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Etica funzionale. Considerazioni filosofiche sulla teoria dell’agire morale artificiale
Full text linkThe purpose of Machine Ethics is to develop autonomous technologies that are able to manage not just the technical aspects of a tasks, but also the ethical ones. As a consequence, the notion of Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) has become a fundamental element of the discussion. Its meaning, however, remains rather unclear. Depending on the author or the context, the same expression stands for essentially different concepts. This casts a suspicious light on the philosophical significance of Machine Ethics. In particular, the risk arises of discarding Machine Ethics as a whole on the basis of accusations that, however, apply exclusively to one specific understanding of what AMAs are – but not to other, more adequate and convincing conceptualisations. To avoid this pitfall, this essay tries to elaborate a philosophically sound interpretation of AMAs and to sketch its primary component, i.e., the notion of functional ethics
Vision, Image and Symbol
Full text linkDuring the Fifties and the Early Sixties Hans Jonas developed a theory of man based on a series of concepts as separation of form from matter, image and symbol. By reflecting on these themes, Jonas seems to refer to the aesthetic abilities man embodies as the essence of human life. In this article I try to analyse Jonas’ thoughts on man and to determine to what extent it is possible to consider his theory as an aesthetic anthropology. Eventually, I discuss what Aesthetics may win by directing its attention to this author.</p
Recensione a Etica delle tecnologie dell’informazione e della comunicazione di Adriano Fabris
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Sulle cause e gli usi della filosofia e altri scritti inediti. Saggio introduttivo e traduzione a cura di Fabio Fossa
No full textExistentialism, nihilism—and gnosticism? Reassessing the role of the gnostic religion in Hans Jonas’ thought
No full textLate antique Gnosticism and Heidegger’s Existentialism are usually counted among the main theoretical targets of Hans Jonas’s philosophy of life and responsibility, since they are supposed to share the dualistic and nihilistic attitude the philosopher deemed most mistaken and pernicious. In particular, Gnosticism is commonly understood as the exact opposite of what Jonas strove to accomplish in his work. However, I think it is simplistic to relegate Gnosticism to a merely antagonistic role in the development of Jonas’s philosophy. My claim is that Gnosticism, being a non-nihilistic form of dualism, might have been a relevant source of inspiration – although not the only one – for amending the flaws of Heidegger’s Existentialism. By taking a closer look at the essay Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism, this article aims to clarify the critical and constructive role that Gnosticism might have played in shaping some of the major traits of Jonas’s thought. The first part of this essay deals with Jonas’s ‘gnostic reading’ of Heidegger’s Existentialism and highlights the positive insights drawn from such interpretative strategy. The second part focuses on three main motives in Jonas’s philosophy that may be traced back to the gnostic narrative: value objectivity and vulnerability, human responsibility and involvement in the history of being, and the sense of belonging to a wider dimension capable of providing orientation and meaning to human life
What are the applied ethics: Three preliminary problems / Che cosa sono le etiche applicate? Tre problemi preliminari
No full textIn this essay I try to identify a viable starting point towards a philosophical theory of applied ethics. My aim is to explore the conditions under which a unitary enquiry concerning the essence of applied ethics, their distinctive constructs, their novelty, and their relevance in face of traditional moral thinking may be carried out. Since a similar approach is yet to be fully worked out, a preliminary analysis concerning its very possibility and starting point seems to be necessary. After a general introduction (§1), I discuss the terminological problem raised by the many labels through which applied ethics, as they are commonly called, are known (§2). Secondly, I review the debate on how the relations between different branches of applied ethics, their scientific contexts, and moral philosophy are to be understood (§3). Finally, I try and show that these issues originate from a common source, i.e., the tension of theory and practice in moral experience and the problem of moral application. My thesis is that the experience of the gap between ethical theory and moral practice, i.e., the problem of moral application, can be pinpointed as the unifying and fundamental content of applied ethics in all its plurality. At the same time, this shows the true philosophical nature of applied ethics. In my opinion, approaching applied ethics in such terms will not only help shed light on their status, but also offer moral thinking a new and interesting perspective from which to reconsider some of its traditional issues
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