140,533 research outputs found
George W. Tibbles and George T. Poor letter to Warren G. Harding, February 21, 1920
This official letter from George W. Tibbles and George T. Poor, members of the Advisory Committee of the Hamilton County Republican Central Committee, to Senator Warren G. Harding provides notice that their committee will endorse Harding as the party's presidential candidate at the Republican National Convention in Chicago in June. The letter also includes the names of the districts' delegates and alternatives.
This letter is part of the Warren G. Harding Papers (MSS 345). This collection includes correspondence, business records, and other materials documenting Harding’s business career as owner and editor-in-chief of The Daily Marion Star, as well as the various stages of his political career. A significant portion of the collection, and what’s available on Ohio Memory, highlights his 1920 presidential campaign, spanning just before publicly announcing his candidacy to handily defeating Ohio Governor James M. Cox in the election. Correspondents include both Ohio and national businessmen, political figures, and ordinary citizens writing with questions, support, congratulatory notes, and campaign advice. Some of the most interesting insights into the tumultuous political climate in the U.S., the extreme factionalism within the Republican Party in Ohio, and Harding’s campaign strategies are described in letters between Harding and his campaign manager, Harry M. Daugherty. Some of the topics addressed include women’s suffrage, Prohibition, the League of Nations, African American representation and issues, and lingering peace negotiations following World War I
Poor getting richer and the rich-poor gap getting smaller?
The author asks what 'win-win' public policies can substantially reduce the percentage of people who live in absolute poverty and enable the poor to become richer even if the rich also become richer.This article is hosted by our co-publisher Taylor & Francis.</p
Pro-poor growth : A primer
These days it seems that almost everyone in the development community is talking about"pro-poor growth."What exactly is it, and how can we measure it? Is ordinary economic growth always"pro-poor growth"or is that some special kind of growth? And if it is something special, what makes it happen? The author first reviews alternative approaches to defining and measuring"pro-poor growth."He then analyzes evidence on whether growth is pro-poor, what factors make it more pro-poor (including the role played by both initial inequality and changing inequality), and whether the factors that make the distribution of the gains from growth pro-poor come at a cost to growth. The author identifies some priorities for future research.Poverty Reduction Strategies,Services&Transfers to Poor,Public Health Promotion,Economic Conditions and Volatility,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Achieving Shared Growth,Governance Indicators,Economic Conditions and Volatility,Inequality,Services&Transfers to Poor
Targeting assistance to the poor using household survey data
It is important that limited government resources be channeled to the poor, but it is not always easy to identify the poor. Which households should be given tranfers when reliable information on incomes is difficult to obtain? The authors of this paper present a simple method for targeting when income is not observable but other characteristics that are correlated with income can be observed. Using survey data taken from Cote d'Ivoire, they predict incomes based on observable characteristics and distribute transfers on the basis of those predictions. It appears that significant reductions in poverty can be achieved using this method.Environmental Economics&Policies,Rural Poverty Reduction,Services&Transfers to Poor,Safety Nets and Transfers,Poverty Assessment
Game-theoretic power control in impulse radio UWB wireless networks
In this paper, a game-theoretic model for studying power control for wireless data networks in frequency-selective multipath environments is analyzed. The uplink of an impulse-radio ultrawide band systems is considered. The effects of self-interference and multiple-access interference on the performance of Rake receivers are investigated for synchronous systems. Focusing on energy efficiency, a noncooperative game is proposed in which users in the network are allowed to choose their transmit powers to maximize their own utilities, and the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived. It is shown that, due to the frequency selective multipath, the noncooperative solution is achieved at different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios, respectively of the channel realization. A large-system analysis is performed to derive explicit expressions for the achieved utilities. The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution is also discussed and compared with the noncooperative approach
Privacy-cost trade-offs in smart electricity metering systems
Trade-offs between privacy and cost are studied for a smart grid consumer, whose electricity consumption is monitoredin almost real time by the utility provider (UP) through smart meter (SM) readings. It is assumed that an electrical battery isavailable to the consumer, which can be utilized both to achieve privacy and to reduce the energy cost by demand shaping.Privacy is measured via the mean squared distance between the SM readings and a target load profile, while time-of-use (ToU)pricing is considered to compute the cost incurred. The consumer can also sell electricity back to the UP to further improve theprivacy-cost trade-off. Two privacy-preserving energy management policies (EMPs) are proposed, which differ in the way the targetload profile is characterized. A more practical EMP, which optimizes the energy management less frequently, is also considered.Numerical results are presented to compare the privacy-cost trade-off of these EMPs, considering various privacy indicators
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Smart Meter Privacy with an Energy Harvesting Device and Instantaneous Power Constraints
A smart meter (SM) periodically measures end-user electricity consumption and reports it to a utility provider (UP). Despite the advantages of SMs, their use leads to serious concerns about consumer privacy. In this paper, SM privacy is studied by considering the presence of an energy harvesting device (EHD) as a means of masking the user's input load. The user can satisfy part or all of his/her energy needs from the EHD, and hence, less information can be leaked to the UP via the SM. The EHD is typically equipped with a rechargeable energy storage device, i.e., a battery, whose instantaneous energy content limits the user's capability in covering his/her energy usage. Privacy is measured by the information leaked about the user's real energy consumption when the UP observes the energy requested from the grid, which the SM reads and reports to the UP. The minimum information leakage rate is characterized as a computable information theoretic single-letter expression when the EHD battery capacity is either infinite or zero. Numerical results are presented for a discrete binary input load to illustrate the potential privacy gains from the existence of a storage device
Poor Little Rich Girls (After Warhol)
Poor Little Rich Girls (After Warhol) is a cinematic homage to, and conceptual remake, of Andy Warhol's Poor Little Rich Girl (1965) featuring Factory superstar Edie Sedgwick. Some 50 years later: Warhol's film has been re-imagined, re-performed, remixed and revived for the digital age. Gracie Otto performs the role of Edie Sedgwick. Jack Sargeant re-stages the role of an off-screen Chuck Wein, a spectral presence in the film. Feature film invited to screen at: Vivid Sydney 2013: Festival of Light, Music and Ideas; The Sydney Underground Film Festival; The London and Portugal Underground Film Festival; Cine-B Festival (Chile). Excerpts shown at the MCA (Museum of Contemporary Art) in Sydney. J1 - ERA Context Statement to be supplied by author
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