1,721,072 research outputs found
"History of economics becomes a science for cyborgs. A review essay of Mirowski P., Machine Dreams, Cambridge University Press, 2002"
No full textThree alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory
Full text linkThe paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory
"La teoria dell'interesse di Ferdinando Galiani e l'ipotesi di Bernoulli: una grande occasione perduta?"
No full text"Whose hand matters? Market forces, lawgivers, and the history of economic thought. A review essay of Steven G. Medema, The Hesitant Hand. Taming Self-Interest in the History of Economic Ideas, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2009"
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Neither Populist nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust Law
No full textContemporary critics of American antitrust law lament a supposed misinterpretation by modern, welfare-driven enforcers of the true meaning of the competition principle. This essay contributes to the debate by reconstructing the principle's historical origin. While it did not feature in the Sherman Act, the competition principle was introduced by the Supreme Court during the early years of antitrust law. The court formulated alternative versions of the principle; the one that eventually prevailed was neither populist nor neoclassical, as it was based on classical political economy and, in particular, on freedom of contract and “natural” values. This historical circumstance may pave the way for a new approach to antitrust law
Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni's Quest for Contractual Settlements
No full textThe paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni’s 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni’s neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law’s role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni’s work with John Rogers Commons’s theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics
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