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Plato’s Journey through the Conflict: Knowledge, Action and καιρός in the Syracusan Experience
No full textThe first aim of the paper is to discuss the relationship between knowing and acting in Plato’s Seventh Letter, showing that we can interpret it in two ways: first, in strictly theoretical terms (i.e. the relationship between knowing and acting in general); and second, from a more biographical and historical point of view (i.e. in connection with the life and action of Plato). Although the two ways are strictly linked, we do not have to think that Plato wanted to export his kallipolis to the Sicilian context. Therefore, it’s not by chance that the Seventh Letter shows the highest concentration of the Kairos lexicon in the whole Corpus Platonicum. The second aim of the paper is to carry out an extensive investigation of pre-Platonic and Platonic use of the word kairos. In the last part of the paper I examine the so-called “philosophical excursus” of the Seventh Letter, showing that it is part of the text in a very strict way
Nickolas Pappas, The Philosopher's New Clothes: The Theaetetus, The Academy, and Philosophy's Turn against Fashion, London; New York: Routledge, 2016, Pp. 234. ISBN 9781138929562, $148.00
No full textLaura Gianvittorio, Il discorso di Eraclito. Un modello semantico e cosmologico nel passaggio dall'oralità alla scrittura, OLMS, Hildesheim 2010
No full textMethod and knowledge in Plato's seventh letter
No full textThe philosophical excursus of the Seventh Letter (342a-345c) is the only passage in the whole Platonic corpus in which the philosopher speaks in first person about his method. If authentic, as I
think, the letter provides us not only some fundamental biographical information about Plato, but also a description of his philosophy written for a different audience than the Akademia. The purpose of
my paper is to analyze the excursus in philosophical terms, showing it to be consistent with what we can learn from the Dialogues.
The excursus qualifies philosophy as a method of investigation different from all the other. This method requires some instruments that we must necessarily use if we want to get closer to the truth.
The first two lines of the excursus are central in my analysis: ἔστιν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστῳ, δι' ὧν τὴν ἐπιστήμην νάγκη παραγίγνεσθαι, τρία. Some interpreters weaken the sense of νάγκη, while others
connect it with παραγίγνεσθαι: the first option negates that for Plato we necessarily use the τρία to get closer to the truth; the second option promotes the idea that, through the τρία, we necessarily
reach the truth. Both options, according to me, are wrong. The right meaning of the sentence is that we must necessarily use the τρία to get closer (not to reach) the truth, as the use of παραγίγνεσθαι
points out (παραγίγνομαι is indeed in the present tense, not aorist or perfect). In other words, Plato does not focus on the goal of the inquiry, but on its method. The excursus, in accordance with the
Dialogues, does not suggest a strong epistemology, but a problematic one. This is confirmed by the fourth element, that is indicated by Plato with these words: τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς ληθής τε
δόξα περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, where περὶ ταῦτα refers to the τρία. Plato associates science, intellection and right opinion: does he want to deny the opposition between opinion and science, or to subvert the
dialectic in its standard version? or is this an indicator of the fact that the letter is spurious? None of the above. Despite some authoritative scholars consider this passage problematic with respect to the
Dialogues, it is actually consistent with them, as shown by Resp. 585b14-c1, Phil. 11b4-c1, 60d4-5, 66b5-c3, Leg. 688b2-4. The most considerable passages in the letter are those about the fallibility and the obscurity of the διαγωγή through the four elements (343b6-e1; 343), by which we can not solidly reach the knowledge of the fifth (i.e. the thing itself, the essence). To understand why the tools through which we must necessarily approach to knowledge are faulty by nature (πεφυκυῖα φαύλως) is the primary purpose of my paper and an inevitable investigation for anyone (considering authentic the letter) wants to get a sense of Plato's philosophy. Only by addressing this point it is possible to understand what kind of knowledge can be obtained through the method of inquiry called philosophy"
Experiences without Self-justification: the " Sticks and Stones " Argument in the Phaedo
No full textMy talk has one major and one secondary goals. The main purpose is to demonstrate that the “Sticks and Stones” Argument (SSA) in the Phaedo (74a9 ff.) proves, and not requires, the existence of the Forms. The topic is highly debated. Some scholars (among others: Penner, Dimas and recently Apolloni) think that SSA has the function to demonstrate that Forms exist; others (for instance: Jordan, Svavarsson), on the contrary, believe that SSA is intelligible if and only if it presupposes the Forms. In my opinion SSA is one of the arguments that Plato uses to prove the Forms, and it is an argument based on human experiences without self-justification. I mean cases in which we are incapable to legitimate our mental states on the plan of the mere empirical experience. An argument of this kind considers there are experiences that cannot be justified only in terms of the experience itself. In other terms, we have mental states (for instance, the concept of the Equal, i.e. something perfectly equal in all respects) that cannot be derived from our empirical experience of the world. But at the same time we are certain of that mental state; indeed we cannot confuse the Equality and the Inequality. As Penner highlights, we will never make a mistake about which one it is we are thinking about. How can we have such a certainty concerning our mental states? Or, more in general, how can we have certainty respect the mental states X and not-X, if we regularly confuse x and not-x things?
At 72e3-73b2, an argument based on the recollection is proposed by Cebes. This argument is “one and the most beautiful” (ἑνὶ λόγῳ...καλλίστῳ). According to it, if men had not knowledge and right λόγος, they could not properly respond to those who ask about, for instance, geometric figures. To do this, the argument proceeds, the soul must be immortal, or rather must have some prenatal knowledge. Men are able to remember something when they are in contact with something else linked to the first. For example, when someone sees the lyre played by the beloved, he/she remembers the beloved; again, when someone sees a picture of the beloved, he/she remembers the beloved. And so on. In addition, he/she notes that there is always a gap between the original and the copy. Simmias agrees, but he says it is not necessary having an immortal soul to notice this gap. Indeed, we can certainly tell the difference between the portrait of Lorenzo de’ Medici by Bronzino and Lorenzo himself without having an immortal soul. If Socrates wants to be successful, he must be able to demonstrate that there are cases in which recognizing this gap is possible if and only if the soul is immortal. In other words, if and only if we have notions that we cannot justify in terms of experience alone. This is the function of SSA. The case of the Equal, in fact, is emblematic. In short, the argument runs as follows:
1. all “equal” things appear also unequal (to different people and/or in different circumstances);
2. so, we can confuse equal things and unequal things;
3. but we cannot confuse Equality and Inequality;
4. if equal things are always unequal in some respect but we know that Equality is not Inequality, it is necessary we possess the notion of the Equal independently from the perceptible experience;
5. there must therefore be something like the “Equal itself” and the soul must know it;
6. since we have begun to have experiences newborn, it follows that we assimilated the Equal before the birth;
7. thus, the soul existed before become incarnate.
Contrary to what some people think, SSA proves at the same time both the Forms and the recollection. It does not require neither.
I will argue that SSA is an Anti-nominalism argument. There are not only the “objects” we say “equal”, but also another “object”, the Equal itself, that the soul can know before birth. We can not abstract the notion of “Equal” from the things because none of them is really equal. But we are able to recognize the gap between the Equal, which is never unequal, and the things we call “equal”, which appear also unequal. The Equal is not the result of a processing of empirical data.
It is important to remark also that 75c7-d5 extends this consideration to everything that is “in itself” (Beauty, Good, Just, Holy...). It is not therefore the Equal qua Equal the focus of the Phaedo’s passage, but the Equal qua an “itself” case. Plato wants to show, through the case of the Equal, that the Forms exist and the soul knows them somehow (i.e. in such a way sufficient to note the gap). The Equal is an emblematic case of recollection because it shows the inability of experience to justify itself in a more evident way than other cases. But this applies to the Beauty and other cases too.
The secondary goal of my talk is to defend a non-problematic reading of the enormously controversial expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα at the lines 74c1-2: αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;. What is the meaning of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα? Is the question introduced by ἢ epexegetical or not? As to the first question, i.e. the meaning of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα, I believe that we should not assume that the expression alludes, for instance, to the base angles of an isosceles triangle (Burnet), or to the mathematical entities in general (Hackforth), or to a large class that includes Forms, mathematical entities, immanent properties and so on (Dimas), or that the plural is due to the fact that “Equal” is a relative notion (Geach), or again because according to Plato Forms like the Equal are of an internal relation between two or more symmetrically related items (Sedley). I think that the solution is much simpler. The expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα means “the Equal itself” or alludes to very generic “equals themselves” useful to the dialectical context, without any precise reference. There is no any grammatical reasons not to intend in this way. The neuter plural can be used to refer to singular entities. As the second point, i.e. the second question introduced by ἢ, I will argue it is epexegetical and it serves to highlight that this is the key of the whole argument
Οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου : Per una ricostruzione dell’argomento platonico che dimostra le idee dalla possibilità della conoscenza
No full textDa un esame congiunto di alcuni passi platonici (in part. Resp. V 476e4-477b11, Crat. 439b10-440c1 e Tim. 51d-52a) e di Aristotele (Metaph. Μ 4.1078b12-17 e De cael., III 1, 298b14-24) si argomenta che Platone ha adottato una prova dell’esistenza delle idee fondata sulla possibilità della conoscenza, intepretando in questo senso la filosofia di Parmenide. Tale argomento ha la forma del modus ponens: se la conoscenza è possibile, esistono le idee; la conoscenza è possibile; allora le idee esistono. L’argomento si espone al rischio di una petitio principii, ma Platone ritiene di avere buone ragioni per evitarlo
David Wolfsdorf, Trials of Reason. Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy, Oxford University Press 2008
No full textM.M Sassi, "Indagine su Socrate. Persona, filosofo, cittadino", Einaudi, Torino 2015, pp. 243
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