in the absence of an agreement as a consequence of the terms-of-trade externality. Second, we consider the origin and design of GATT. We note that GATT is a rules-based institution whose origin can be traced to the disastrous economic performance that accompanied the high tariffs of the 1920's and 1930's. Finally, we review the theoretical literature that interprets and evaluates the institutional features found in GATT. We consider in particular whether GATT articles can be interpreted as offering negotiation rules that help governments undo the inefficient restrictions in trade that are caused by the terms-of-trade externality. On the whole, our review suggests that the core principles of GATT indeed may be interpreted in this manner. Specifically, we report findings that indicate that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination work in concert to remedy the inefficiency created by the terms-of-trade externality. We also extract a variety of predictions from the literature on enforcement and trade policy, and we argue that these predictions are broadly compatible with both the design of GATT and certain historical experiences in trade-policy conduct. We thus interpret the literature reviewed here as providing a strong presumption for the view that GATT can be understood as an institution whose central principles are well-designed to assist governments in their attempt to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma. Our review therefore offers support for the (politically-augmented) terms-of-trade theory as an appropriate framework within which to interpret and evaluate GATT.
Competition, competition policy, and the GATT
No full textThe authors argue that further moves to liberalize trade and to implement existing GATT rules and principles may have a greater impact on global competition than would the pursuit of harmonization of competition policy. They also suggest that current GATT rules and case law provide scope for disputes to be brought before the GATT that relate to both the application and the nonapplication of existing domestic competition laws of GATT contracting parties. This leads to de facto discrimination between domestic and foreign products. Little use has been made of the GATT in this connection. Perhaps existing indirect avenues for raising competition-related disputes in the GATT should be pursued more actively. This would help identify what specific government policies might be the subject of multilateral negotiations and explicitly incorporated into the GATT framework.Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOMEAND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Economic Theory&Research,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access
Brazil, the GATT, and the WTO: history and prospects
No full text1. Brazil and the GATT, 1947-1980 Early years: GATT and ITO The first 20 years: rich men’s club and free riders Brazil and the Tokyo Round 2. Skirmishes before the Uruguay Round, 1980-86 3. The Uruguay Round, 1986-1994 4. Brazil and the GATT, 1980-1994 5. Brazil and the WTO after the Uruguay Round, 1994-1998 6. Brazilian diplomacy in the GATT and the WTO 7. Perspectives
National Treatment on Internal Taxation : Revisiting GATT Article III :2
No full textThis paper examines GATT Article III :2 on national treatment on internal taxation. The fact that as of 1 January 2008, national treatment violations in the goods sector have been challenged in nearly 29% of the WTO complaints points to the great importance of the national treatment principle in the multilateral trading system on the one hand, and temptation of WTO Members to protect domestic production through internal taxes and regulations on the other. Cases involving de facto discrimination against foreign goods will increase in number given the sophistication of governments protectionist policy. The examination of a claim on a discriminatory internal tax requires a multi-tiered test of several issues including likeness, discriminatory threshold and protective application of the tax measure. This test applies differently depending on what sentence of Article III :2 is at issue. The controversial aim-and-effect approach is not relevant to the determination of likeness, but can still be utilized, to some extent, in examining the protective application of the measure concerned. Some discrepancy in the Appellate Bodys approach to the subjective intent issue seems to leave some room for referring to government statements in future analyses of protective application. Korea and its FTA partners have affirmed their adherence to GATT Article III. When the FTA parties enter into a dispute over national treatment, a problem as to the jurisdiction of WTO panels over FTAs GATT-plus provisions on national treatment may arise. Irrespective of what dispute settlement forum is resorted to, GATTplus provisions, as a lex posterior, would prevail over the corresponding provisions of Article III. Another problem is that FTA panels are not legally constrained by WTO jurisprudence. In this regard, it is suggested that FTA panels, wherever possible, follow the WTO interpretations of Article III to secure consistent and predictable application of the national treatment rule.Non-discrimination, national treatment, Internal Taxation, Like Product, Directly Competitive or Substitutable Product
Do rules control power? GATT articles and arrangements in the Uruguay Round
No full textMany complain and offer evidence that in recent years the GATT system has become more power-oriented, less stable, and less equitable. A concern to reverse this drift was one of the motives that brought the international community to agree to undertake the Uruguay Round. Rules control power, assumed the signers of the Punte del Este declaration, therefore elaborating and extending GATT rules would move the international community toward a fairer, more stable international trading system. Finger and Dhar contend that the opposite is true. Particularly in the 1980s, the elaboration and application of GATT rules has been an exercise in the application of economic and political power, not in its control. GATT rules, in theory, are there to limit national trade restrictions. Finger and Dhar contend that in fact things work the other way around: national practice comes first, and determines what the GATT rules mean. GATT's rules do not put limits on national practices, but provide international santion for these practices. Such rules are not part of the thereforelution but are part of the problem. Theirs is a situation-specific argument, say Finger and Dhar, not a generic one. Their target is not"rules", nor is it"GATT". Rather, it is the GATT rules.Rules of Origin,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Common Carriers Industry,Transport and Trade Logistics,Trade Policy
Trade dispute settlement mechanisms: the WTO dispute settlement understanding in the wake of the GATT
No full textA critical feature of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations was the establishment of a new and more effective system of dealing with international trade disputes, known as the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The original GATT dispute settlement system comprised rudimentary remnants of a more thorough framework contained in the defunct Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). By the time of the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations in Punta del Este in 1986, the effectiveness and credibility of the GATT dispute settlement system was being very seriously questioned. The primary reason for the increasing lack of confidence in the system was the propensity of GATT contracting countries to ignore the findings of Panels, resulting in a stalemate in a number of high profile trade disputes. Several trade disputes between the EU and the United States discussed were initiated under the GATT dispute settlement system but remained unresolved. These disputes became increasingly acrimonious as a direct consequence of the failure of the GATT system to enforce a satisfactory resolution. This paper provides an outline of the workings of the GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems underlie several recent trade disputes. The first two sections deal with the GATT system of settling trade disputes. The first details the key elements of the GATT dispute settlement system while the second considers its performance in resolving disputes. Section 3 outlines the origins of the WTO DSU and summarises its principal Articles. The WTO DSU is appraised on the basis of its first nine years of operation in Section 4 followed by a brief discussion of the key issues that have arisen from its operation. The final Section makes some concluding comments on the relative efficacy of the GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems.
Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanisms : The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding in the Wake of The GATT
No full textA critical feature of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations was the establishment of a new and more effective system of dealing with international trade disputes, known as the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The original GATT dispute settlement system comprised rudimentary remnants of a more thorough framework contained in the defunct Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). By the time of the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations in Punta del Este in 1986, the effectiveness and credibility of the GATT dispute settlement system was being very seriously questioned. The primary reason for the increasing lack of confidence in the system was the propensity of GATT contracting countries to ignore the findings of Panels, resulting in a stalemate in a number of high profile trade disputes. Several trade disputes between the EU and the United States discussed were initiated under the GATT dispute settlement system but remained unresolved. These disputes became increasingly acrimonious as a direct consequence of the failure of the GATT system to enforce a satisfactory resolution. This paper provides an outline of the workings of the GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems underlie several recent trade disputes. The first two sections deal with the GATT system of settling trade disputes. The first details the key elements of the GATT dispute settlement system while the second considers its performance in resolving disputes. Section 3 outlines the origins of the WTO DSU and summarises its principal Articles. The WTO DSU is appraised on the basis of its first nine years of operation in Section 4 followed by a brief discussion of the key issues that have arisen from its operation. The final Section makes some concluding comments on the relative efficacy of the GATT and WTO dispute settlement systems
Special and Differential Treatment in the GATT: A Pyrrhic Victory for Developing Countries
No full textPreferential measures for developing countries implemented within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade failed to achieve their purported goal of facilitating economic development; this failure was due to their weak theoretical underpinnings and poor policy design. Not only were the demands developing countries made for discriminatory preferences largely ineffectual, their demands for preferential treatment, together with their forgoing full participation in the multilateral trading system, fundamentally reduced the obligation of developed countries to consider the interests of developing countries in future negotiation rounds. Thus the winning of preferences was rendered a pyrrhic victory for developing countries.Economic development, trade liberalization, GATT, special and differential treatment, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy,
Welfare Implications of Regionalism in the GATT
No full textThis paper investigates the welfare implications of an existence of a free trade agreement (FTA) and a customs union (CU) within the GATT. Two types of GATT regimes are considered in a completely symmetric world: a pure GATT regime without any type of the regional trade agreements (RTAs), and a modified GATT regime with one of them. The main results are for a range of sufficiently high discount rate, first that free trade and global welfare efficiency can be supported under the pure GATT regime but not under the modified regimes, and second that a country's ranking of the both regimes depends on (1) whether it belongs to an RTA or not and (2) which one of the RTAs it belongs to. The insight of these results are that the regionalism in the GATT may restrict free trade and thus fails to achieve the highest global welfare.Most Favored Nation Clause, Free Trade Agreements, Customs Unions
The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
No full textThis paper provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, when two-sided asymmetric information exists regarding panel judgement.Dispute Settlement, legal controversy, block, appeal, two-sided asymmetric information, political cost
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