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    Poverty, Injustice and Obligations to Take Political Action

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    Peter Singer has recently reaffirmed his belief that, in response to poverty, individuals have obligations to ‘do the most good they can’ by donating to those organizations that demonstrate the greatest amount of benefit per dollar donated (Singer, The most good you can do. Yale University Press, Yale, 2015a). Singer’s charitable giving based approach to extreme poverty has been criticized for failing to understand poverty as a form of injustice and for not acknowledging that it requires institutional change. This chapter investigates how Singer’s response to this criticism has been inadequate by exploring the ways in which Singer’s utilitarian understanding of morality and his account of the duties individuals have with regards to poverty can be rejected. Singer’s analysis implies that all those who recognize a common-sense duty to assist others in difficulty must address poverty by donating large amounts of their income to the most effective poverty reducing charities (Singer, The most good you can do. Yale University Press, Yale, 2015a; Philosophy and public affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, pp 229–243, 1972). His work suggests that rationality requires that all those motivated by a genuine concern for others must adopt the action he recommends. Thus his approach suggests that a common-sense approach to moral duties requires agents to donate to the most effective charities. However, Singer’s up front appeal to common-sense duties, concern for others and basic rationality hides a commitment to a controversial utilitarian approach to moral obligation. The analysis here will argue that a common-sense approach that identifies multiple duties to others and recognizes the fact that genuine moral action must be rational and grounded in concern for others can in fact make different recommendations from those supported by Singer. In doing so the chapter will articulate an alternative account of the duties individuals have with regards to extreme poverty. It will suggest that, given that poverty is a form of social injustice, individuals have collectivization duties that require that they act responsively with a view to establishing a collective of a particular kind. The collective they work toward forming must be willing and able to establish and maintain procedurally just governing institutions that end poverty by ensuring no agent is placed in a position where they are vulnerable to deprivation or domination. It will be proposed that this duty operates in addition to the duties to assist Singer recognizes

    The Global Luxuries Tax

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    This chapter proposes a policy to tackle the problem of global poverty, the Global Luxuries Tax (GLT). The GLT is a levy collected whenever a person, anywhere in the world, purchases a certain luxury good or service. The money collected will go towards a Global Poverty Fund to be used to alleviate the worst cases of global poverty. The tax is a miniscule percentage of the price of the good or service being purchased, so that the GLT raises money for the Global Poverty Fund by virtue of the high number of transactions taking place. The first part of the chapter will highlight two main pitfalls faced by any potential solution to the problem of global poverty, the Unintended Consequences Objection and the Implementation Objection. The second and third parts will introduce the idea of a Global Luxuries Tax, first in theory and then in practice. Examples of luxuries to be taxed by the GLT include air travel, financial transactions, texting on mobile phones, and procreation. In the final part some objections to the GLT will be considered, and appeased

    Why do the public oppose inheritance taxes?

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    Common wisdom supposes that inheritance taxes are very unpopular among the public. This public opposition seems puzzling as these taxes typically apply to a minority of estates. Usual explanations for this are that people are poorly informed about the extent of these taxes or a lack of a compelling moral case for such taxes. This chapter argues that current approaches do not go far enough. It suggests public attitudes to inheritance taxes are better understood as a specific case of discontent with wider taxes. Addressing this means tackling a disconnection the public feel over the taxes they pay as well as exploring public reactions to different combinations of taxes. Greater public support for inheritance taxes is important for building public compliance with these taxes as well as improving the chances for policy reform

    A Decent Social Minimum as a Matter of Justice

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    Why Taxing Consumption?:Justifications, Objections and Social Cooperation

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    Robert Frank is famous for proposing an incremental tax on consumption. His proposition is motivated by the control of positional externalities, i.e. the costs that individuals impose on each other when they consume goods for securing or acquiring social status. A close analysis of Frank’s proposition identifies three justifications for a tax on consumption: efficiency, paternalism and equality. This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it reviews these justifications, highlighting some objections and possible replies. As such, it suggests that reasons based on equality or paternalism are controversial while the invocation of efficiency is actually grounded in an underlying view of social cooperation. Secondly, this chapter advances the idea that an ultimate justification for the choice of specific tax base (consumption, income and wealth) expresses such an underlying view. In other words, the choice of a specific tax base is not totally instrumental, it has some intrinsic moral value too. In this respect, the chapter ends with a comparison between taxing income and taxing consumption. It is shown that a tax on consumption raises questions that should be answered by political philosophers

    Ideologie oder Strategie? Polnischer Euroskeptizismus nach dem EU-Beitritt

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    Knapp zwei Jahre nach dem EU-Beitritt Polens versucht dieser Beitrag festzustellen, inwieweit sich euroskeptische Haltungen und Positionen in Polen verändert haben. Dabei unterscheidet er zunächst zwischen „direktem Euroskeptizismus“ der WählerInnen und „repräsentiertem Euroskeptizismus“. Ausgehend vom Befund, dass die Wahlen zur Europäischen Parlament im Juni 2004 aus polnischer Sicht als klassische second order elections zu gelten haben, unternimmt dieser Beitrag eine Analyse der Position der verschiedenen Parteien in den Wahlkämpfen zur EP-Wahl und der Bezugnahmen auf den Europäischen Verfassungsvertrag. In einer Gegenüberstellung zweier Modelle zur Erfassung von „repräsentiertem Euroskeptizismus“ wird herausgearbeitet, inwieweit die respektiven Positionen ideologisch bedingt sind oder eher strategisch als Reaktion auf den Parteienwettbewerb zu Stande kommen. Dabei kommt der Beitrag zu dem Schluss, dass die Mehrzahl der euroskeptischen Positionen als strategisch zu bewerten ist

    Polen und der Verfassungsvertrag in der ICG 2003 als klassisches two level game?

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    Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht das Scheitern des Verfassungsgipfels im Dezember 2003 als ein two level game (Robert D. Putnam) zu analysieren. Er kommt dabei zum Schluss, dass aufgrund der Besonderheit der Situation des Beitrittslandes Polens, die Präferenzbildung auf nationaler Ebene mit diesem Konzept nur unzureichend erklärt werden kann. Erst unter Berücksichtigung der Schwierigkeiten, die aus der Gleichzeitigkeit von Beitritt (Kampagne, Referendum) und Konstitutionalisierung der EU entstanden sind, gewinnt die Erklärung ausreichend Plausibilität und Reichweite.Die Analyse dieser Schwierigkeiten deutet auf einen Mangel an Legitimität des Konvents und „seiner“ Verfassung hin. Wenige Wochen vor dem polnischen Referendum wurden im Konvent die machtpolitisch bedeutendsten Reformen debattiert und verhandelt, was ein Abgehen vom für Polen günstigen System der Stimmengewichtung nach Nizza bedeuten sollte. Dies führte zu einer Diskurspolitik der polnischen Regierung, die auf eine Unterdrückung des Themas „Konvent“ in der parlamentarischen und öffentlichen Debatte abgestellt war. Als das Referendum geschlagen war, trat die Regierung plötzlich scharf gegen die umstrittene Neuregelung des Systems der Stimmengewichtung auf, während Danuta Hübner als Regierungsvertreterin den Konventsentwurf mitunterzeichnet hatte.Diese Widersprüche wurde von der proeuropäischen Opposition aufgegriffen und gegen die Regierung gewendet: die Politisierung dieses issues kraft des Slogans „Nizza oder Tod“ bedeutete eine maximale Einengung des win sets für die polnischen VerhandlerInnen in den entscheidenden Verhandlungen und war ein entscheidender Faktor für deren Scheitern.Im Résumé kommt der Beitrag zu dem Schluss, dass das notwendige Einbeziehen des Konvents in den Erklärungsrahmen des two level games die heuristische und theoretische Stimmigkeit dieses Ansatzes insgesamt in Frage stellt
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