2,440 research outputs found

    Mapping the disaster : global prediction and the medium of ‘digital earth’

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    This paper explores the mapping of disaster in digital prediction models. Concentrating on the imminent disaster of climate change, the author asks how global digital models can be expanded to incorporate a wild nature and wild data. This theme is considered through an examination of the ‘nature’ of disaster and its reportage, GISs and their extension into physical space, the language of climate change, and the role of digital machines in these experiments with climate. The author concludes with an examination of expanded forms of mapping to suggest possible reconfigurations of the terms of the disaster

    Book review: El Sistema: orchestrating Venezuela’s youth, by Geoffrey Baker

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    Book review of: El Sistema: orchestrating Venezuela’s youth, by Geoffrey Baker. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014; ISBN: 9780199341559 ($35.00)Publisher PD

    Kathryn Morton, 15th Annual ODU Literary Festival

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    Kathryn Morton, the Virginian-Pilot\u27s book page columnist for 15 years, has reviewed scores of children\u27s books for that paper, as well as for The Washington Post Book World and the New York Times Book Review. Among the notable children\u27s book writers she has interviewed are Katherine Paterson, Madeleine L\u27Engle, Steven Kellogg, and Rosemary Wells. She describes herself as a groupie for children\u27s book and author seminars. As a sometime teacher and the mother of three avid readers, she field tests children\u27s books at home and in the classroom

    Revealing Redundancy: The Tension between Federal Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review

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    The doctrine of sovereign immunity dictates that courts lack jurisdiction to review cases challenging official action unless Congress has expressly consented to suit. But in the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, courts use “nonstatutory review” to justify the exercise of jurisdiction in suits against federal officers seeking to enjoin ultra vires conduct. This article explores the apparent inconsistency between the Supreme Court’s unequivocal statements that the United States can only be sued with its consent and the federal judiciary’s willingness to adjudicate suits challenging official action in the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity. The article concludes that, as the federal courts have narrowed the availability of nonstatutory review and of implied rights of action and remedies, sovereign immunity has become superfluous. The article explores that doctrinal redundancy and suggests that these alternative grounds for decision are preferable to sovereign immunity, because they are more closely tied to the text of Article III and to maintaining the balance of power among the branches of the federal government. Thus, the author advocates allowing federal sovereign immunity to wither away.Peer reviewe

    Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law

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    This Article employs William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of superstatutes as a tool to argue that administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is illegitimate. Eskridge and Ferejohn conceive of statutes that emerge from a lengthy, public debate and take on great normative weight over time as “superstatutes.” Superstatute theory highlights the deficiency in deliberation about the meaning of the APA. The APA bears all the hallmarks of a superstatute. Unlike the typical federal superstatute, however, the APA is not administered by a single agency. Thus, to respect and encourage the civic-republican style of deliberation that Eskridge and Ferejohn espouse, courts must adhere more closely to the compromises encoded in the statute’s text, paying particular attention to the context and history of each individual provision. Courts should hesitate before moving too far towards the boundaries of the text’s possible meaning. Venturing beyond those boundaries altogether is even more troubling. In the absence of an agency that spurs public deliberation about the meaning of the APA, administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA should be presumed to be illegitimate.Peer reviewe

    Kathryn H. Kay Roberts Interview, August 11, 1981

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    Kathryn Kay Roberts summarizes her family’s move to a homestead near Roberts, Idaho. She discusses going to school, the work her family did on the homestead, and her town’s reaction to changing women’s styles. She also talks about attending the University of Idaho, living in a dormitory in college, and meeting her husband. Roberts describes the societal expectations that dictated how married women should act, including that married women shouldn’t work outside the home. She discusses her husband’s education and career working in theater until the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929. Roberts talks at length about her own employment history as an author, teacher and speech pathologist, particularly after World War Two.https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mtwomen_oralhistory/1016/thumbnail.jp

    A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act

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    The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 paves an essential avenue to the courthouse door for plaintiffs challenging military decision making, particularly those alleging that the military has violated individual civil liberties or federal environmental statutes. Yet, the APA does not authorize judicial review of “military authority exercised in the field in time of war.” This article provides a much needed and long overdue legislative historiography of that exemption, fitting it into context with the loss of faith in administrative expertise and fear of totalitarianism that accompanied World War II. The article then examines the provisions in the Articles of War from which the “military authority” exemption apparently was drawn. The final analysis is of the courts’ and commentators’ assumptions about the exemption, foremost the assumption that “in the field” connotes only the locus of combat. The article concludes that, although the “military authority” exemption appears to be quite narrow, Congress’ understanding of its chosen phrasing in 1946 would have been somewhat broader than that of a modern reader, and thus many courts and commentators’ assumptions about the exemption are flawed.Please direct any questions about this deposit to me, as the authorized depositor

    Brief of Amici Curiae Takings and Federal Courts Scholars in Support of Respondents, Knick V. Township of Scott, No. 17-647 (U.S.)

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    The question presented in this case is whether a property owner may file a federal taking claim in federal court without first seeking compensation under state law in state court. This brief responds to two points in the United States’ brief as amicus curiae. The Solicitor General suggests that the Court should exercise jurisdiction over petitioner’s state-law inverse condemnation claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court should reject this suggestion. This case is not in the “special and small category of cases” in which a state law cause of action is held to “arise under” federal law. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)). The Solicitor General also raises the possibility that petitioner may pursue a claim directly under the Fourteenth Amendment in federal court. The Court should not decide this complex question here because it was not aired in the lower courts and because Pennsylvania law provides petitioner a statutory cause of action to recover compensation. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 502(c) (2006). If the Court opts to address this issue, it should hold that petitioner may not pursue a cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. Implying a cause of action under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would conflict with Section 5, which delegates authority to enforce the Amendment to Congress. Even if Section 1 provides a cause of action in some circumstances, it does not in cases like the one at bar in which state law provides an adequate means of redress.Please contact Charlotte Schneider ([email protected]) for any questions regarding this deposit

    Leveling the Deference Playing Field

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    Judicial deference to federal agency expertise is appropriate. What is not appropriate is the judicial tendency to give the military more deference than other agencies not only in cases that directly implicate military expertise, but also in administrative law cases raising constitutional, environmental, and employment issues. This article argues that the military should receive no greater deference than other agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act. The APA established a single standard of judicial review for all agencies. Recent empirical studies have confirmed, however, what the case law has long revealed: that courts often apply different standards of review to different agencies, and specifically a “super-deference” standard to the military. This article demonstrates that the APA’s exception for “military authority exercised in the field in time of war,” interpreted correctly, insulates core military functions from judicial review, thus removing any basis for giving the military heightened deference as a matter of course. That exception accommodates separation of powers concerns raised by judicial interference with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief, and it removes concern about courts second-guessing military expertise in particular by making actions that directly implicate that expertise unreviewable.Peer reviewe
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