1,720,970 research outputs found
South Korea’s Greater Engagement with NATO and Europe: Becoming a Reliable Security Partner Through a Thriving Defense Industry
No full textConsecutive rounds of defense reforms across progressive and conservative administrations have resulted in South Korea being the world’s eighth largest arms exporter.
Particularly under former President Moon Jae-in, the government leveraged high defense budgets to develop more homegrown capabilities, with an eye to ratcheting up military sales. That was based on a national defense approach, which assumed the contours of an all-out push for greater self-reliance within and beyond the U.S.-ROK alliance. As the global and regional security environment are in flux, current President Yoon Suk Yeol
has set an even more ambitious goal of joining the “Big 4” suppliers of weapons and military systems.
In the wake of Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, South Korea’s security engagement with NATO and Europe has scaled up also through some lucrative arms deals adding to those previously inked by South Koreans in the Indo-Pacific and the MENA region. While major Western defense industries are undergoing a multi-year process to backfill military transfers to Kyiv, the volume and content of recent defense procurement contracts, particularly the expected supply of South Korean indigenous military hardware to the Polish
armed forces, suggest that South Korean companies might be in the position to step in where other defense market actors have stumbled.
Although not enough time has passed to make any determination on that, this paper contains some preliminary observations about the kind of advantage that Korean contractors hold vis-à-vis more established competitors, and proposes a series of recommendations for tackling current limitations, which cast some doubt upon the Yoon government’s declared objectives. It argues that in the midst of high demand coupled with budget pressures in every country, South Korean industry and government are successfully filling the niche of good defense hardware for the price, but admittedly not the highest available technology
Perché la strategia di Moon Jae-in non è una 'Sunshine Policy 2.0'
No full textDiscussione dell'approccio seguito dall'amministrazione liberal sudcoreana del presidente Moon Jae-in nella gestione dei rapporti con la Corea del Nord
Stati Uniti e Cina: l’adozione di misure di controllo di export di semiconduttori e la nuova National Security Strategy dell’amministrazione Biden-Harris
No full textIl ricorso da parte degli Stati a strumenti economici nel perseguire interessi di sicurezza nazionale è aumentato sulla scia del deterioramento delle relazioni tra Pechino e Washington. La tecnologia è attualmente la “principale arena di competizione e rivalità” come sottolineato dal direttore della Cia, Bill Burns. La maggior parte delle misure attuate negli ultimi quattro anni da Washington per smorzare la dipendenza dell’economia nazionale statunitense da quella cinese ruota attorno ai semiconduttori. La tensione riaccesasi nello Stretto di Taiwan in occasione della visita a Taipei di
Nancy Pelosi lo scorso agosto ha accelerato le mosse della Casa Bianca da un lato, per limitare l’accesso cinese alle tecnologie più avanzate provenienti dagli Stati Uniti e dai suoi alleati e, dall’altro, per attrarre gli investimenti delle aziende taiwanesi e sudcoreane al fine di migliorare la capacità di produrre semiconduttori di fascia alta entro i confini statunitensi
Bridging the Gap: Progress and Prospects for Accelerating South Korea's Move Towards a Carbon Neutral Scenario
No full textThe Moon administration in South Korea has implemented rapid changes to accelerate the decarbonization of the energy sector. While seeking to embrace renewables, Seoul has been relying on the bridging capacity of natural gas—of which it is the world’s third largest importer. In this context, President Moon is also confronted with public discontent over weak emissions goals and inadequate policies to curb the negative effects of climate change. Besides, the socio-economic fallout from the pandemic could hinder the enforcement of environmental measures and loosen restrictions for the sake of an immediate recovery. As Seoul attempts to secure more environmentally-friendly and economically sustainable energy sources, this paper examines the advances and major drawbacks of this policy agenda. By shedding light on the dynamics within the gas sector, the analysis also assesses the viability of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as the pillar of this pro-environmental policy shift, including the potential of some LNG-related projects. The paper finds the feasibility of the current goals is challenged by the realities of energy supply stabilization, particularly due to the simultaneous phaseout of coal and nuclear power and the persistent capacity
obstacles for renewables to fill this gap. In light of this, the paper advocates for integrated policy measures aimed at improving consistency in implementing national energy policy in tandem with climate change mitigation efforts
Guest Editorial: Framing Sustainable Security on the Korean Peninsula
No full textIn this issue entitled “Framing Sustainable Security on the Korean Peninsula”, we seek to broaden this focus and bring non-traditional security considerations into the conversation regarding traditional ones, which remain salient to the region. The issue brings together an exciting selection of scholars and practitioners who have generated timely and critical insights into the complex security environment of not just the peninsula itself but East Asia more broadly
L’Asia orientale e la penisola coreana
No full textPartendo da una ricostruzione storica delle interferenze esterne che hanno condotto alla “grande tragedia nazionale” del popolo coreano, il capitolo intende far emergere la centralità della penisola coreana nelle dinamiche di difesa e sicurezza dell’Asia nord-orientale. L’attenzione si concentra su alcuni lasciti, ancora ben visibili, della divisione della Corea e della guerra del 1950-53: il ruolo del nucleare e l’evoluzione dei rapporti intercoreani. Questi temi offrono lo spunto per valutare la risposta delle due Coree ai limiti rappresentati dal contesto interno, regionale e internazionale. Dall’analisi emergeranno i tentativi nord-coreani e sud-coreani di concepire la geografia non solo come fonte di costrizioni, ma come opportunità per perseguire interessi nazionali e ambizioni storiche
Chinese Maritime Coercion in East Asia: Probing the US Alliance System Trigger Points
No full textOver the past several years, the strategic environment in East Asia has faced a complex of security challenges, especially noticeable in the maritime domain. Mounting tensions have risen amid China’s growing assertiveness in the context of disputed waters and territories in the East and South China Seas. By skillfully adopting a playbook and toolkit short of direct use of conventional force, the Chinese leadership has sought to advance its objectives and leverage its influence to pressure or punish countries without provoking outright escalation to military confrontation. Amid a destabilised rules-based regional order, the United States and its allies most notably Japan have struggled to devise effective strategies to counter China’s maritime challenges in the gray zone due to shortcomings related to existing deterrent strategies, defense planning and diplomacy at the level of individual countries and bilateral security alliance. This chapter examines China’s attempts to gain the upper hand through the use of non-state actors, paramilitary and civilian means in the maritime domain. In doing so, the Chinese Communist Party exploits the defining advantages of gray zone activities in terms of deniability and the determination of regional countries to respond. For this reason, it will be stressed the importance of managing gray zone threats with a long-term perspective and a whole-of-government approach aimed to enhance coordination between civilian and military agencies
Una nuova militarizzazione dell’Asia orientale
No full textLa regione dell’Indo-pacifico è attraversata da dinamiche
di sicurezza in continua evoluzione, che includono le crescenti
minacce alla salute pubblica, come la pandemia da Covid-19,
e l’acutizzarsi di fenomeni meteorologici estremi. Tuttavia, la
proliferazione di armi di distruzione di massa, le controversie
territoriali e marittime e il declino demografico sono i principali
fattori che influenzano i dibattiti sulle spese militari e sulla
modernizzazione della difesa nazionale e delle forze armate.
La penisola coreana, lo stretto di Taiwan e il Mar cinese
meridionale costituiscono i principali focolai di tensione
nella regione. La concentrazione di risorse militari a scopo
di deterrenza in spazi geograficamente limitati aumenta il
rischio di escalation innescata da errori sia tecnici sia relativi
all’interpretazione delle intenzioni della controparte; un
epilogo a cui nei mesi scorsi ci si è avvicinati più volte nella
penisola coreana. Ma il dato più rilevante resta quello che le
autrici definiscono la “dimensione sistemica” dell’insicurezza
regionale, vale a dire il ruolo che le potenze mondiali – Cina e
Stati Uniti – svolgono nel processo di militarizzazione nell’area.
Questa dinamica, alimentata dalla crescente presenza degli Stati
Uniti nella regione e dall’altrettanto crescente attivismo militare
della Cina, è stata aggravata negli ultimi anni dalla rarefazione
degli incontri diplomatici tra le parti
Chaos at the Gates: The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and energy price shocks on South Korea's gas industry amid energy transition
Full text linkSouth Korea was one of the first countries to be hit by the coronavirus infections. Having rapidly contained the health emergency in the immediate period, Seoul arguably mitigated the economic fallouts more successfully than the majority of advanced economies but could not avoid substantial losses. The far-reaching fallout of COVID-19 has been testing the country's energy transition pathway, as actors involved are facing difficult decisions amid more stringent financial constraints to deliver their ambitious targets, including achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Amid the combined effects of the pandemic and the global energy prices shocks, addressing the nexus between energy security on the supply side, affordability, and the safety of people's lives and property, has become even more pressing. Against this backdrop, natural gas has tailored a special role to bridge the low carbon re-alignment of the entire Korean energy system, also in the face of the current and future challenges to Korea's energy security. But long-drawn hurdles stemming from rather unsuccessful efforts to reform the gas system risk weakening its ability to cope with present uncertainties and heightened volatilities
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