1,721,089 research outputs found

    La rete di comunicazione astronomica di Francesco Bianchini: un'analisi del fondovallicelliano

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    Francesco Bianchini, una delle maggiori personalità della cultura italiana tra i secoli XVII e XVIII come erudito, storico-antiquario, filologo, ebbe forse il tratto distintivo più notevole nell’essere anche uno scienziato di livello (uno dei maggiori astronomi italiani del periodo), apprezzato da Newton e dalla Royal Society come dall’Académie Royale des sciences. Il vastissimo epistolario, esteso a buona parte d’Europa, interamente conservato per le lettere in arrivo e in parte notevole per quelle sue, non è mai stato studiato unitariamente, data anche la molteplicità delle competenze ed interessi richiesti. Questo studio riguarda la porzione forse meno indagata, quella relativa all’astronomia, che mostra una rete di contatti estesa ma con peculiari discontinuità geografiche e temporali. Queste sono una spia delle modalità ed interessi di Bianchini, ed offrono un tramite per indagare le modalità concrete di svolgimento della ricerca e di costruzione di collaborazioni. Ne risulta un quadro nel quale gli incontri tra discipline ed il sovrapporsi degli impegni ebbero un ruolo sia propulsivo che frenante, e che evidenzia ragioni e misura delle differenze nell’esercizio dell’attività scientifica tra l’Italia ed i paesi passati all’avanguardia delle ricerche

    Francesco Bianchini et les 'cardinaux antiquaires': Archéologie, science et politique

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    In Modern Rome, the archaelogical activity can not be dissociated from its cultural, diplomatic and ideological context and implications. The relations between Francesco Bianchini, the papal antiquarian, and three cardinals of his generation deeply involved in the scientific and political life in the Early XVIIIth cent., clearly illustrates the case.Dans la Rome du XVIIIe siècle, l'activité archéologique ne peut être dissociée de son contexte politique et de ses implications culturelles, idéologiques et diplomatiques. Les relations entre Francesco Bianchini, archéologue de premier plan dans le premier quart du siècle, et trois cardinaux de sa génration très impliqués dans la vie scientifique et politique (Davia, Gualtieri, Polignac) illustrent cette imbrication

    Una tessera nummularia inedita in un manoscritto di Francesco Bianchini (1662-1729)

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    Si presenta una tessera nummularia inedita appartenente alla collezione dell'antiquario romano Ficoroni e disegnata da Francesco Bianchini in un codice conservato presso la Biblioteca Capitolare di Verona

    Francesco Bianchini et Azzura Carrara Pantano. — Le Guide Vert des plantes et des fleurs

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    Gillet Hubert. Francesco Bianchini et Azzura Carrara Pantano. — Le Guide Vert des plantes et des fleurs. In: Journal d'agriculture traditionnelle et de botanique appliquée, 27ᵉ année, bulletin n°2, Avril-juin 1980. pp. 161-162

    Recensione di: Brigitte Sölch, Francesco Bianchini (1662 - 1729) und die Anfänge öffentlicher Museen in Rom, München, Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2007

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    Recensione di: Brigitte Sölch, Francesco Bianchini (1662 - 1729) und die Anfänge öffentlicher Museen in Rom, München, Deutscher Kunstverlag, 200

    Per un inventario dei carteggi bianchiniani

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    ricognizione dei materiali epistolari manoscritti e a stampa relativi all'erudito veronese Francesco Bianchini (1662-1729

    A New Definition of “Artificial” for Two Artificial Sciences

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    In this article, I deal with a conceptual issue concerning the framework of two special sciences: artifcial intelligence and synthetic biology, i.e. the distinction between the natural and the artifcial (a long-lasting topic of history of scientifc though since the ancient philosophy). My claim is that the standard defnition of the “artifcial” is no longer useful to describe some present-day artifcial sciences, as the boundary between the natural and the artifcial is not so sharp and clear-cut as it was in the past. Artifcial intelligence and synthetic biology, two disciplines with new technologies, new experimental methods, and new theoretical frameworks, all need a new, more specifc, and refned defnition of (the) “artifcial”, which is also related to the use of the synthetic method to build real world entities and in open-ended (real or virtual) environments. The necessity of a new defnition of the artifcial is due to the close relationship of AI and synthetic biology with biology itself. They both are engineering sciences that are moving closer and closer, at least apparently, towards (natural) biology, although from diferent and opposite directions. I show how the new concept of the artifcial is, therefore, the result of a new view on biology from an engineering and synthetic point of view, where the boundary between the natural and the artifcial is far more blurred. From this, I try to formulate a brand-new, more useful defnition for future understanding, practical, and epistemological purposes of these two artifcial sciences

    The Problem of Prediction in Artificial Intelligence and Synthetic Biology

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    The problem of prediction is a general problem in the philosophy of sci- ence. It is important in every discipline for which prediction concerns the behavior of an artificial or a biological system, such as artificial intelligence or synthetic biology. Synthetic biology shares with artificial intelligence some theoretical issues from the point of view of prediction. My claim is that the problems related to the prediction of system behaviors are analogous because: (a) artificial intelligence and synthetic biology aim at producing autonomous systems; and (b) their products interact with an open-ended and uncertain context. I argue my claim by providing three versions of the prediction problem in artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, to show the analogies between them within this framework and to suggest some useful consequences

    On Lieto Antonio, Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds

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    The computational cognitive science that uses cognitive modeling in-volves some problems, among which the main one is the problem of model. What makes a computational model a cognitive one? What are the right and relevant constraints to build a model that is not merely a system producing the same performance in specific tasks as the humans do? The focus of Lieto’s proposal is on cognitive architectures, a notion that was introduced by Newell in his attempt to define a unified theory of cognition. They are abstract models between the high-level cognitive capabilities and their neural/bodily implementation, so they are at an intermediate level and their characterization as an integrated mechanism is what allows to build a computational counterpart of them in an artificial system. The more interesting cognitive architectures are, clearly, the more general ones, i.e. the ones modeling the cognitive capabilities at the highest degree of integration among intelligent features. The intermediate nature of cognitive architecture makes the problems of relevant constraints of modeling a crucial one to achieve an actual model of cognitive processes

    Autopoiesis of the artificial: from systems to cognition

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    In the seminal work on autopoiesis by Varela, Maturana, and Uribe, they start by addressing the confusion between processes that are history dependent and processes that are history independent in the biological world. The former is particularly linked to evolution and ontogenesis, while the latter pertains to the organizational features of biological individuals. Varela, Maturana, and Uribe reject this framework and propose their original theory of autopoietic organization, which emphasizes the strong complementarity of temporal and non-temporal phenomena. They argue that the dichotomy between structure and organization lies at the core of the unity of living systems. By opposing history-dependent and history-independent processes, methodological challenges arise in explaining phenomena related to living systems and cognition. Consequently, Maturana and Varela reject this approach in defining autopoietic organization. I argue, however, that this relationship presents an issue that can be found in recent developments of the science of artificial intelligence (AI) in different ways, giving rise to related concerns. While highly capable AI systems exist that can perform cognitive tasks, their internal workings and the specific contributions of their components to the overall system behavior, understood as a unified whole, remain largely uninterpretable. This article explores the connection between biological systems, cognition, and recent developments in AI systems that could potentially be linked to autopoiesis and related concepts such as autonomy and organization. The aim is to assess the advantages and disadvantages of employing autopoiesis in the synthetic (artificial) explanation for biological cognitive systems and to determine if and how the notion of autopoiesis can still be fruitful in this perspective
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