669 research outputs found
Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking
No full textGorton and Huang (2001) argue that private coalitions of banks can act as central banks, issuing private money and providing deposit insurance during times of panic. This lender-of-last-resort role depends upon banking panics occurring threat of liquidation makes the private bank coalition incentive compatible, inducing banks to monitor each other. But, despite the evolution of private bank coalitions, government central banks and government deposit insurance schemes historically replaced the private bank coalitions. In this paper we ask why this transition from private arrangements to public arrangements occurred. We survey the historical and international evidence on panics, suggesting that Gorton and Huang (2001) are consistent with the evidence. Then, we extend Gorton and Huang (2001) to show the welfare improvement brought about by a government central bank replacing private bank coalitions as lender-of-last-resort. In particular, panics, while necessary for private coalitions to function, are costly because they disrupt the use of bank deposits as a medium of exchange. With government deposit insurance, panics do not occur, but the government must monitor banks. Such monitoring by the government is not as effective as private bank coalitions. We provide conditions under which the government can avoid the costs associated with panics by implementing deposit insurance and thereby raise social welfare.
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No full text“When confidence is lost, liquidity dries up.” The authors investigate the meaning of “confidence” and “liquidity” in the context of the recent financial crisis, which they maintain is a manifestation of an age-old problem with private money creation: banking panics. The authors explain this problem and provide some evidence with respect to the recent crisis.Bank liquidity ; Financial crises
Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking
No full textCentral banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with many small, undiversified banks, are prone to panics and failures, unlike systems with a few big banks that are heavily branched and well diversified. Systems of many small banks are more efficient if the banks form coalitions during times of crisis. We provide conditions under which the industrial organization of banking leads to incentive compatible state contingent bank coalition formation. Such coalitions issue money that is a kind of deposit insurance and examine and supervise banks. Bank coalitions of small banks, however, cannot replicate the efficiency of a system of big banks.
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No full textWhen "confidence" is lost, "liquidity dries up." We investigate the meaning of "confidence" and "liquidity" in the context of the current financial crisis. The financial crisis is a manifestation of an age-old problem with private money creation, banking panics. We explain this and provide some evidence with respect to the current crisis.
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